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Editor's Note:

This special issue, combining the issues of October, November and December, 2012 is dedicated to the Intelligence Bureau on completion of 125 years of its existence.

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From the Chairman, Editorial Board



One of the important departments of the government is the police force. In any civil society a sound and efficient police force is necessary for good governance. In India the police forces have been functioning on the basis of the Police Act of 1861 (Act V). Several provinces also enacted their own Police Acts, which have been modelled on the Central Police Act. The statute was created against the backdrop of the uprising of 1857, and had as its main objective the preservation of British rule in India.

Before the advent of the British, the system of governance in India had its genesis in the interregnum of Sher Shah Suri, the Afghan chieftain who defeated Humayun and ruled much of North India from 1539 to 1545. Sher Shah designated groups of villages as parganas, and these in turn formed larger units which were called sarkars, or revenue districts, each having a shiqqdar or revenue collector and a chief munsif, the leading judicial officer. Subsequently, the Mughals introduced some modifications in the titles, for instance 'nayabdiwan' in place of 'chief shiqqdar', and superimposed over the whole system a military veneer, appointing an officer of a certain specified rank in the military hierarchy of 'mansabdar'. Though this gave cohesiveness to the bureaucracy, during the inevitable reigns of weak rulers, the ties between the provinces and the imperial regime weakened.

The physical presence of the British in India was not significant, yet for almost two centuries the British were able to rule two-thirds of the subcontinent directly and exercise considerable leverage over the princely states that accounted for the rest of the country. Madras Presidency enacted the first Provincial Police Statute in 1859. Two years later, using the Madras legislation as a model, a central law called the Police Act of 1861 was created. It was framed against the backdrop of the uprising of 1857 and known as Act V, the police in the districts was placed under the control of the Collector and District Magistrate. The efficiency of the police force was reckoned by the manner in which it protected British interests, the zamindari, and the effectiveness with which it suppressed the aspirations of the people for self-governance.

Very early, the British realised the importance of collecting intelligence in a structured and organized manner. Lord Dufferin, then Viceroy of India, in a communication addressed to the Secretary of State for India on 15th November, 1887, submitted a proposal regarding collection of secret and political intelligence in India.

The secret internal note, since declassified, has been included in this issue and makes for interesting reading. It refers to a memorandum of 23rd July, 1887 on the formation of an Intelligence Department by Col. Henderson and Mr. D. McCracken and goes on to describe a two-pronged strategy of collecting political, social and religious intelligence through the police force deployed in the British India and through the instrument of the Political Officers assigned to native States. The approval to the Viceroy's proposal arrived through a dispatch dated 23rd December, 1887 and thus, was born the Intelligence Bureau.

Since independence, the Bureau has safeguarded the nation's interest effectively in a low profile manner befitting the nature of its assignment. While most on the outside will never know the achievements of this organisation, it should be possible for all to discern that the safety and the security of the country has indeed been well served by this important organ of the Government.

On the occasion of the 125th anniversary, the Bureau of Police Research and Development considers it a privilege to dedicate the current issue of the Indian Police Journal to the Intelligence Bureau.


(Kuldip Sharma)
Director General
BPR&D

From the Director's Desk



New Delhi, December 10, 2012

Over its 125 year history, the Intelligence Bureau has witnessed significant changes in the security landscape. There has been a multiplication of challenges and diversification of the quarters from which those emanate. Ability of subversive and disruptive elements to adopt technologies has added an edge to the threats that they pose. Amidst this changing scenario, the Intelligence Bureau has striven to live upto its charter, that of protecting the Constitution and ensuring national security. Besides, it continued to assist Government in policy formulation and in decision making processes.

Acutely conscious of the difficult tasks before it, the Intelligence Bureau visualises, in the 125th anniversary, an opportunity for introspection and reflection with the purpose of promoting higher levels of professional excellence amidst its members.

This would seem an appropriate juncture to acknowledge the unstinting support tendered so readily by members of Police Forces in the States and Union Territories and by officers and personnel of the Central Armed Police Forces. The togetherness that has been so realised promises to make for a more cohesive and comprehensive response to national security challenges.

I would like to express my gratitude to the Bureau of Police Research and Development, particularly the Director General of the Bureau and the Editor of the Indian Police Journal, for bringing out this Special Issue to mark the completion of 125 years of the Intelligence Bureau.


(Nehchal Sandhu)
Director

Introduction

When the Director, Intelligence Bureau asked me to take over the task of bringing out the special issue of Indian Police Journal, on the occasion of completion of 125 years of Intelligence Bureau, I instantly felt that I have come of age in the organization. The onerous task not only brought home the responsibility associated with it, but also the pride of having been chosen to do this project.

To bring together 125 years of an organization in itself is a mammoth task, and as I consulted my seniors and colleagues new insights and understandings about the organization gushed forth. Having decided to highlight the various facets of the organization through writings of those who have been, and are, an integral part of Intelligence Bureau and the National Security Architecture, the process became an opening of new doors to the world of Intelligence and Security. As I got more involved in the job at hand, I realized how much the Organization has shaped my world. Over the years, I have been compelled to reflect, to understand, to grow and to adapt, and this is exactly what Intelligence Bureau is all about. Through vigorous professional analysis, operations and prognosis it has gently shaped the destiny of the Nation, protecting it and steering it to safer harbours.

This issue of Indian Police Journal is about professionalism, commitment, adventure and emotions related to the Intelligence Bureau. It is about the mystique of the silent sentinels, and about the unknown and unsung bravehearts.

Putting together this issue was a journey, in which I grew as a professional and evolved as a human being.

I am truly blessed to be an instrument to bring together various facets of my Organization, and present them to all the stakeholders and readers for better understanding of the Intelligence Bureau and its history.



SHEEL VARDHAN SINGH
Joint Director, Intelligence Bureau
Special Editor

23rd December, 1887: The Journey begins.....

APPENDIX - A

No. 179 of 1887.

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA.

FOREIGN DEPARTMENT.

SECRET.
Internal.

To

THE RIGHT HON'BLE VISCOUNT CROSS, G.C.B.,
Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India.

Viceroy's Camp, the 15th November 1887.

MY LORD,

I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of Your Lordship's Secret Despatch No. 11, dated the 25th March last, regarding the collection of secret and political intelligence in India. As Your Lordship is aware the matter had been under consideration for some time before this despatch was received, and I had already brought it to Your Lordship's notice. Your Lordship now desires to be furnished with complete information as to the measures which I may have taken, or may have in contemplation, to secure the object in view. Your Lordship further asks me for any observations I may desire to offer with particular reference to the expediency of employing specially qualified natives in those parts of the Empire, notably the Punjab and Hyderabad, which are exceptionally exposed to political intrigues or dangers.

2. Until now the arrangements for the collection of secret and political intelligence have been, except perhaps in the Punjab, very imperfect, but I have now prepared a scheme which will, I hope, result in my obtaining much more systematic and complete information from all parts of India.

3. The papers enclosed* fully explain the nature of my proposals.

* (1) Memorandum on the formation of an Intelligence Department by Colonel Henderson and Mr. McCracken, dated the 23rd July 1887.

(2) Home Department Confidential Circular to Local Governments and Administrations, No. 371, dated the 1st October 1887, with enclosure.

(3) Foreign Department Circular to Chief Political Officers, No. 4702 I., dated the 29th October 1887.

(4) Foreign Department Circular to Local Governments and Administrations, No. 4703 I., dated the 20th October 1887.

Briefly I desire to utilize in British India the services of the Police force, and in Native States the existing means at the disposal of Political Officers, for the collection of intelligence on political, social and religious

movements, the nature of which is fully explained in the accompanying papers. Being of opinion that the formation of a large detective staff

would be open to very serious objections, I propose to work as far as possible through the Local Governments, imposing upon them the responsibility of collecting such intelligence as may be necessary for their own purposes and of reporting to the Government of India whatever it may be desirable for the latter to know. At the headquarters of the Government of India and of Local Governments I design to employ special agencies of the lowest possible strength consistent with the work of collecting and recording the intelligence received, and of initiating or conducting at the instance of the Government of India, such enquiries as may be necessary in special cases. I am convinced that the principle underlying this scheme is sound, and that a more extended employment of special and secret agents would lead to unsatisfactory results.

4. Your Lordship will observe that in the General Superintendent of Operations for the Suppression of Thuggee and Dacoity, I have an officer whose headquarters are with the Government of India, and who has always been employed in the collection of intelligence, and in enquiries of a confidential character. By the nature of his present duties, he is enabled, and indeed is obliged, to travel over the whole of India, including the Native States, and his movements attract no special attention. His office affords a convenient centre for the proposed organization, while his departmental work is not so heavy as to interfere with the duties assigned to him as the special agent of Government for Intelligence. I have therefore entrusted the supervision of the newly constituted "Special Branch" to the General Superintendent.

5. I propose to attach to his office as an Assistant an English Officer who has received a Police training. The officer I have selected is Mr. D. McCracken, an Officiating District Superintendent of Police, who has for some years had charge of the working of the "Special Branch" attached to the Office of the Inspector-General of Police in the Punjab. He has now 16 years' service and is at present drawing a salary of Rs. 700 per mensem. In consideration of the fact that he will be called on to be present at the headquarters of Government at Calcutta or Simla, and that during the absence of the General Superintendent of the Thuggee Department on tour, he will be obliged to conduct the responsible and confidential duties of the "Special Branch," I have fixed his salary at Rs. 800 per mensem. Having received a reply to my telegram, dated the 19th October, asking sanction to this appointment, I have now started the new organization.

6. The Native Attaché in the Foreign Department whose appointment was sanctioned in Your Lordship's Political Despatch No. 4 of the 20th January last will be for the present attached to the new "Special Branch," and I have sanctioned a small office establishment consisting of—

1 European Clerk on ...	Rs. 150 per mensem.
and 1 Native Inspector (maximum according to qualifications)	250
Total	400

The expense, therefore, of the "Special Branch" belonging to the Government of India will amount to Rs. 1,200 per mensem.

7. Until replies are received from Local Governments as to the strength of the establishment considered necessary by each I am unable to inform Your Lordship what will be the total cost of the scheme now sanctioned. The concluding paragraph of the enclosed memorandum, dated the 23rd July last, will show that the maximum expenditure which can be caused to devolve on the Imperial revenues is Rs. 37,200 per annum. This however does not include the pay of the European Assistant, which will raise the total to Rs. 46,800. I will in due course communicate to Your Lordship full information both as to the financial aspect and the practical working of the scheme, with a view to carrying out completely the instructions contained in Your Lordship's Despatch under reply.

I have the honor to be,

My Lord,

Your Lordship's most obedient, humble servant,

(Signed) DUFFERIN

No. 30.

Office Memo., No. 5138 I., dated Fort William, the 14th December 1887 (Confidential).

From—The Offg. Under-Secretary to the Government of India, Foreign Department,
To—The Home Department.

With reference to the endorsement from the Home Department No. 371 B., dated the 1st October 1887, the undersigned is directed to forward, for confidential record in the Home Department, a copy of the papers noted in the margin, regarding arrangements for the collection of secret and political intelligence.

Despatch from Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 11 (Secret), dated the 23th March 1887.
Despatch to Her Majesty's Secretary of State for India, No. 179, Secret-Internal, dated the 15th November 1887, and enclosure.

No. 31.

No. 31 (Secret), dated India Office, London, the 23rd December 1887 (Confidential).

From—The Secretary of State for India,
To—The Government of India.

I have considered Your Excellency's letter of the 15th November 1887 in the Foreign Department, No. 179, Secret-Internal, reporting the steps taken by Your Excellency's Government for improving the means of obtaining secret and political intelligence.

2. These steps appear to me to have been well considered, and have my full approval.

No. 422 I., dated Fort William, the 30th January 1888 (Confidential).

Endorsed by Foreign Department.

A copy of the foregoing despatch is forwarded to the Home Department, in continuation of the Foreign Department's Office Memo., No. 5138 I., dated the 14th December 1887.

From Her Majesty's Secretary of State, No. 31 Secret, dated the 23rd December 1887.




The IB insignia symbolises the quintessence of the organisation. It depicts the whole, which is bigger than the parts.

The outermost contour is octagonal in shape and symbolises multiplicity of directions and stands for the multi-dimensional responsibilities and tasks of the organisation. Contained within the octagon is a square resting on one of its corners, which is symbolic of the dynamic and progressive approach of the organisation. The wheel with 24 spokes, forming the inner core of the logo, is a replica of the “Dharma Chakra”, and stands for integrity and professionalism.

The motto ‘जागृतं अहर्निशं’ depicts the longstanding tradition within the Intelligence Bureau, which causes its personnel to remain alert always and put in their all in protecting and serving the Nation.




The Logo released on the completion of 125 years of Intelligence Bureau's existence, with sweeping colours of the national flag depicts diverse and dynamic India. Central to the National Security Architecture, the Intelligence Bureau has striven over one and a quarter century to protect the core values of this great Nation. The insignia of the Intelligence Bureau, cradled within the national colours, signifies the organisation's unwavering commitment to the preservation of the Constitution of India, and the country's security and integrity.



D. Pilditch ESQR, who was Director Intelligence Bureau between December 1939 to April 1945, being accorded farewell in 1935, after handing over charge as Superintendent of Police, Etawah



Helmsmen of the IB during the Pre-Independence Period



The image shows an open book with a list of names and dates on its pages. The text is written in a cursive font and is arranged in two columns, one on each page. The names are listed on the left page, and the corresponding dates are listed on the right page. The book is bound in the center, and the pages are slightly aged and yellowed.

<i>Mr. D.E. McCracken</i>	<i>January 1888 to April 1904</i>
<i>Mr. H.A. Stuart</i>	<i>April 1904 to April 1909</i>
<i>Mr. Stevenson Moore</i>	<i>May 1909 to January 1910</i>
<i>Sir C.R. Cleveland</i>	<i>February 1910 to September 1919</i>
<i>Col. Sir C. Kaye, CSI, CIE, OBE</i>	<i>October 1919 to October 1924</i>
<i>Sir David Petrie</i>	<i>October 1924 to March 1931</i>
<i>Sir Horace Williamson</i>	<i>April 1931 to March 1936</i>
<i>Sir J.M. Ewart</i>	<i>March 1936 to December 1939</i>
<i>Sir D. Pilditch</i>	<i>December 1939 to April 1945</i>
<i>Sir N.P.A. Smith</i>	<i>April 1945 to April 1947</i>

DIRECTORS, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU, SINCE 1947



SHRI T.G. SANJEEVI PILLAI, IP
(APR 12, 1947 TO JULY 14, 1950)



SHRI BHOLA NATH MULLICK, IP
(JULY 15, 1950 TO OCT 09, 1964)



SHRI S.P. VERMA, IP
(OCT 1964 TO JAN 1968)



SHRI M.M.L. HOOJA, IP
(JAN 1968 TO NOV 1971)



SHRI ATMA JAYARAM, IPS
(NOV 1971 TO AUG 1975)



SHRI S.N. MATHUR, IPS
(AUG 1975 TO FEB 1980)



SHRI T.V. RAJESWAR, IPS
(FEB 1980 TO AUG 1983)



SHRI R.K. KAPOOR, IPS
(AUG 1983 TO NOV 1984)



SHRI H.A. BARARI, IPS
(NOV 1984 TO MAR 1987)



SHRI M.K. NARAYANAN, IPS
(APR 1987 TO DEC 1989)
(JAN 1991 TO FEB 1992)



SHRI R.P. JOSHI, IPS
(DEC 1989 TO DEC 1990)



SHRI V.G. VAIDYA, IPS
(MAR 1992 TO JULY 1994)



SHRI D.C. PATHAK, IPS
(AUG 1994 TO AUG 1996)



SHRI ABHIJIT MITRA, IPS
(AUG 1996 TO SEP 1996)



SHRI ARUN BHAGAT, IPS
(SEP 1996 TO APR 1998)



SHRI SHAYAMAL DUTTA, IPS
(APR 1998 TO MAY 2001)



SHRI K.P. SINGH, IPS
(MAY 2001 TO JULY 2004)



SHRI A.K. DOVAL, IPS
(JULY 2004 TO JAN 2005)



SHRI E.S.L. NARASIMHAN, IPS
(FEB 2005 TO DEC 2006)



SHRI P.C. HALDAR, IPS
(JAN 2007 TO DEC 2008)



SHRI RAJIV MATHUR, IPS
(JAN 2009 TO DEC 2010)

*Line Drawings depicting the infamous
Thugs of India*



“Sleeman sahib ki jai”

“No Crime has been without a precedent”- Seneca

Shri Vijai Shukul, IPS (Retd.)


No, this is not from ‘Jai ho’ of A.R. Rehman, but a charming and entirely spontaneous expression of joy and affection coming from the villagers of Saleemnabad, a town 70 kms from Jabalpur on highway no. 7 towards Benaras. The occasion was visit of the grandson of Sir W.H. Sleeman, Col. James Lewis Sleeman, along with his son, on 6th February 1937. Col. J.L. Sleeman was accompanied by G.W. Benton, IP (Suptd Police, Jabalpur). In the year 1836-37, Sir William Sleeman, while touring Jabalpur district, had come across a village named Khoka, where he settled landless labourers by taking 96 acres of land from the Government as *Mauji-land*. In 1839, the village was named Saleemnabad after the name of its benefactor and a railway station of the same name stands close by. About half a mile from the village, there was a tiny hamlet, where, a holy man of Krishna order, named Baba Haridas lived. Sleeman had already been married for four years and had no children. While passing *Khoka*, Baba Haridas remarked that it was a holy place and all who came here would be blessed with a son. Sleeman jokingly promised, that if his prophecy came true, he would present the village with a large sum of money. The prophecy did come true, as Sleeman a year later, while camping at a village in Sagar, was blessed with a son. Sleeman, not forgetting his promise, donated a large sum of money to the village. Haridas by that time had died and a shrine was made in his memory. To perpetuate the memory of the founder and the benefactor of the village, a brass lamp was placed in the memory of Sleeman, which continues to remain lit since last 150 years. Two ladies of the Sleeman family, out of curiosity, visited Khoka in recent years and were also blessed with sons within a year. The Sleeman family has, thus, continued its association with Saleemnabad.

During his visit Col. James Sleeman was taken out in a procession through triumphal arches and streets lined with buntings. Village ladies with shining bright brass ‘*Lotas*’, followed singing. The affection showered was for a man whom they revered as ‘*Baba Sleeman*’. Under a huge shamiana, the village elders presented Col. James Sleeman with two memoranda. In the words of Col. James Sleeman, “for where else in the world today would one find such generous expression of gratitude for services rendered over a century ago”. Col. James L. Sleeman also visited the shrine of Baba Haridas to pay his obeisance, and the old police station building, designed by his grand father and constructed under his direction in 1843. The whole visit to Saleemnabad was like a page from the Arabian Nights, so wrote Col. James Lewis Sleeman.

On 8th February 1937, Col. James Sleeman visited the Court House at Jabalpur, where Sleeman senior had tried more than 2000 Thugs. He was intrigued by the stone pedestal upon which the Thugs were made to sit during his grandfather's searching interrogations, with lights of three windows directly upon them. He also met a 92 yrs old Thug, a Kanjar, whom Sleeman had tried and was liberated at the age of 74. An acre of land was given to settle the descendants of the Thugs, which is today called the Kanjar mohalla, it is also called ‘*Gurandi*’ from the Persian word ‘*Goyanda*’, which means, one who speaks, that is an approver.

Col. James Sleeman also visited the site of the old jail, which no longer exists and the reformatory school called the *Darikhana* or the School of Industry, presently with the Home Guards, Jabalpur. There he met the descendants of the Thugs. A plaque is still embedded on the wall of the building to commemorate the founding of

the Jabalpur School of Industry in 1836, which Sleeman had started from his own funds, in anticipation of government sanction.



Plaque showing inauguration of Jabalpur School of Industry, founded by Sir W H Sleeman

To write about Sir William Sleeman would be to write about the Old Central Provinces, or today's Madhya Pradesh, and earlier Sagour and Nerbudda territories, which had become the '*Karam-bhoomi*' of Sleeman. It would be appropriate to write about 'Thuggee Sleeman' and the Thuggee lore, by mentioning the romantic side of Sleeman's exploits with the Thugs and their sinister style of murder, besides writing about the titanic task of suppression of the centuries old evil of Thuggee and Dacoities. These were very systematically and painstakingly penned by Sleeman in his own hand through innumerable reports and letters to the Government of East India Company.

As a Policeman, Sir Sleeman was the greatest the world has ever seen. A Police officer who, in words of Sir Francis Toker, had done:

Quote "more than any man had ever done before and more than any man was likely to do for generations after he had gone." Unquote

Though Sleeman had many feathers in his cap as a soldier, a linguist, an administrator, an agriculturist, but he will be remembered most as a police man. In hours of crisis, Sleeman was sent by providence, not only to give a new orientation to police work, but also to foresee and lay the foundation of the police force to meet future needs of the country. He, as a leader, had exceptional qualities like the ability to gather

evidence and to educate the people, especially those wielding legal and political authority, to enlist the aid of good men to uproot and destroy the conspiratorial organization. He had the full backing of the Governor General Bentick, and loyalty of valiant sepoy and nujeebs in his employ, whose courage Sleeman often praised.

In order to understand the full impact of Sleeman's contribution in building and laying the foundation of the present police force in India, it is necessary to mention, in brief, his life and career in India. His faith in prevention, detection and successful prosecution became the hallmark of policing in India. Analytical reports of great depth, as a result of interrogation of the Thugs and Dacoits, informers and approvers, highlighted the modus operandi, their origin and field of operation. This was the beginning of the modus operandi system, later adopted by the Police forces to detect crimes. As a result of painstaking touring of villages and interaction with the villagers about their society, culture and problems and immediate redressal of their grievances, he created an atmosphere of trust and confidence. The above not only showed the way to the Reforms Commissions of 1861 and 1904, but also paved the way for the creation of a separate department to deal with special types of organized crime. Sleeman believed that extra ordinary crimes needed extra ordinary measures, and provoked the government to enact special laws to deal with them. His reports on the *Badhak* dacoits led to the enactment of Act XXX 1836 and later the Criminal Tribes Act of 1878.

Born in Cornwall in 1778, Sleeman had prepared himself to become a soldier but destiny finally made him a civil servant and a police officer. He learnt French, German, Latin and Greek literature. He studied the campaigns of Greek and Roman Emperors and political and economic history of the world. Unable to acquire a Commission, he joined the Bengal Army, in 1808, at the age of 20 years. He also learned Arabic, Persian, Urdu and Hindustani, and in October 1809, landed at the Hoogly Harbour.

Sleeman was a good shot and a good rider and on his Colonel's advice, kept away from women and drinks. While in the Army, Sleeman missed no opportunity to mix with the villagers to know

their life and their problems related to agriculture and the revenue system. He could freely converse with the villagers in Hindustani, and had a great passion for history and old records and documents. Going through the old records, he came across the accounts of Thugs, as mentioned by Ziya-uddin Barni's history of Ferozshah, written in 1356 and the French traveler Thevenot, in the 14th Century. With this, his thirst to know about these types of criminals, their origin, field of operation and their modus operandi, increased. He noticed that many of the sepoys going on leave did not return for duty. This aroused his suspicion. One Robert C. Sherwood of the Madras Medical Corps, had written an article in the Madras Literary Gazette on the *Phansigars* (the stranglers), operating in South India, which confirmed Sleeman's suspicion of the existence of Thuggee all over India. He could connect Thevenot's criminals of north to the Phansigars mentioned by Sherwood. Yet the Army officers dismissed the disappearance of sepoys, as routine happenings and were not interested in research, calling it as Sleeman's obsession.

At Allahabad, Sleeman was totally disillusioned with the Army life and applied for the post of a language teacher but was advised to join the Political Service. In December 1819, Sleeman got a chance of his lifetime when he was appointed as Assistant to the political agent of the Governor General at Sagar. He felt that it was God's will that he use all his energies to promote the good of those who would come under him. Sleeman had finally come to his '*Karam-bhoomi*' where he spent three-fourth of his career of 47 years, with brief spells at Jhansi, Moradabad and Lucknow.

In March 1820, Sleeman was attached to the office of the Political Agent at Jabalpur to learn revenue and police work. While at Jabalpur, Sleeman doggedly continued his investigations about the Thugs. Between 1820 and 1830, the chips were in favour of the Thugs. The biggest hurdle was the *laissez-faire* policy of the East India Company, to keep away from all matters of religious, social and cultural practices in India. Though Thuggee had been exposed by Sherwood in a detailed article in the Madras Literary Gazette in 1815, the existence of Thuggee was not officially acknowledged. Magistrates in

various areas under the company had caught Thugs before 1810, but they went unpunished due to the judges mistaken idea of transplanting principles of criminal jurisprudence of England to India, which were not suitable to deal with organized crime like Thuggee. The connivance of native states and the zamindars, distances between the scenes of crime, places of arrest and places of trials, security of the witnesses and discouragement to informers, who were often charged with perjury by the judges, were the main hurdles. Despite these shortcomings, Sleeman continued to investigate Thuggee cases to find out the areas of operation, their origin, hereditary ties and modus operandi. He started building up his own records of the criminals. He found the police system thoroughly corrupt, inefficient and inadequate.

About the Thanedars he wrote, "who can suppose that men so inadequately paid, who have no promotion to look forward to, and feel no security in their tenure of office, and consequently, no hope of provision for old age, will be zealous and honest in the discharge of their duties?" He felt that if the government kept the above considerations in mind for European public servants, why were the same principles not applied to native police officers. He further wrote that "the magistrate of the district gets a salary from 2000 to 2500 rupees a month, the native officer, next under him is the Thanedar or the head native police of the sub division of his district, containing many towns and villages, with a population of a 100 thousand souls. This officer gets a salary of 25 rupees a month and the people, seeing how much is expected from the Thanedars and how little is given to them, submit to his demands for contributions without a murmur and consider favourably almost any demand coming from a man so employed and so paid". He also suggested, in much detail, ways to remove obstacles in the way of prosecution of cases, conviction of offenders and delay in justice. Sleeman was in favour of bringing the un-covenanted services at par with covenanted services. His emphasis was on supervision and touring.

In 1822, Sleeman was given independent charge of Narsinghpur district, about 70 kms from Jabalpur.

There, through intensive touring and interaction with the villagers, he protected them from the 'Zulum' of the administration, by prompt redressal of grievances and thereby earned the good will of the people. His report to the government on agriculture, horticulture, administration and trade were favourably commented upon by the Board of Directors. He showed how dangerous it was to run the show, sitting at the district and subdivision headquarters and thus laid the foundation of 'tent-touring' and its benefits for the future civil and the police officers. Humane treatment of prisoners and their families earned him the trust and good will which helped him in later years in his battle against the Thugs and dacoits and also set an example for jail reforms. It was again at Narsinghpur that he came to know, in 1831, that a gang of Thugs lived not even 400 yards from his *Cutchery* (Court), and that the groves of Mundesur, some 12 miles off Narsinghpur, was one of the greatest 'Beles' or places of slaughter in India. While at Narsinghpur, he also got a taste of the *Badhak* dacoits after they successfully committed a bold dacoity, hardly a few paces from the police chowki, after very cleverly duping the check-post staff and disappearing in thin air. Sleeman did not sit quiet after this affair and started investigations regarding the *Badhak* dacoits. In later years, when he was appointed to deal with them, Sleeman already had collected ample record.

In 1824, Sleeman was promoted as Captain, and due to ill-health went on leave to the South seas and the Mauritius island. On coming back in 1825, he was temporarily attached to Jabalpur to help Molonny, his senior who gave him some court work to do. It was at Jabalpur that Sleeman made a thorough study of the Thugs, with the help of one Kalyan Singh, an ex-convict, whom he had once helped. Kalyan Singh, of his own accord informed and exposed a gang of thirty Thugs, who had been released, as the huge stolen property could not be traced to their owners. Moti, Kalyan's brother turned an approver and on his information, 27 bodies were recovered, just a few miles from Jabalpur town. Moti was spared and others were tried and convicted. Till that time, no special laws had been made to convict the accused on the basis of information

of the approvers. Act XXX 1836 had not been enacted and Sleeman taking advantage of the non-regulatory territory, applied its laws freely. Moti taught Sleeman the secret language of the Thugs, the 'Ramasee'. Documents related to Thug dialect were circulated through out Central India, which were of great help in investigations. At Jabalpur, Sleeman personally interrogated, and cross-examined Thugs and recorded their statements in his own hand. He created informers and approvers by releasing them on the condition that they help him in catching other criminals. By that time he had collected enough information and material for his book "Ramaseena", giving graphic description of the origin of and the language of the Thugs. Till then no officer had attempted such an independent study. Sleeman continued to send reports to the government along with suggestions and steps to combat this form of crime. By this time Sleeman had come to the conclusion that Thuggee was like a big tree with branches, trunk and roots and that with patience and creation of genealogical tree of the Thugs, the root could be cut, by which the whole tree trunk and branches would come down. He also learnt about the revenge of Thugs against informers and approvers. It was Moti, the Thug, who suggested setting up of reformatories for the Thug approvers and informers and their families, thereby providing them with useful employment, security and prevent *recidivism*. Open settlements were created at Sagar and Jabalpur which grew into big villages. The *Kanjar mohalla* called Gurandi is still there in Jabalpur. It was at Jabalpur that Sleeman took a bold decision to open a reformatory out of his own funds. 'The School of Industry', as it was called, did good work in making various arts and crafts like blankets, cotton dures, niwars, woollen carpets, bricks, baskets, etc. They were marketed locally and to the government offices. Good money was earned by this honest profession by the Thugs. On a request by Queen Victoria, a carpet measuring 40'x80', weighing 2 tons, was successfully made for use in the Windsor Castle. The above experiment was in later years followed in various ways. The salvation army started its camp at Moradabad for the *Bhatu* criminal tribes to which the notorious dacoit, Sultana belonged.

Settling down of criminal tribes was taken up by the native States and a *Mogia* department was created in the old Holkar, Scindia and Bhopal states of Madhya Bharat. Recently, open jail was created for the surrendered dacoits of Chambal and Bundelkhand regions at Mugawali in district Ashoknagar. Today, jails all over the country are running artisan workshops of all kinds and are termed as correctional institutions, a principle put in practice nearly 175 years earlier by Sleeman.

In 1928, while holding civil and executive charge at Jabalpur, Sleeman was given a residence near the parade ground. The house and the park was destroyed in 1870 when a railway line was laid at the site. As Commissioner Jabalpur, Sleeman stayed and lived in style, in a huge mansion built in 1821, called the Commissioner's Residency, which today is the residence of the Revenue Commissioner, Jabalpur. It was here he wrote 'Rambles and the Recollections of an Indian Officer'. Under the main hall, there still exists a huge cellar which has not been opened since a long time.

In 1828, Sleeman found his life companion Amelie Josephine, a French nobleman's daughter, who

had escaped the French revolution and settled in Mauritius. But it was at Jabalpur that he met her, and was married on 21st June, 1829, by licence, at the political residency by T. H. Maddock, agent to the Governor General. To commemorate his marriage Sleeman got an impressive 86 mile long avenue planted on the Jabalpur-Benaras road and on the Jabalpur-Narsinghpur road. The road side trees lasted for more than 100 years. One can still see some old trees on these roads.

The year 1828 was lucky for Sleeman as 'Do Nothing' Lord Amherst was replaced by 'Go Forward' Lord Bentinck. Earlier, in 1826, Sleeman had already been given the additional charge of tackling and coordinating Thuggee crimes over a large area. Bentinck was impressed with the reports of Sleeman and opposition by his brother officers withered. Those who had scoffed at Sleeman's single-handed operation, started co-operating. If the Thugs considered it a duty ordained by 'kali' to kill, so Sleeman thought it his duty ordained by God to exterminate the Thugs. Sleeman was trying to reach to the roots of the Thuggee tree and cut it. More than half a century before Frazer commission recommended a number register for the police station, as a part of police records

General William Henry Sleeman



Amelie Josephine



of the criminals, Sleeman had already created a methodology based on history sheets, gang history sheets, village crime note books, conviction register, etc. and used them against the Thugs and Dacoits. In 1829, Sleeman sent a report to Curween Smith, agent to Governor General at Sagar, to be forwarded to the Government. It proposed a need for a more efficient police establishment, and the creation of out-posts along roads. Besides physical measures, he mentioned that the existing judicial system was inadequate to deal with the challenge, and that only with the evidence of the approvers and informers, was conviction possible. As Thugs living in native states enjoyed immunity, he recommended their trials at one place. In August 1830, Bentinck accepted the recommendations, ordering liberal rewards to informers and branding of convicted Thugs on their back. The finger print system had not come in vogue. The practice to employ spies as an extra ordinary measure to deal with extra ordinary crimes like Thuggee, was suggested in 1810 by O. W. Steer, who was Assistant to the Magistrate of Etawah. The Government approved of the use of spies as suggested by Steer, acknowledging that it was a necessity in Police work. The expenses for the pay of spies was to be listed under the heading 'Secret Service'. Bentinck impressed by the report asked for a master plan. Sleeman prepared a blue print, namely, a 'Plan' for the eventual destruction of the association of Thugs infesting central India. For some reason Smith, the agent to the Governor General delayed forwarding the Plan to Bentinck. Sleeman resorted to an un-orthodox method to expose Thuggee to the public eye. On 3rd October, 1830, Calcutta Gazette published an article anonymously sent by Sleeman, exposing the gruesome deeds of Thugs. People in Calcutta were shocked. Bentinck immediately agreed for the creation of a separate department with Sleeman as its first Superintendent. After 10 yrs of hard labour, Sleeman's course was set, with extra powers and resources at his disposal to destroy the secret societies of the Thugs.

Act XXX of 1836 made convictions possible, even for association with the Thug gangs. This legal *carte-blanche* was extended to all the British provinces. In the meantime, Sleeman worked on

two projects, one to complete genealogical table by removing discrepancies, by cross checking with police and revenue records. With it, the entire hereditary tree of the Thugs was completed. The second project was the completion of his book, the secret language of the Thugs 'Ramaseena', for the benefit of the investigating officers to identify the Thugs in public places.

In 1835, to coordinate and collate records of over a dozen offices of superintendents, working all over the country, a post of General Superintendent was created and Sleeman was the first choice. By then he had been promoted as a Major with Headquarters at Jabalpur, to concentrate solely on Thuggee operations. This was the first attempt by a Central authority to collate and disseminate Intelligence to all field officers. It goes to the credit of Sleeman that he laid the foundation of the present Intelligence Bureau, as a constitutional body, as per VII schedule of Indian Constitution. A small cell for a "Special Branch" was established in 1887, as by that time the Thuggee and Dacoity department had more or less ceased to exist. In 1904, on Frazer Commission's recommendations, a Central Criminal Intelligence Department, under an IG was created, in line with the provincial CID to collect, collate and communicate information, under condition of frank and cordial cooperation, between the Centre and the provinces, without taking away the responsibilities of the local Government. Later the word criminal was deleted and thereafter the bulk of the Intelligence collected was no longer related to criminal activities only.

In 1835, due to deterioration of his health, Sleeman was reluctantly granted leave but was reappointed as General Superintendent in 1836. After dealing with the river Thugs of Bengal, Sleeman, in 1838 would proudly report that from 1829 to 1837, the total number of Thugs tried were 3266. The massive conviction bears testimony to the high standard of evidence collected by Sleeman before he sent any person for trial. Though subdued activities continued in the native states and the Punjab, the trunk of the Thug fraternity had been destroyed. It was only a question of time before the branches would also

perish. Between 1841 and 1848, another 514 Thugs had been convicted. Thuggee ceased to exist after 1848. In the Central provinces Thugs remained a column in the annual crime statistics upto the year 1900. In 1904, only 2 cases were reported in India.

Though Sleeman was nicknamed 'Thuggee Sleeman', it would also be more appropriate to call him 'Thuggee and Dacoity Sleeman'. For in the year 1839, another feather was added to his cap. He was to face another challenge for which he was well prepared. Sleeman was now made Commissioner, in addition to his job as Superintendent of the Thuggee Department. The new department came to be known as the "Department for the suppression of Thuggee and Dakaity". Sleeman shifted his headquarters from Jabalpur to Moradabad. In the year 1839, there were wide spread depredation by *Badhak* dacoits in Northern India, from Jamuna to Kosi, and from Himalayas to Narmada. There was terror and fear amongst the people, 'no one seemed to know from whence they came and whence they fled'. Treasuries of native Collectors had to be fortified. The *Badhaks* were well organized, numbering upto 10,000 dacoits in the region. Sleeman had already had a taste of *Badhaks* at Narsinghpur in 1824, and since then, besides investigating Thugs, he was also investigating the *Badhak* dacoits. Sleeman immediately went into action against the dacoits and adopted the same tactics, as he had done against the Thugs, including reformatory measures. He set up a colony for the dacoits named *Badhakpura* at Moradabad. Sleeman had to adopt harsh measures against the dacoits due to the organized and deceptive ways of the *Badhaks*. Army was called out against them. One Mangal Singh in Oudh area and Gajraj Singh in Chambal area of Gwalior, Dholpur and Alwar had created a reign of terror. The Sarafa of Jhansi, Peshwas palace at Bhithur, Kanpur and several other big and small towns were looted and ransacked. In the Central Province, the towns of Narsinghpur, Hoshangabad and Sohagpur were also looted. Enroute, no treasury was safe from these dacoits. Sleeman fell on the *Badhaks* like a tornado and by 1842, all major gangs and their members were either arrested, killed or had surrendered. By comparison, it is

realized that in the same Chambal region, twelve to thirteen Battalions of Special Armed forces of MP, UP and Rajasthan had been engaged for over twenty years since 1951, till the surrender of the 23 listed gangs of Madhya Pradesh, in 1972. In fighting the descendants of the *Badhak* gangs, Sleeman's achievement in two years stands out in bold contrast. Sleeman's strength lay in the intelligence collected with meticulous care and of very high standard of accuracy, before he struck against the gangs.

It was at district Sagar in the year 1973, while investigating a case of dacoity, I came across a report on 'Budhuk @ Bagree Decoits and Other Gang Robbers' and on the measures adopted by the Government of India for their suppression by Lt. Col. W H Sleeman. Although the report was sent to the press in 1840, the Governor General, Lord Auckland felt that the proper time for its publication had not arrived. It is believed that the report, which highlighted the existence of hereditary gangs of robbers and dacoits and their depredations would show the East-India company in a bad light before the English Parliament and the Crown. It was finally published in 1849. Sleeman, in a forwarding letter to H. M. Elliot, Secretary to the Government of India, had opined that this was the last elaborate report on crime in India. Sleeman was correct, because after Sleeman, to this day, no person or organization in India, connected to crime, has ever come out with such a report. It goes to the credit of the Intelligence Bureau that after Independence, it published a "Report on the Criminal Activities on Inter-State Gangs of *Bawarias*". Sleeman had the advantage of being familiar with acts, thoughts and feelings of persons involved in crime. He had foresight, and he expressed his apprehension that though Thuggee had been suppressed, it was sure to rise again, if the police was negligent. The report was an eye opener for me, which set me on my course in Police career to study the Criminal Tribes.

As a reward, Sleeman was first given an additional charge to look into the affairs of Gwalior State, which was in bad shape. He superseded Cavindich, the Resident at Gwalior who was a friend of Bentinck. Sleeman made Jhansi his

headquarters where he built a house. He had become Lt. Colonel by now. His next promotion was that of Resident of Oudh at Lucknow, in the year 1849. Sleeman had found both Gwalior and Oudh badly governed and found King Wajid Ali of Oudh, an incorrigible ruler. He took strong measures to clean the Augean stables. Sleeman, from day one, was never in favour of annexing Gwalior or Oudh. Lord Hardings, and later Bentinck had already made up their mind to do so. All the pleadings of Sleeman fell on deaf ears. His strong views on the annexation policy show what diplomatic and administrative foresight and acumen Sleeman was gifted with. He had warned that since in the Bengal Army most of the recruits belonged to the Oudh area, they would rebel in case of annexation. Sleeman was of the view of not adding areas of native States, as "they were back waters, with clan loyalty. People did not want the ruler to be disposed off by an alien power, even though he was a bad ruler". Sleeman was apprehensive that with the Indian States gone, mal-administration would go to the company's credit and would result in full scale rebellion, leading to blood shed and sufferings. Sleeman's principle in dealing with Indian states was to do all the good he could, but allow it to appear as if the initiative came from the Darbar. They were sound principles, which were not accepted. He wrote, "to confiscate would be dishonest and dishonorable. To annex would be to give people, a government almost as bad as their own".

Sleeman was a public servant in the true sense of the word. He was accessible to all and sundry and provided immediate relief to grievances. Subordinate officers were proud of their boss, who by now had acquired the reputation of being one of the ablest administrator and police officer in the whole country. In 1851, Sleeman was made a full Colonel and in 1852, a Major General. By 1855, Sleeman was almost crippled due to rheumatic and malarial fever and found it difficult to carry on. He wanted to go back to England and retire. On Jan 24, 1856 Sleeman along with his wife Amelie boarded the boat at Hoogly. He was informed at Calcutta that he was being recommended for the "Civil Cross of

Knight Commander of Bath". On 5th February 1856, Queen Victoria appointed Major General Sleeman to the most Honorable order of Bath. However, this news did not reach him at sea. His end came on 10th February 1856, on board, and Sleeman was buried at sea off the Coast of Ceylon.

It would be unfair on my part, not to mention as to how Sleeman had become a hero in the late 19th century and beyond. After the publication of Col. Philip Meadow Taylors "Confessions of a Thug", the Thuggee lore became a literary subject in the West. The Thugs captured the Victorian romantic imagination. Books like Eugene Sue's "The Wandering Jew" became the best selling book of the century. Pictorial and sculptural depiction of Thugs in action also became popular souvenirs and old Thug prisoners were paraded and made to stage their former deeds in front of thrilled tourists, including the Prince of Wales, who in 1877, allowed an old Thug to 'strangle' his arms in order to feel the method of strangulation himself. Besides, popular works like Francis Toker's "The Yellow Scarf" (1963) and George Bruce's "The Straglers" (1966) made Sleeman a hero. Also, writers like Russels, Hiralal, Mike Dash, Robert Johnson and Kim Wagner came out with excellent material on Sleeman.

If such was the popularity of Sleeman after more than 150 years, how could the Police officers all over the country and especially those of Central Provinces, present Madhya Pradesh, whose proximity to Sleeman's 'Karam Bhoomi' in the districts of Jabalpur, Sagar and Narsinghpur, remain unaffected. They were very close to Sleemans Thuggee and Dacoity legends and also to the first and second generation of the Thug descendants living in Jabalpur. No doubt Sleeman became a role model for Police officers, who contributed in no small measure towards Intelligence based investigation; analytical reports based on crime records and field touring; building of records of criminal 'denotified Tribes'; publication and dissemination of criminal gazette; and above all leadership of a very high order.

In conclusion, I would like to recommend that young officers and new entrants to police service devote sometime to the voluminous reports and records penned by Sleeman in his own hand, and that Sleeman is made a subject of research and studies at police academies all over the country. The Sleeman Library, which was

shifted from Shivpuri to Delhi, should not only be a repository of old books and records, but also a centre of study for young police officers. This will go a long way to create a culture of real policing and provide the much needed upright and moral leadership to the Police force, to take it forward.



Drawing of Thugs by Capt. Patton, who served under Sleeman in Lucknow.

Growth of Intelligence Institutions in British India

Shri Amiya K. Samanta, IPS (Retd.)

Intelligence gathering is an ancient profession which can claim scriptural authority from the earliest literature – the *Rig-Veda*, which records: “As the wind moves everywhere and penetrates all created beings, so also should the king penetrate everywhere, by the means of his mysterious agents.”¹ In the West too, engagement of spies has scriptural sanction. The Lord instructed Moses to send secret agents “to spy out the land of Cannan and give him valuable advice on the intelligence recruitment.”² In the ancient and medieval periods, the engagement and deployment of spies and informers was by and large personalised; an institutionalised intelligence system grew up only with the growth of the apparatus of a modern state.

1. POLITICAL SETTING AND ADMINISTRATIVE NEEDS

In the first half of the 19th century, the Company's Government in India came to possess immense “power-knowledge” from the reports and write-ups on trade and commerce, socio-economic and religious practices and various other matters. Such ‘power-knowledge’ became useful in formulating policies on education, social reform, land revenue etc., but had little to do with security. Since army was the mainstay of British rule, threat to security, both internal and external was largely taken care of by it. After the First War of Indian Independence in 1857, the Government had realized that India could not be ruled by the sword alone. Though the administration continued to suffer from the “Mutiny Complex” for several decades, the institution of a modern state, with justice and individual liberty as a cornerstone, started emerging after the Queen's Proclamation of 1858.

While the Indian Council Act of 1861 contained the ideas of representative government and provincial autonomy in seminal form, the new Penal Code (1861), Criminal Procedure Code (1868), Evidence Act (1872) and the Police Act (1861), set up a criminal justice system in which the ideas of justice and equality were ingrained. Thus, under the direct rule of the British Crown with ultimate authority vested in the Parliament, India started emerging as a modern state.

In the 1860s, when the Wahabi movement broke out, followed by the Hindu revivalist movement, the Government's anxiety about a possible connection between religious revivalism and political unrest increased. The British rulers, infected by “Mutiny Complex” suspected every religious movement as preparation for political uprising. Though the Wahabi movement in India, created little more than some low-key disturbances in Bengal,³ Bihar, Punjab and the North West Frontier Province, yet the bogey of Muslim uprising in India, or the rebellion of the fiercely independent frontier tribes under Wahabi influence, haunted the British. In dealing with the Wahabis, the concept of ‘sedition’ was introduced in criminal jurisprudence by adding section 124A to the Indian Penal Code.

But the Indian nationalism, which eventually ended the British rule, was slowly gathering strength. Hollowness of the British claim to the introduction of a system of justice, equity and individual liberty in India, was exposed when the Arms Act of 1876, dispossessed Indians of fire arms for self-defense, the Vernacular Press Act of 1878, restricted publication of newspapers in Indian languages, the Ilbert Bill of 1883, seeking to abolish the trial of Anglo-Indian by judges of their

1 S.D. Trivedi : Secret Services in Ancient India: Techniques and Operations. New Delhi, 1988, P.23

2 Christopher Andrews: Her Majesty's Secret Service, P.1

3 In Bengal the rebellion of Titu Mir was a Wahabi upsurge. He defied the British authority, but was eventually defeated by the army.

own race alone, had to be withdrawn in the face of strong opposition from the racist Europeans. In this context, in 1877, Surendra Nath Banerji's stirring "lectures in English, in upper India assumed the character of a triumphant progress" and they "excited as much enthusiasm among the rising generation in Multan as in Delhi."⁴ The top level of the Government did not have much clue about the depth of resentment amongst the educated section of the society.

When one Wahabi convict assassinated Viceroy Mayo in the Andaman jail in 1872, Viceroy Northbrook (1872-1876) felt the need for "a detective police for political purposes" and asked the Thuggee and Dakaiti Department to take up the job.

Viceroy Lytton (1876-1880), aware of the inadequacies of Indian intelligence, felt that he had, "no Special Officer whose duty requires him to receive and to submit to the head of the Government, confidential and secret information of political and military importance."⁵ Northbrook's experiment evidently had failed. Lytton's advice to the Local Governments, to adopt the experiment of 'Special Branch', set up in 1876 in Punjab⁶, was not followed. Viceroy Ripon (1880-1884) had a consensual approach to the problems of administration. "We cannot now rely on military force alone; policy as well as justice ought to prompt our endeavour to govern more and more by means of, and in accordance with, the growing public opinion, which is beginning to show itself throughout the country."⁷ Evidently Ripon implied that the Government should keep track of the public opinion in India through an alternative method.

2. AN INSTITUTION FOR INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION

Eventually, after the formation of the Indian National Congress in December 1885, the Secretary of State addressed his secret despatch

4 Henry Cotton wrote this in his book "New India" referred to this tour. See S.N.Banerji's "A Nation in Making," Pp59-60

5 Amiya K. Samanta: History of Intelligence in Modern India, (Restricted circulation) P.35

6 This was mentioned in an enclosure to Dufferin's letter to Lord Cross dated 15th November, 1887.

7 Judith M. Brown: Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy, P. 100.

No.11, dated 25th March, 1887, on the subject of 'collection of secret and political intelligence in India'. After consulting the Governors and top officials of the Presidencies, Viceroy Dufferin (1884-1888) wrote to the Secretary of State: "I desire to utilise in British India, the services of the Police force, and in Native States, the existing means at the disposal of Political Officers, for collection of intelligence on political, social and religious movements." Dufferin then gave out the details of his scheme. "Being of opinion that the formation of a large detective staff would be open to very serious objections, I propose to work as far as possible, through the Local Governments, imposing on them the responsibility of collecting such intelligence as may be necessary for their own purposes and of reporting to Government of India, whatever may be desirable for the latter to know. At the headquarters of the Government of India and the Local Governments, I desire to employ special agencies of the lowest possible strength, consistent with the work of collecting and recording intelligence received, and of initiating and conducting at the instance of the Government of India, such enquiries as may be necessary in special cases." Dufferin's secret despatch had, thus, broadly divided the responsibilities of the proposed Central and the Provincial Special Branches, and also laid down the roles of the Central and the Local Governments, with regard to the Central and the Local outfits. The provincial Special Branches would remain under the control of the Local Government but it would be obligatory on their part to share all relevant intelligence with the Central Special Branch.

To curtail the cost, Dufferin suggested the use of the office and the manpower of the Thuggee and Dakaiti Department as a launching pad. "The privileges and facilities that the Department had acquired over the years should be shared." The General Superintendent of the Department was entrusted with "the supervision of the newly constituted "Special Branch."⁸

The financial commitment of the Government would be Rs 46,800 per annum. Dufferin selected D McCracken, an officer of the Punjab Cadre, to head the Central Special Branch,

8 The name was apparently taken from the Special Branch of Metropolitan Police, London.

and he "will be called on to be present at the headquarters of the Government at Calcutta or Simla, and that during the absence of the General Superintendent of the Thuggee Department on tour, he will be obliged to conduct the responsibilities and confidentialities of the Special Branch". Its headquarters would be at Simla, but the Chief of the Special Branch was to remain present at Calcutta, when required. Thus, the premier intelligence agency of the sub-continent⁹ came into existence officially on 23rd December, 1887, when the Secretary of State approved the proposal "for improving the means of obtaining secret and political intelligence"¹⁰.

Two pertinent questions, related to the setting up of the institution for collection of secret political intelligence, may be briefly touched upon here. It has often been contended that "Victorian statesmen held espionage in absolute abhorrence,"¹¹ and so the people at the top echelons of the administration in England, as also in India, were not in favour of setting up an institutionalised intelligence system, lest the Government of India should earn the opprobrium of being despotic. But such scruples were not in evidence in the accounts of the Crimean War (1856), the annexation of Oudh, and the first war of Indian independence, 1857, when spies were recruited and used rampantly by the regiments and administrative officers.¹²

Thus, the so-called Victorian aversion to secret police or spy system appears to be a myth. There was, however, genuine apprehension in the Government, that the liberal democratic system might be stigmatised for too much reliance on secret service and the administration might be branded as despotic. Writing to Lord Cross on 15th November, 1887, Dufferin underscored the secrecy of the communications, as "it would not

do for the native press to get it into their heads, that we were about to establish a *Third Section* after the Russian pattern."¹³

The second issue is, whether the establishment of a permanent institution for collection of secret political intelligence, in December 1887, was related to the foundation of the Indian National Congress in December, 1885. The Congress was claimed to have been founded by an Englishman, named Allan Octavian Hume (1829-1912)¹⁴, in consultation with high British officials, including Lord Dufferin. It was later on alleged that Hume, though a founder of the Congress, was undoubtedly pro-empire in his attitude and therefore sought the support of the British bureaucracy for the Congress. But, the fact is that Hume was elected General Secretary of the Congress till 1908, and spared no pains to make it a truly national party, capable of giving voice to national aspirations, by inducting representatives from all communities and all province. Yet it is also true, that "Before issuing the Congress Manifesto, Hume had consulted the Viceroy, Lord Dufferin and that it was on his suggestion that Hume had given the organisation a political character."¹⁵ That, perhaps, provoked Lajpat Rai to write that the British bureaucracy and Hume wanted the Congress to act as a "safety valve, for the escape of the great and growing forces generated by British connection." Thereafter, many authors have harped on this theme, and R. Palme Dutt gave wide currency to it, as it became handy for the communists to prove that the Congress was an ally of British imperialism.

Historians¹⁶ have proved, after painstaking search, that there is no evidence of 'great and growing forces' sweeping across India. Dufferin's opinion about Hume, that he "seems to have got

9 Two other countries which emerged from the Indian Empire, namely Pakistan and Bangladesh have an unbroken continuity of the Intelligence Bureau (IB) for domestic intelligence.

10 See Viceroy Dufferin's Secret Dispatch No. 179 dated 15.11.1887 and the Secretary of State/ Viscount Cross's Secret Despatch No.31 dated 23rd December, 1887

11 Richard J. Popplewell: Intelligence and Imperial Defence; London, 1997; P33-35. Patrick French in his 'Liberty or Death' has endorsed the views of Popplewell.

12 C.A. Baily: Information and the Empire;

13 Dufferin to Lord Cross, dated 17 April, 1887. *Third Section* was the notorious secret Russian Police and it was replaced by *Okhrana* in 1881.

14 Hume retired as secretary of Agriculture and as such had knowledge about the condition of the Indian peasantry. In his official capacity he tried to reform Indian agriculture and was known as a kind-hearted officer.

15 L.S. Rathore "A.O. Hume" The Origin of the new National Movement, P21-22

16 Bipan Chandra, Aditya Mukherjee, K.N. Panikkar and Sucheta Mahajan: India's Struggle for Independence, 1989. Their search for materials to substantiate the "the great growing forces" has been noted in this book. Pp 60-68

a bee in his bonnet"¹⁷, and about the Congress, that it represented no more than a "macroscopic minority", do not suggest that the Congress was enjoying official patronage. On the contrary, the despatch dated 25th March, 1887 of Lord Cross, Secretary of State, on "the collection of secret and political intelligence in India", suggests that the birth of the Congress, specially its second well-attended session in Calcutta, in 1886, did not go unnoticed in London. Thereafter, Lord Cross suggested the creation of an institution for collection of "secret political intelligence", and approved the proposal for the Central Special Branch and the Provincial Special Branches, as soon as it reached him. The birth and growth of the Congress, being the only political event of significance during 1885-1887, the intelligence organisation that came into existence in 1887, was evidently in response to the new political development. In this context, it is not rational to think that the British created the Congress as a 'safety valve' for the Empire; on the contrary, the Government having foreseen the threat from the Congress, set up the institution for political intelligence, as a protective measure.

3. FROM CENTRAL SPECIAL BRANCH TO INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

McCracken, ensconced at Simla and aided by the old staff of the Thuggee Department, failed to produce much intelligence; though the few reports he produced, did carry more weight, because of the very nature of information collection. The Provincial Special Branches (SB) were attached to the offices of either Inspector General of Police or of Chief Secretary of the province. The staff was so meagre and so inept in intelligence collection, that the Government of Bengal described its Special Branch as 'a farce'. In Bombay Presidency, however, on account of political murders and Tilak's prosecution for sedition in 1897-98, the Special Branch became a little active. At the turn of the century, when secret societies started proliferating in Western India and Bengal, the Special Branches increased the staff strength and improved the techniques of intelligence collection.

The Police Commission (1901-1902) under Andrew Fraser recommended, *inter alia*, the setting

¹⁷ Sumit Sarkar "Modern India, P.2

up of Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in each province, under a Deputy Inspector, General of Police, for "collating and distributing information regarding organized crime and to assist in investigation of crimes when they are of special character."¹⁸

The Commission further recommended:

- (i) "There should be a similar Department for the whole of India, presided over by an officer of the standing and experience of Inspector General."
- (ii) "That the functions of the Central Department should be to collect, collate and communicate information, obtained from the Provincial CID or otherwise."
- (iii) "That its intervention in the investigation of offences should be confined to such technical crimes as note forgery, etc."¹⁹

The Commission's recommendation for a separate Criminal Investigation Department (CID) in each Province was, in fact, a long-felt need; but the recommendation to set up a Central CID, with the powers of investigation and supervision over the Provincial CIDs, was resented as infringement on Provincial autonomy. Neither in the terms of reference, nor in the Report of the Commission, mention was made of the Central or Provincial Special Branches, or anything relating to collection of political intelligence. The Commission also appropriately made no comments on them. It was also silent on the fate of the Thuggee Department.

The Government of India intervened to rectify the lacunae and anomalies in the Commission's recommendations. It abolished the Thuggee Department and merged the Central Special Branch with the proposed Central CID, renaming it as Central Criminal Intelligence Department (DCI). The power of supervision over the Provincial CIDs was scrapped on the ground of Provincial autonomy. Its power of investigation of cases was greatly circumscribed, and it was tasked, "to collect and communicate information with regard to special forms of crime, some

¹⁸ Report of the of the First Police Commission, 1901-1903, P 49

¹⁹ Recommendations of the First Police Commission, P 52-53

of which have been rendered more difficult for suppression, by the recent expansion of railways and the increased use of Post Offices and the Telegraph by the natives". Under this head, the Department could "organize and supervise operations directed against criminal tribes, organized dacoits working over large areas, wandering gangs of criminals, note-forgers, coiners, and professional poisoners etc. Besides, "collecting and testing intelligence upon matters, including social, religious and political movements, not necessarily of criminal nature, should also be the duty of the Central Criminal Intelligence Department."

But the proposal of the Government of India was considerably modified by the Home Government, as they could view situations in India in much clearer political and administrative perspective than the local administrators, who were too involved in personal and inter-departmental rivalries, to take an objective view of the situation. While the Government of India sought to make it a department for criminal intelligence and marginally, for political intelligence, the Home Government made political intelligence its primary responsibility. The Secretary of State scrapped the power of investigation of certain criminal cases bestowed on the Central Intelligence, on the ground of provincial autonomy. Further, in the context of the political unrest then brewing in several provinces, the Central Intelligence was to collect political intelligence alone. In his Despatch No.70, dated 22nd April, 1904, the Secretary of State asserted that the provincial autonomy had been working satisfactorily, and therefore, nothing should be done to disturb it. He warned that he "would not regard with approval any attempt to share for the Supreme Government by means of an establishment, working under their direct order, the duty of investigating crime". Thus, shorn off the investigation duties, the Central Criminal Intelligence Department was left with the responsibility of "collecting and testing intelligence upon matters including social, religious and political movements, not necessarily of criminal nature."²⁰ The Secretary of State, through his judicious intervention, made it essentially an agency for collection of political intelligence, while Curzon's administration

20 Amiya K.Samanta: op.cit, Pp 49-54

wanted to make it a central authority, for coordinating the activities of the Provincial police forces. The name suggested by the Government of India, however, remained unchanged, though the term 'criminal'²¹ in the nomenclature, evidently became anomalous.

The Police Commission proposed the appointment of "an officer of standing and experience of the Inspector General", and accordingly the appointment of Harold A. Stuart, ICS, Inspector General of Police, Madras Presidency, as Director of the Central Criminal Intelligence, was approved. Stuart joined as Director on 19th April, 1904, and McCracken joined as Deputy Director. The Secretary of State declined to communalize the Department by appointing one Hindu and one Muslim Assistant Director, on the ground that the Head of the Department "ought himself to be qualified in gauging native feeling and opinion." The existing staff of the Thuggee Department was absorbed in the DCI. Though, Home Secretary Risley stated that the DCI "would be located at the headquarters of the Government of India,"²² Stuart, however, continued the practice of going to Calcutta in cold weather, while the headquarters of the Department remained at Simla.

In the initial years of the DCI, the total expenditure for the DCI was only Rs 25,000 more than the expenditure for the Central SB, but gradually its expenditure went on increasing. The DCI, like the Central SB, used to get a paltry amount as secret service fund till 1907, when it was raised to rupees fifty thousand, and after the bomb attack on Hardinge, in 1912, it was raised to one lakh rupees annually.

Some apologists for the Empire, like Richard Poplewell have claimed that there was a general aversion in the British administration for spy system and "The reform of police intelligence under Curzon, was in no way stimulated by the existence of Indian nationalism, either of the moderate variety, represented by the majority of Congress politicians, or of the more extreme type,

21 The telegraphic address of the Department as "criminaire" is derived from "Criminal Intelligence" and the address still continues although the name has been changed to Intelligence Bureau in 1920.

22 Home Department No. 594/603 dated Simla, the 30th June, 1904. Also see Amiya K.Samanta:op.cit, Appendix-B

represented by Tilak and his followers."²³This is not borne out by the plethora of intelligence records²⁴, which show that, not to speak of political leaders, non-political personalities like Rabindranath Tagore, were under surveillance of the Special Branch. On the same issue, another British author, Patrick French has written, "For the last three decades of British rule in India, intelligence gathering was extended massively, since with the rapid rise of Congress it was seen to be the only way of retaining the upper hand. Covertly obtained information began to take on an increasing importance in the formulation of policy and decision making..."²⁵ There is no doubt that in the post-Curzon period, the colonial regime depended more and more on secret intelligence. But it may be noted here that both the Viceroy and the Secretary of State, discouraged the DCI to have an independent network of sources or separate units in the provinces under its control, without the knowledge of the Provincial Governments.

With the bomb making its appearance on the political scene in India, DCI became, exclusively, an agency for collection and analysis of political intelligence. The term 'criminal' in the nomenclature became more and more incongruous. In the Government of India Act, 1919, the change of name was first indicated in section 40(2) which enjoined, inter alia, that the Intelligence Bureau should keep the Government posted with matters relating to the security of the Indian Empire. Even before the Act came into force in 1921, the name was changed to Intelligence Bureau in 1920.

4. PROVINCIAL SPECIAL BRANCHES

The Provincial Special Branches were ignored till the anti-Partition *swadeshi* movement broke out in 1905 and the underground terrorist activities came to the surface in 1907-1908, in Bengal presidency. When in April, 1906, the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) was set up in Bengal, as also in other provinces, the Special Branches were made a part of the Provincial CIDs under one DIG. Later on, with the increase in the work-load of the Special Branches and due

to growing political unrest, in the big provinces, the Special Branches were delinked from CID and brought under officers of a suitable rank. Bengal's Special Branch had a faster growth, both in size as also in quality of intelligence output, due to strident political movement, both surface and underground. In September, 1907, Stevenson-Moore²⁶, Director, Criminal Intelligence Department, predicted in his report that the Bengalis 'had no capacity for violence'. One district magistrate of Dacca, who held the view that *bhadralok* Bengalis were incapable of physical aggression, was shot at the station²⁷, while he was leaving Dacca on transfer. In this context, the discovery of arms and explosives in Muraripukur Garden at Calcutta, and the arrest of Aurobindo Ghose along with 40 educated *bhadralok* youths, made them change their ideas. Home Secretary, Harold Stuart wrote, "the revolutionary movement will gain in influence and strength until, at no distant date, it will become a serious menace to law and order." But the Government was of the considered view that "while a revolutionary rising is out of the question", an efficient secret service was essential" to contain any widespread disturbance in the province.

The Bengal Special Branch, like Special Branches in other provinces, was placed as a separate unit under a Deputy Inspector General of Police, CID. An officer of the rank of SP, named Denham²⁸, was appointed as Special Officer of the Special Branch, which was strengthened by posting a good number of officers.

There was one Special Branch and one CID for the whole of Bengal, including Calcutta, both drawing officers from Bengal and Calcutta police forces because they were statutorily separate entities. This led to mutual recrimination, in which higher officers like DIG, CID and Commissioner of Police were involved. Eventually to resolve the

²³ Richard Popplewell: op.cit. P45

²⁴ Circulars of Intelligence (Special) Branch, No 6SB dated 27 July 1909.

²⁵ Patrick French: Liberty or Death, 1997, Pp 98-99

²⁶ Sir Charles Stevenson-Moore succeeded H.A. Stuart who became Home Secretary.

²⁷ B.C.Allen had praised the social service and discipline of the members of the Dacca *Anushilan Samiti*, a member of which shot him. The assailant was never caught.

²⁸ Godfrey Denham was a fine intelligence officer and some of his reports are valuable source materials of the revolutionary terrorist movement in India. An unsuccessful attempt was made on his life in 1911 in Calcutta and in 1912 he joined the Central Intelligence and played a key role in unraveling the plot to kill the Viceroy. In 1917 he was with the MI5 helping the prosecution in San Francisco Conspiracy case. He did not return to the service in India.

unseemly rivalry, separate Detective Department for Calcutta Police was created in 1909, and a separate Special Branch, in 1911. To differentiate the Bengal Special Branch from its Calcutta counterpart, it was named as Intelligence Branch.

The Provincial Special Branches had to improve their collection and processing of intelligence in the face of growing terrorist activities. Though, both the Central and Provincial intelligence used to work together, often the Central Intelligence worked as an umbrella agency for the Provincial Branches. Between 1908 and 1916, there was a spate of dacoities and assassination of lower level intelligence and CID officers in Bengal, leading to a crisis of morale and efficiency, as the Indian officer declined to work in these organisations. Both, Home Member, Reginald Craddock and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI), Charles Cleveland, were seriously concerned and extended full support to the Indian officers "who have been murdered, ostracized and threatened."²⁹

Reginald Craddock expressed similar concerns and condemned the terrorists for "murdering informers and zealous Criminal Investigation Department officers, supplemented by murder of school masters who have faithfully done their best to suppress sedition under their charge."³⁰ With the moral support and material assistance of the Central Intelligence, and under the inspiring leadership of Charles Tegart, DIG of the Intelligence Branch, the morale and efficiency of the organization was restored.

When the Central Intelligence was under severe stress, the Special Branches and the CIDs acted in a body to face the situation. On 23rd December, 1912 Viceroy Hardinge narrowly escaped death in the bomb attack in Delhi. The intelligence had no information about the existence of any secret society in North India. The Central Intelligence and its Director, Cleveland, came under severe attack for failure to prevent

the outrage. As the normal investigation failed to produce any result and the pressure on Cleveland increased, a special team was formed under David Petrie, with 34 Intelligence and CID officers from Punjab, UP, Bengal, Bombay and Central Provinces. Petrie claimed that by March 1913, there was "scarcely a single person all over India capable of being considered as a potential factor in the bomb conspiracy, whose doings have not been subjected to careful scrutiny."³¹ When this team also failed to show any positive result, even after ten months, the Viceroy's Executive Council passed a formal vote of censure on Cleveland. On Harcourt Butler's advice, Cleveland consulted Sir Edward Henry³², Commissioner, Metropolitan Police, London for lending English and French detectives. But Henry, pointing out the constraints of geography, language and people for foreign detectives, advised that the local detective talents in India were superior to English detectives. It was really embarrassing that one of the most comprehensive investigations ever launched in India, failed to trace the culprit. Then, after about 14 months, Denham of the Special Team and Tegart of Bengal Intelligence succeeded in identifying the revolutionary group from the remnants of the bombs which exploded in Sylhet, Calcutta, Lahore and Delhi and from a revolutionary leaflet printed in Calcutta and circulated in the Punjab and UP. All the culprits were brought to book, except Rash Behari Bose, who could never be arrested. Thereafter, the Secret Service grant of the DCI was doubled from 50 thousand rupees to one lakh rupees.

The Government having appreciated the usefulness of the intelligence agencies in containing revolutionary terrorism, especially in Bengal, readily sanctioned the creation of District Intelligence Branches in every district of Bengal in 1917, bringing all important localities and endemic areas under intelligence scanner.

31 D.Petrie's note on the investigation of the Delhi Bomb Case.

32 Sir Edward Henry was Inspector General of Police, Bengal. While he was district magistrate, Hooghly in the last decade of the 19th century, two of his subordinate officer namely Hem Chandra Basu and developed the system of study of finger print for identification. The system was tested and found to be scientific and has since been adopted all over the world as the most scientific method of identification. Though developed by an Indian, the system has been named as Henry's System.

29 Notes in the CIB, dated 4 February, 1916. Quoted by Richard Popplewell, in *Intelligence and Imperial Defence*, P209

30 Memorandum of R.H.Craddock dated 26 February, 1916.. Quoted by Popplewell, op.cit. P 208 Craddock referred to the murder of the Headmaster of Comilla High School on March,4,1915 and the Murder of Headmaster Maldah Zilla School on January25,1916 by the revolutionary terrorists.

The agency more and more fine-tuned their trade-craft by adopting still more rigorous system of recruitment and screening of the sources and keeping them under deep cover.³³ Armed with wide knowledge about the terrorists and their outfits, they acquired the ability to influence the groups and even engineer a split in the group. Thus, the agencies emerged not only as the most powerful instruments against the underground movement, but also as advisors to the Government in formulating the policy towards the revolutionary movement, in particular and the political movement, in general.

The growing influence of the Intelligence and the Police on the formulation of the Government policy was criticized not only at the political level in England but also in the bureaucratic circles, for turning India into a "Police state". In January, 1918, Secretary of State Montague wrote to Viceroy Chelmsford, "I have an uneasy feeling that the CID is being used not merely as a great detective agency, but as an instrument of Government: that its activities are too widespread; that it is growing too rapidly; that it is convenient but dangerous to govern by means of your police." Among the Indians, the only significant voice of protest came from Rabindranath Tagore, who in 1917 made a scathing criticism of the Government, police and intelligence in an article, "The Small and the Great"³⁴, read out to hundreds of people before publication.

The Government's decision to enact a new legislation (Rowlatt Act), to take the place of the Defense of India Act, 1915, which would lapse after the World War, was the result of persistent prodding by the Central Intelligence and the Intelligence Branch, Bengal. Two intelligence officers namely J.C.Ker, Personal Assistant to the Director of Central Criminal Intelligence

and Charles Tegart, DIG of Bengal Intelligence Branch had assisted the Rowlatt Committee from the preliminary stage of their investigation to the drafting of the Bill. The Report and the Bill evidently reflected the attitude of the Police and Intelligence to the terrorist movement in the country. But, by 1919, public resentment was so strong against repressive measures that the Government had to permanently shelve the Act. The intelligence failed to gauge the depth of public resentment and the magnitude of the protest, which eventually resulted in the Jallianwalla Bagh Massacre in April, 1919. The Indian nationalist movement and the colonial government had reached a point of no compromise.

5. IN THE TRAIL OF THE REVOLUTIONARIES: INDIAN INTELLIGENCE ABROAD

During the War years (1914-1918), the Indian intelligence operatives went to three continents of Asia, Europe and America following the revolutionary terrorists. As early as in 1908, Stevenson-Moore, Director of Central Intelligence wrote to the Government, "it is quite impossible for a group of separate Provincial Secret Service to deal adequately with political conditions of such extent and character that prevail in India. The chief centres of the Indian political movement are Calcutta, Lahore, Poona, New York, Paris and perhaps Japan. The chief agitators in these places are in close connection with each other and the necessity of secret agents in America and London has recently been brought to notice in letters from London and Dublin."³⁵ In pursuit of them, the Central Intelligence sent its operatives to all these countries. The British had the advantage of unchallenged supremacy on the high seas, colonies in all parts of the globe and above all, their expertise in interception, in breaking codes and recruiting sources and informers, in building up a network for information even in the countries where they had little political authority or influence. The Indian intelligence, however, aimed at monitoring the activities of the revolutionaries and subverting their plans in all the three continents of Europe, America and South East Asia.

³³ Several European and Indian officers contributed significantly to the development of the 'craft of intelligence' in Bengal Intelligence Branch. Similarly in the central Intelligence H.A.Stuart, Charles R. Cleveland, David Petrie, Godfrey Denham, Horace Williamson were some of the pioneers ably assisted by the Indian officers.

³⁴ Tagore wrote, "What kind of statesmanship was this which can afford to hand over such youths and boys to the tender mercies of the secret service? And what makes the calamity greater is that any tender shoot once bitten by the police thrives no longer, and will bear neither flower nor fruit, for there is poison in their touch."

³⁵ Note by Stevenson-Moore dated 13th May 1908. Quoted by Popplewell:op. cit, P.70

However, long before the Indian intelligence officers reached London, the Special Branch³⁶ of the Metropolitan Police organized surveillance on the Indians and collated systematic records of their activities in the first decade of the 20th century and sent them to Simla. These classified documents, containing very useful information about Gandhiji, Dadabhai Naoroji, Surendra Nath Banerji, Bipin Chandra Pal, Vinayak Savarkar, Madan Lal Dhingra and a host of others, with rare group-photographs, were printed at Simla as "Memorandum on the Anti-British Agitation among the Natives of India in England."³⁷ But the Special Branch had obvious limitations in intelligence collection, as Secretary of State Morley stated in a communication to Viceroy Minto: "The whole Indian field is unfamiliar in language, habits and everything else". Stevenson-Moore prepared a plan for an Indian Secret Service establishment for Europe, centered on the DCI in India and controlled by an officer based in the India Office in London. He wanted to have reliable agents in about half a dozen centres in various countries of Europe, and their work would be coordinated by an 'itinerant officer', based in India Office, London. The Director chose John Arnold Wallinger, an officer of the rank Superintendent of Police from Bombay Police, and in January, 1910 Wallinger took charge in London. In 1913, P.C. Vickery, an Assistant Superintendent of Police of Punjab, was posted as deputy to Wallinger and when in 1916, the MI5 started functioning as a counter-intelligence unit, Vickory was put in charge of the Indian Political Intelligence (IPI), which became a section of the MI5. Vickory had been an integral part of the IPI's development for ten years and had also worked in undermining the Gadar movement in America, where he was sent following the San Francisco Conspiracy case in 1917-18. "Around 15 to 20 people worked under him in the administration of IPI in London, and he had an unknown number of agents."³⁸

With the outbreak of the War, apart from the

36 Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police was created in the 1880s to assist the police in fighting the 'Dynamic War' of the Irish Republican terrorists. It gradually became an intelligence unit with executive powers to prosecute.

37 Amiya K.Samanta (ed): Terrorism in Bengal, Vol. V. All the available reports from 1908 to 1910 containing very useful information and with two rare photographs have been compiled in this volume. Pp 243 to 455.

38 Patrick French: op.cit, P98

India Office based unit under Wallinger, the MI5, Britain's domestic counter intelligence agency,³⁹ was directly concerned with the monitoring of the Indian revolutionary movement in Europe. This particular branch of the MI5 was reinforced by induction of eight senior officers from the ICS and the Indian Police, who raised valuable sources of information and scuttled the plans of the India Independence Committee in Berlin to subvert the loyalty of the Indian troops in Turkey, Egypt and also in Europe. They broke the German Code and intercepted the communications of the Indian revolutionaries with the German Foreign Office and, thus, checkmated the rather ambitious plans of sending arms and ammunitions to India for an armed uprising⁴⁰, of engineering rebellions in the British colonies in the Middle East and South East Asia. After Wallinger's retirement in 1926, Vickory took his place as head of the Indian intelligence in Europe, simultaneously continuing as head of the IPI. "Vickory's network was very secret. Its existence was never acknowledged officially. Its contact with the outside world was always through indirect channel. All dealings with India went via Director, Intelligence Bureau, New Delhi, and with India Office, through one or two assistants under the Secretary of State."⁴¹ It dealt with all matters relating to security of the Empire. In 1920-21, IPI and the Intelligence Bureau of India were "at the centre of the anti-Bolshevik campaign."⁴² All persons suspected to be associated with any movement, secret or open, violent or non-violent, right wing or left wing, came within the ambit of the IPI's surveillance, if it was suspected to undermine the British Empire in India. In actual practice, however, IPI used to maintain surveillance on all and sundry, without trying to ascertain whether the activities of the subject were prejudicial to the interest of the empire. This continued till India gained independence.

When discontentment among the Indian immigrants in the west coast of Canada and

39 In 1914 MI5 was created as Section MO5g in the War office. In 1916 it changed its name to MI5.

40 The subverted plan of sending in a ship called *S.S. Maverik* and failed attempt to engineer a revolt in Burma may be referred to.

41 Patrick French. Op.cit. P 100-101

42 Christopher Andrews: Her Majesty's Secret Service, P 277. Department of Criminal Intelligence was renamed as Intelligence Bureau and from 1919 to 1924 Cecil Kaye was its Director.

US was brewing, one William Hopkinson, an officer who served in the Punjab and Calcutta Police, was posted to the Vancouver Immigration Department⁴³, in 1907. He was also designated as a "Dominion Police Officer on Special Duty" at Vancouver, for conducting enquiry into the Sikh unrest there. Hopkinson, besides reporting to his department, also reported to the Canadian Minister of Interior, to the Colonial Office and the India Office in London and to the Director of Central Criminal Intelligence Department at Simla. From 1907 to 1914, Hopkinson succeeded in breaking the *Gadar* party, created a network of informers to monitor the activities of the leaders like Tarak Nath Das, Har Dayal and many others. Hopkinson's conspiratorial activities created so much religious and racial discord in the immigrant community that Hopkinson was killed by a *Gadar* activist in 1914. The vacuum was filled up by deputing MI5 officers like Nathan, Alexander Marr and Denham, who all worked to launch the prosecution known as San Francisco Conspiracy or Hindu German Conspiracy case in 1917, against the *Gadar* and other revolutionaries. This was, in fact, a supplementary to the three Lahore Conspiracy Cases (1914-1916) against the *Gadar* rebels.

As regards South East Asia, Director Cleveland was aware of the plan of the revolutionaries to incite a mutiny in the Burmese Police and the persistent efforts to send arms and ammunitions to India. His plan of organizing a Far Eastern Bureau in 1915, was rejected by the Home Government. David Petrie, however, opened up channels of information through a network of agents in vulnerable areas of the Far East.

The Intelligence Bureau's domestic counter intelligence unit was organized in 1939, on the eve of the Second World War, and an elaborate, watch and surveillance arrangement was put on the ground.

6. PROVINCIAL AUTONOMY AND THE INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

The Intelligence Bureau, till early 1930s, was

⁴³ William Hopkinson, Immigration Officer at Vancouver was born in India and served in the Punjab Police from the age of 16. From 1901 to 1907 he was in Calcutta Police. He knew several Indian languages. In view of influx of the Indians to the West Coast of North Africa at that time he was posted under the cover of an Immigration officer.

merely a compiling and collating agency, as it had, hardly any independent channel of intelligence. The idea of the Central Intelligence agency collecting intelligence by sending agents and spies to the Provinces, without their knowledge was considered as interference with the provincial autonomy and was rejected way back in 1909-1910. As a matter of fact, there was so much homogeneity in the functioning of the Centre and the Provinces, that the provincial Special Branches acted almost as subordinate offices of the Central Intelligence, leaving no scope for an alternative system of intelligence collection by the Central Intelligence.

But, when in response to political agitation, introduction of the federal system became a distinct possibility, the control over the Intelligence Bureau and the Provincial Special Branches posed a serious problem. In the early 1930s, the Government of India prepared a 'White Paper', wherein the issues of their status and control were reiterated. The first issue was, that the existing set up of the Intelligence Bureau was functionally inadequate and structurally unsound in a federal system for effectively handling the subversive movements, such as terrorism and communism. One of its weaknesses is its total dependence on the Provincial Special Branches for intelligence collection, which would be badly affected under a regime of provincial autonomy. A system of intelligence collection, directly under the Bureau, was necessary.

The second issue was the control of the intelligence organizations. The suggestion in the "White Paper" that the Intelligence Bureau should be at the disposal of the federal minister in the proposed federation, was turned down by the Secretary of State and the Home Government, as "inappropriate and unworkable". According to the Secretary of State, "The authority in the last resort, responsible for the maintenance of the internal security, is the Secretary of State as the mouthpiece of the Imperial Parliament, operating through the instrumentality of the Governor General." In fact, the British Government was unwilling to accept the situation in which the Indian representative body should be vested with the ultimate responsibility of security of the country. Under no circumstances, therefore, sensitive institution like Intelligence Bureau, and matters like internal security would be entrusted

to a person who was not directly responsible to the British Crown.

Having decided that the Governor General should control the Intelligence Bureau, which was to be “so organized as to be in a position to obtain for the use of the Governor General, full information as to the internal political situation and the activities in the Provinces, of forces likely to impair peace and order, and the staff acting in liaison with the corresponding staff of the Governors, would form the channel of communication between the Governors and the Governor General in the performance of this branch of their duties.”⁴⁴ The suggestion was to create a separate set up for intelligence collection, directly under the IB

In the early 1930s, when a new constitution was being considered, the thought of organizing provincial set up of the Intelligence Bureau was discussed. In the third annual conference⁴⁵ of the Inspectors General of Police at Simla, from 23rd to 26th May, 1932, it was recommended that the IB should be placed directly under the control of the Governor General, and that it should employ a number of Indian Police Service officers as intelligence officers in the Provinces, under IB’s direct control. These officers were to be designated as Central Intelligence Officers (CIO) and also as Assistant Directors or Deputy Directors, according to their ranks, and the units in the provinces should be known as “Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau” (SIB).

On June 30, 1933, in a high level meeting at Simla, presided over the Viceroy, it was decided that the Governor General should have at his disposal, a system of intelligence collection throughout India, along with an agency for processing such intelligence. The need for IB’s own intelligence collection network was recognized and recommended. The proposal was tentatively approved by the Secretary of State, pending the results of deliberations of the

Joint Select Committee of Parliament, under the Chairmanship of Lord Linlithgo.

The Director, IB, in a separate note dated October, 2, 1933 reiterated that the Bureau should be taken out of the control of the Home Department and placed directly under the control of the Governor General. This was strongly objected to by the Home Secretary and the Home Member. The Secretary of State, a protagonist of the independence of the Bureau, in a long note tried to convince the Joint Select Committee, by referring to the terrorist threat and the need for not divesting the Governor General of essential powers and the instruments of maintaining law and order in India. This note had considerable impact on the recommendations of the Joint Committee.

The Government of India, however, held that for effective handling of the subversive movement, the Intelligence Bureau should be under a Federal Minister. They argued that “the implication of a personal law and order staff, under the Governor General, are far-reaching. Provisions on those lines would be deeply resented by the Indian public opinion, and this resentment would, we are convinced, be a serious obstacle, with which the personal staff would be continuously confronted.” What will then be the outcome of such confrontation? The Intelligence Bureau “would fail to serve the purpose for which it was set up.”⁴⁶ The difference of opinion was not altogether altruistic and inspired by the concern for true federalism, but it reflected an inter-service rivalry.

Linlithgo was of the view that a federal system was unsuitable for administration of India. The Joint Committee understandably had dwelt at length on the need for a strong executive as, “nowhere in the world is there such frequent need for courageous and prompt action, as in India”. They underscored the need for “protection of the police from political pressures”, as they apprehended, “Indian Ministers would interfere with police action”. The recommendations of the Joint Committee on the Intelligence Bureau and the provincial Special Branches were as follows:

Firstly, the Committee was much concerned with the protection of the identity of the informers / agents, in case the Bureau and the Special Branches

44 Government of India, Reform Despatch No. 6 of 1932 and correspondences dated September, 30 and October 2 of 1932 and of April 30 and November 7 of 1933.

45 Annual conference of the police and intelligence chiefs of the provinces was conceived as a method of sustaining the unity of the police force and homogeneity in police action in the country in the context of the threat of the introduction of provincial autonomy and federal constitution. The first such conference was held in 1930 and it has been continuing since then.

46 Letter to the Secretary of State, dated January 30, 1933.

came under the control of Indian ministers. They recommended that "the records of any such intelligence department should be protected from even the slightest danger of leakage." To obviate the possibility of the Indian ministers coming to know the names of such agents, the Committee recommended that "the instruments and instructions of the Government should specifically require them to give directions that no record relating to intelligence affecting terrorism, should be disclosed to anyone other than one or two persons, who are directly dealing with them."

Secondly, the Committee was of the view that no purpose would be adequately served by placing the Special Branch of the province under the Governor. Instead, they recommended that the Governor should be empowered to assume charge of the department, if, according to him, the peace and tranquility of the province is endangered, by overt or secret activities of persons who intend to overthrow the Government.

Thirdly, the Committee did not agree with the suggestion that the IB should be under the exclusive control of the Governor General and that the provincial Special Branches will be controlled by the IB. There should, however, be close touch between the two, but to put the provincial intelligence units under the Intelligence Bureau will tend "to break up the organic unity of the provincial police force."

Fourthly, on the question of exclusive control of the Governor General over the IB, the Committee stated that the IB "should, under the new constitution, be assigned one of the Governor General's reserved departments, as part of its normal activities." The Committee, however, hoped that "the change in the form of Government, whether in the Centre or in the Provinces, should not involve any change in the relationship, which at present exists between the Intelligence Bureau and the Provincial Intelligence departments."

The Government of India Act, 1935 gave legal sanction to the suggestions. The Intelligence Bureau remained, by and large, under the direct control of the Governor General, though the Home Department of the Federal Government remained its immediate controlling authority.

The fear that haunted the conscientious IB officers, both at the Centre and in the Provinces, was that when the Provincial Special Branches would come under the Indian Home Ministers, classified information about the Non-Cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements, as well as some records of terrorist activities, might be leaked, resulting in exposure of sources, jeopardizing the safety of the agents and informers. Thus, the credibility of entire organization will be demolished.

When the new ministers assumed office in the Provinces under the Government of India Act, 1935, the mutual distrust between the intelligence agencies and the people's representatives went on increasing. Many important secret and top secret files, relating to the Non-cooperation and Civil Disobedience movements, were sent to the office of CIO of the Intelligence Bureau, which was statutorily secured from ministerial interference, or to the Governor's secretariat, either for destruction or for transfer to more secured places. The Provincial Governments frequently complained of spying on them by the Central Intelligence.

Control over the Intelligence organizations remained a contentious issue till the outbreak of the Second World War, when under the Defence of India Act, ministerial authority over the intelligence organizations was reduced. Again, on the eve of independence there was great confusion about the sensitive records of the IB. Eventually, many records, especially those relating to the identity of the sources and informers, were destroyed. Many sensitive files were removed to England. From many files, which are still in IB records, relevant papers have been removed, with a note in the notesheet.

In the post-independence era, the Intelligence Bureau has expanded consequent upon the multiplicity of the problems that the nation has been encountering. This great institution has spawned several important security organizations like Special Service Bureau, Special Security Force, Aviation Research Center, Indo-Tibetan Border Police Force, Research and Analysis Wing, Bureau of Aviation Security, Special Protection Group, all for safeguarding the nation against the forces of disorder and destabilization.

Intelligence Bureau

Shri K.C. Verma, IPS (Retd.)

The Intelligence Bureau was established in 1887 as the Central Special Branch, primarily for the collection of "secret and political intelligence". It was renamed as the Central Criminal Intelligence Department in 1904, and as the Intelligence Bureau in 1920. The Intelligence Bureau is thus more than one hundred and twenty-five years old. It is possibly the only intelligence organisation in the world to have been in continuous existence for such a long period.

Over the years, the Intelligence Bureau has represented continuity and evolution. It has responded to the changing requirements of the times, maintaining the highest standards of professional excellence. It has undergone structural changes without losing its essential character of an intelligence agency, working to secure the nation against threats – external and internal. The changing nature of threats has made it imperative for the Bureau to keep pace with the times, to handle the ever growing responsibilities. It has fashioned appropriate responses to new threats, creating additional capacities and providing the kernel for the formation of new security agencies, whenever required. It has always strived to be the eyes and ears of the Government of India, even as it has never been assigned any executive functions.

The Intelligence Bureau faced its severest test in the immediate period after Independence. On the one hand, it suffered depletion in its strength due to British officers leaving India and many other officers opting to go to the newly formed Pakistan, on the other hand, the new nation was beset with a plethora of unprecedented threats. These ranged from unrest fomented by Pak-sponsored elements in Jammu and Kashmir to insurgencies in the north eastern states. There were incipient divisive movements in the new nation, yet to be fully emotionally and politically integrated. The powerful cross currents within large sections of the population were required to be tracked and

kept in the reckoning while formulating policies affecting the people.

The Intelligence Bureau responded by evolving a sound organisation, which met the intelligence and security requirements of the nation and proved its worth in the tumultuous period of the integration of princely states and the language disturbances in the nineteen fifties; and in the still more difficult decades that followed ahead.

In the times of conflict, the Intelligence Bureau repeatedly proved its capabilities. It served an early warning of the evil designs of China, much before the 1962 aggression. Again, in 1965, reports of the Intelligence Bureau provided valuable inputs regarding Pakistani manoeuvres. The buildup to the war with Pakistan in 1971 and the liberation of Bangladesh are well documented triumphs of the intelligence fraternity. After the debacle of 1962, the Intelligence Bureau and its then Director, Shri B.N.Mullick, were closely associated with the formation of the Special Service Bureau (in 1963), the ARC and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police.

With Independence, the Intelligence Bureau quickly developed capacities in the domain of counter-intelligence and collection of foreign intelligence. The foreign intelligence collection arm of the Intelligence Bureau, which became a major entity, was formally separated from the Intelligence Bureau in September, 1968 and given the name Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW).

After the formation of the R&AW, the two organisations have continued to enjoy a coordinated working relationship, with each complementing the other, and ensuring the security of the nation against all threats.

In the domain of counter-intelligence, the Intelligence Bureau has honed its skills over the years to emerge as an effective instrument to guard the nation against espionage and subversion. It has

neutralised many efforts by inimical forces to spy on the country. It has also reduced the threat of sabotage and espionage through preventive steps, including implementation of stringent verification procedures in respect of vulnerable personnel. The Bureau remains the primary agency for ensuring document and personnel security, in order to safeguard the secrets of the nation.

An area in which the Intelligence Bureau consistently delivered excellent results, was the steady flow of high grade intelligence pertaining to the insurgent movements, especially in the North East. The outstanding work done by the Intelligence Bureau officials in these states made it possible for the security forces to contain the separatist elements. A much more significant contribution of the Intelligence Bureau, and several individual officers ensured that the organisation always enjoyed a very high degree of credibility with many leaders of underground movements. This was undoubtedly the result of professionalism of the highest order and a commendable empathy. This was, and continues to remain the strength of the organisation, which has helped bridge the gap between nationalist elements and misguided organisations. The Bureau has often been tasked to act on behalf of the Government to establish contact or enter into a dialogue with misguided sections or agitating groups. Such tasks have been executed not just with finesse, but have created goodwill for the Government amongst disaffected sections. The fact that several such agreements have stood the test of time and have been instrumental in integrating self-professed militant groups into the national mainstream, is cause for much satisfaction.

The symbiotic relationship of the Intelligence Bureau and the state police forces in general, and the state special branches in particular, provides for a seamless sharing of information, essential for the maintenance of public order. This has proved invaluable in containing communal discord and preventing large scale disturbances, attributable to discontent among groups organised on considerations of language, region, caste or ideology. In particular, such an information sharing system has helped to sound early warnings to prevent economic disruptions due to diverse agitations. Particular mention could be made of the railway strike in 1974 and the discontent among police unions in 1979. The

Intelligence Bureau also closely monitored the growth of Left extremist thought.

The Intelligence Bureau has successfully anticipated security threats and, whenever they have been manifest, the Bureau has been able to fashion appropriate responses. The Intelligence Bureau was required to attend to issues of civil aviation security after the first hijacking of an Indian aircraft in 1971. The Intelligence Bureau set up a dedicated unit to collect intelligence related to civil aviation security and conducted many inspections and sensitisation programmes, till a formal civil aviation security cell was created in the DGCA. This was the forerunner of the Bureau of Civil Aviation Security. In a similar fashion, the initial efforts by the Intelligence Bureau to ensure the security of industrial units laid the foundation of the Central Industrial Security Force.

The security of protected persons was always a matter of priority for the Intelligence Bureau, and intelligence pertaining to this important domain required dedicated efforts by Intelligence Bureau personnel. After the assassination of Smt. Indira Gandhi, the Bureau set up a Special Task Force, which subsequently evolved into the Special Protection Group.

Another extremely important sphere of the work of the Bureau relates to counter-terrorism. The growth of terrorism in Punjab in the 1980's presented a new challenge for the security and intelligence agencies. The Intelligence Bureau was able to quickly adapt to the changed circumstances and its operatives mastered the craft of collecting information in extremely hostile conditions. The capabilities of the organisation were once again put to test in Jammu and Kashmir, where initial setbacks were witnessed due to targeted attacks on Intelligence Bureau posts. The growth of Islamic fundamentalism and the use of terrorism as an instrument of state policy by Pakistan, have also stretched the capacities of the Bureau, requiring it to evolve operational methodologies in tandem with other agencies and state police forces. These initiatives have yielded good results and the relentless efforts of terrorists have been neutralised on many occasions. The Intelligence Bureau personnel are, however, acutely aware that every battle has to be won in this ongoing war.

For Intelligence Bureau officers involved in counter terrorist or counter insurgency operations, especially in areas like Manipur, Punjab and Jammu and Kashmir, life can be very arduous. Personnel working in the field do not have any physical or legal protection. The working conditions are often risky and in many circumstances field officers face imminent danger to their lives. Due to the nature of their work and the places of deployment, Intelligence Bureau personnel frequently live without their families or expose their families to a degree of threat of physical harm.

It is not only within the country that the Intelligence Bureau ensures security of the nation. The security architecture of the country requires the Bureau to be present also at the borders. Check posts of the Intelligence Bureau are spread out in penny pockets along all the international borders, ensuring a presence of intelligence operatives to detect and assess any threat to the country, through subversion of the border populace and infiltration of hostiles from across the borders. This requires a constant vigil and collection of intelligence to prevent smuggling of weapons, explosives and fake currency. Further, the IB personnel are dedicated towards ensuring complete integrity of immigration control. These responsibilities place a heavy burden on the organisation in terms of manpower, and a substantial accretion to the strength of the Intelligence Bureau, over the years, has been on account of growing responsibilities in this sphere.

The need to keep our land borders under surveillance, especially in perspective of aggressive activities of China, culminating in the 1962 debacle, made it imperative that Intelligence Bureau personnel were imparted necessary skills to climb and survive in mountainous areas. A mountaineering institute, subsequently christened as the Sonam Gyatso Mountaineering Institute, was, therefore, established at Gangtok in 1963. The SGMI, and climbers of the Intelligence Bureau added several glowing chapters to the annals of Indian mountaineering, with many names being counted among those who scaled Mt. Everest and various other high and technically difficult peaks. The legendary names include Sonam Gyatso, Phu Dorji, H.C.S.Rawat and Sonam Wangyal. The tradition continues, with the Intelligence Bureau being involved in many other mountaineering

expeditions over the years. Several climbers, including a few 'Everesters', are currently in service in the organisation. Intelligence Bureau personnel are regularly engaged in monitoring border transgressions, undertaking patrols along the borders and validating topographic data.

The growth of any intelligence and security organisation is directly related to the threats faced by the nation. It is, therefore, no surprise that the burgeoning problems in recent years have led to a substantial increase in the strength of the organisation. Besides traditional areas like counter terrorism, counter intelligence and security becoming increasingly complex, altogether new dangers to national security have emerged in recent years. The Intelligence Bureau has had to scale up its capacities to thwart economic and cyber threats to the nation. Technological advances require not just expensive infrastructure but appropriately trained manpower. The time lag between the requirement and positioning of infrastructure remains a challenge, and this aspect is likely to become a major limitation in future.

The Intelligence Bureau has a professional core of officers who grow professionally within the organisation. While many senior posts are occupied by police officers, the Intelligence Bureau is not a police organisation. At the same time, it has a symbiotic relationship with all police forces of the states, as also all central police organisations. The Intelligence Bureau provides a unique working environment and it is not unusual for officers who have served in the Intelligence Bureau, to share a special bond with each other, besides of course the bond of being brother police officers. The security and intelligence structures in the country have benefitted from officers who have worked in the Intelligence Bureau and these organisations have, in turn, contributed to the efficacy of the Intelligence Bureau.

The Bureau serves as the nodal point for coordination of intelligence and policing issues. It convenes the annual conference of state police and intelligence chiefs. It also organises events like the Inter-State Police Sports Meets and the Police Duty Meets. Many of the functions related to policing were transferred to the Bureau of Police Research and Development, which was carved out of the Intelligence Bureau in 1970. The Indian Police Journal, in fact, continued to

be published by the Intelligence Bureau for some years, even after the BPR&D was formed.

The Intelligence Bureau has a substantial technical cadre, which performs functions essential for running the organisation. These include providing support for communications and technical aids for the collection of intelligence.

The spread of the organisation throughout the country and the linking of every unit with the state capitals and the national capital, through speedy and multiple means of communication, constitute an important facet of the strength of the Intelligence Bureau. Each one of the units, whether at the district headquarters or in a remote area, is manned at all times and can be accessed for eliciting information. This network helps the organisation to report on developments in a timely fashion. Not infrequently, this organisational spread has proved extremely useful in reporting natural calamities like floods and earthquakes, as also for collecting information for other departments of the governments. Their utility in times of crises


has more than justified the built in redundancies in the communication networks.

Under the Rules of Business of the Government, 1925, the Director of Intelligence Bureau was attached to the Home Department for administrative convenience and was expected to provide, either on his own initiative or on request, information relating to the security of India to other Departments. The Director was to decide the manner and extent of sharing of information, commensurate with the requirement of safeguarding the secrecy of his sources and his channels of information. This mandate provided adequate guidance to the Director, Intelligence Bureau, how to best discharge his functions. The Group of Ministers, which made recommendations for National Security in 2001, thought it fit to specify a charter for the Intelligence Bureau. The organisation was designated as the nodal agency for counter-intelligence and counter-terrorism and was, pithily, charged with protection of the Constitution. This is a responsibility, that all personnel of the Intelligence Bureau discharge with sincerity and pride!

Just like that!

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The Reminiscences of an IB Officer

Shri T.V. Rajeswar, IPS (Retd.)

When I look back on the 21 years that I spent in the Intelligence Bureau (IB), a stream of thoughts and episodes come crowding to my mind. I reported at the Intelligence Bureau Headquarters, at North Block in April 1962. Prior to joining the IB, I was Deputy Commissioner (Law and Order), for the twin cities of Hyderabad and Secunderabad.

Those days selection to the IB was very exclusive and was invariably preceded by talent spotting and discussions with and by senior officers of IB, which formed the basis for assessing whether the candidate would be suitable for the IB. In my case, I first met the then DIB, Shri Bhola Nath Mullick, in 1957 when I was S.P., Guntur district. He was on a visit to Nagarjuna Sagar Dam near Guntur and I was asked to meet him. Shri Mullick asked me searching questions on various issues and my work as S.P. Guntur district, which was then the largest district in India, with 71 Police stations.

It was the system in the initial years of IB, that every new officer would undergo three weeks of tour in each of the three States of West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Kerala. These three States were known for Communist insurgency, and Communism was the main issue facing the country at that time.

After finishing my visits to these three States, my first posting was as OSD, Sikkim. The post was equivalent to the post of AD of any State. The special designation was due to the fact that Sikkim was then a protectorate and not a State of the country.

In Sikkim, I undertook a trek around the entire protectorate, starting from Gangtok and took the route of Chungthang — Thangu — Kongrala — Chholhamo — Yum Thang — Lachung and back to Gangtok. The tour took twelve days to

complete and I had to traverse heights up to 18,000 ft. in Kongrala. It was not a problem for me, since I was only 36 years of age and was accompanied by Shri Sonam Gyatso, DCIO, a mountaineer who later climbed, along with a few others, Mount Everest in 1965.

BHUTAN INTERLUDE

During my posting in Sikkim in 1962-1965, I had the occasion to visit Thimphu, the then capital of Bhutan, along with Shri Avtar Singh, Political Adviser for Sikkim and Bhutan. There was a crisis in Bhutan as the Prime Minister of Bhutan, Jigme Dorji had been shot by unknown assassins. Later, a team from India came to Thimphu for assisting the investigation. But in the interim period, the King of Bhutan, Jigme Wangchuk, whom I had occasion to meet and interact with, along with the Political Advisor, asked for my services, as his Security Advisor, and my deputation was approved a few days later. I spent about two years in Bhutan in 1965—1967, during which I was able to tour the entire State from East to West.

After finishing my assignment in Bhutan when I returned to IB, in mid 1967, I was asked to go to Siliguri and study the phenomenon of Naxalism, which had originated from Naxalbari. The movement had started as an anti-landlord struggle, led by two persons, Kanu Sanyal and Jangal Santhal. Charu Mazumdar was the Marxist theoretician, who later gave the movement a violent turn. The anti-landlord movement, which originated from Naxalbari in 1967, gave it the nomenclature of 'Naxalite movement'.

After I finished my study of naxalism in Siliguri area and returned to Headquarters, I was posted as Deputy Director (Security) and deputy to Joint Director, Shri G.C. Dutt.

As DD (Security), IB, I had occasion to accompany various VVIPs. I visited along with the then Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi, to Burma, presently known as Myanmar, in 1968, and to Afghanistan in 1969. I had also accompanied President Zakir Hussain to Nepal in 1968, President V.V. Giri to Sri Lanka in 1970, and later in 1974 to USSR, Bulgaria and Hungary.

THE BANGLADESH INTERLUDE

Soon after Mujibur Rehman was released from Jail in Karachi, in 1971, he returned to Dacca after a brief halt in Delhi. I was deputed as Security Advisor to President Mujibur Rehman. In Dacca, I visited and inspected the residence of the President and his office, and later accompanied him on one of his tours, which took him to Tangail, north of Dacca. During his tours, he was mobbed by people as well as the erstwhile freedom fighters, and security arrangements made for him were negligible. Later in Dacca, I trained a number of security officers on various techniques of VVIP security, for about two months. I also prepared a scheme for the security of Bangladesh President and gave it to him in 1972 at Calcutta, where he had come to address a mass meeting along with the Indian Prime Minister, Smt. Indira Gandhi.

Mujibur Rehman discussed the salient points of my scheme at Raj Bhavan, Calcutta. He more or less said he did not believe in any security precautions for himself and rejected my basic suggestion that he should move out from his home in Dhanmandi, which was without any protection. Mujibur Rehman asked, "who would cause any harm to Bangabandhu?". It was unfortunate that only a few months later, he was killed in his own residence by a few rogue Army officers of Bangladesh.

AS DIRECTOR, INTELLIGENCE BUREAU

I was appointed as Director, Intelligence Bureau in February 1980.

The NAM meet took place in New Delhi in March, 1983. Though BSF, ITBP and some army units were drafted for providing security by way of uniformed military and para-military units, the overall responsibility for looking after the security aspects of the Conference fell on the IB. A Special Officer, of the rank of Joint Director/

Joint Secretary, was appointed. who was directly responsible to DIB and this officer was to coordinate with MEA, with the visiting delegations as well as the military and para-military units. Dr. K.V.H. Padmanabhan, from the IB, was chosen for the job and though he was at the receiving end of flak from several quarters, I fully backed him and he discharged his duties satisfactorily. He was assisted by several young officers. The IB had asked various State Governments to depute young officers for being attached to various delegations, apart from IB officers, as the number of delegations were large and the requirements could not be met entirely from the Headquarters staff. The selected officers were given orientation training for a few days and I spoke to each one of them personally. Each of the officer was to get himself acquainted with the country whose delegation he would be attached to, as well as the VIP, his antecedents, etc. The officers were also given a crash course on security procedures.

All this was worth the trouble, as Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister suddenly decided that she would like to meet these officers and talk to them to satisfy herself that they were really suitable for the job. They were asked to report at No.1, Safdarjang Road residence, while I stayed behind at the IB Headquarters, quite confident that they would pass muster. Smt. Indira Gandhi talked to the officers, asked a few questions on their knowledge of the various countries and so on and returned them, quite satisfied with the officers selected and the training imparted.

As the delegations started arriving, our problems started mounting. All the visiting delegations had been clearly told, several weeks ahead, that weapons brought by Security Officers, accompanying the delegations, would have to be surrendered at the airport and would be returned to them when they left the country. As the responsibility of security within the country was solely that of the host country, no delegation would be allowed to retain any weapons, with any of their Security Officers. This was, however, observed more in breach than in practice. The outgoing Chairman of NAM, Fidel Castro of Cuba, would not move or go to any function without his bodyguard, who was a high ranking army officer and a long associate of Castro. In his case we permitted him to go even inside the Vigyan

Bhavan, armed with his high-powered revolver. As for Yasser Arafat, the security procedure had to be relaxed even more, as he would never be without his revolver in his holster, which was a permanent fixture on his person.

Saddam Hussein and Col. Gaddafi wanted to bring two plane loads of armed security men each. But we refused permission and both of them cancelled their visit.

The NAM inauguration went off without any hitch on March 7, and the Conference went on till March 12. On its conclusion, Dr. Alexander conveyed the PM's personal congratulations and thanks to the IB officers, and I was asked to send recommendations for medals, rewards, etc. to select staff. President Zia Ul Haq of Pakistan was also quite impressed with the arrangements and he went round various rooms of the Conference complex, for about an hour, and expressed considerable admiration for the arrangements made. A couple of weeks later, he sent his IGP from Islamabad to study the arrangements and also meet the officers concerned and discuss with them about the same. The IGP from Pakistan met me at the IB Headquarters and I put him on to the concerned officers.

AS LT. GOVERNOR, ARUNACHAL PRADESH

In 1983, I was appointed as Lt. Governor of Arunachal Pradesh, which was earlier an Union Territory, consisting of the North Eastern Frontier Area (NEFA). It was the first constitutional appointment for any IPS officer.

During my tenure of two years and three months as Lt. Governor, Arunachal Pradesh, some of the more important events were as follows:

Smt. Indira Gandhi, the then Prime Minister visited Itanagar for a day on February, 4 1984. She addressed a public meeting and later spoke to the MLAs and the Ministers. She also visited the Ramakrishna Mission Hospital, and after lunch at the Raj Niwas, took off for Guwahati, enroute to Delhi.

During her short stay, she asked me about the state of affairs in the Union Territory, and I told her that an important problem which I was facing

pertained to the continuous pressure from the ministers and MLAs, for grant of licences for opening saw mills and if such permissions were given, the forests of Arunachal would get denuded at a fast rate. While speaking to the Ministers and MLAs, she told them to preserve the forest wealth of Arunachal and not to let too many saw mills come up in the area.

President Giani Zail Singh visited Itanagar on March 4-5, 1984. During his visit he was in a relaxed mood and at the time of his morning walk within the Raj Niwas complex, Gianiji spoke freely on men and matters with me.

On April 13, I visited Vijaynagar, which is the farthest point of India in the East, with Putao across the border in Burma. The helicopter trip from Miao took nearly an hour to reach this spot. The tribes of Yobins and Lishus inhabited the area and they were mostly Christians of Burmese origin. Their hair style and clothes were quite different from the rest of the tribes in the area.

On April 25, we were camping at Tippi in East Kameng district, on the banks of the turbulent river Kameng. This was a well known habitat of the hornbills and I could see a lot of them coming home to roost in the evening. Tippi was also the centre for orchids and a devoted team of agricultural scientists was stationed there. In the evening, I saw a wild elephant swimming across the strong current of Kameng river and crossing over before disappearing into the wilds. It was one of those rare sights which one comes across most unexpectedly.

On the evening of July 28, 1984, a tiger cub strayed into the Raj Niwas grounds from the thick jungle adjoining the compound, on the western side. The sentry at a post was shaken when the tiger came and sat a few yards away from him, staring at him. The sentry went on hitting the wooden floor of the sentry post with his rifle butt to scare away the cub, but the cub took its own time before moving away. Unfortunately, nobody else saw the tiger cub, but the sentry's version was corroborated by the pug marks at the site.

I was flying from Calcutta to Jorhat in the morning flight on August 13, 1984 and while approaching Jorhat I could see on my left a rare sight of the three great peaks of Everest, Kangchanjanga and

Chhomohlohri, all of them juxtaposed in a row, at a distance of over 500 odd miles. It was a grand sight indeed.

AS GOVERNOR OF SIKKIM

I was sworn in as Governor of Sikkim on November 21, 1985. This was the first time that an IPS officer or an IB officer was appointed as Governor of a State. In May 1975, after a referendum had been carried out, Sikkim had merged with India.

After the death of the Maharajah, the Maharajkumar succeeded him and I was present at the coronation ceremony, which took place in the autumn of 1965. Smt. Indira Gandhi had represented Government of India at the ceremony.

AS GOVERNOR OF WEST BENGAL

My appointment as Governor of West Bengal was notified on February 19, 1989. I was sounded about the impending change, about four months before the appointment was formally announced. My equation with Chief Minister, Jyoti Basu, as Governor and Chief Minister, was cordial. During our periodical meetings, we used to discuss about men and matters freely and frankly.

In our meeting on June 21, 1989, the recent events in China, centering around the serious incidents at the Tiananmen Square, on the night of June 3-4, were discussed. He said that his colleagues and himself in the CPM Politbureau, deplored the total failure of Communist party of China and its administration in not anticipating events, especially since trouble had been brewing for over six weeks. I told him that calling out the tanks to put down the student agitation was extraordinary. In such a situation in India, the police force, followed by para-military forces and then, in the event of their inability to handle the situation, the infantry units of the army would be called in, but never the tanks. Mr. Basu said that some of his colleagues, and he himself, had asked for a meeting with the Chinese Ambassador in Delhi and these questions would be posed to him. Mr. Basu was also critical of the apparent intelligence failure in China, in not finding out what was brewing amongst the student community. According to Mr. Basu, there were about 45,000 students in Beijing University alone, with a large number of foreigners, mostly

American, and it was surprising that the brewing trouble was not detected earlier.

THE WIDOWS OF BENGAL IN VRINDAVAN AND VARANASI

From time immemorial, predating the coming of the Aryans, worship of Mother has been an honoured and celebrated tradition, and an entrenched religious practice in Bengal. Bengal celebrates the Puja with gay abandon. It was, therefore, particularly sad that the joint families could not look after elderly women, especially the widows, and that there were so many more or less abandoned widows from Bengal ekeing out a precarious living at the pilgrim centres of Varanasi and Vrindavan. There were several widows, most of them sent away by their children, taking advantage of an ancient tradition of the elderly wanting to spend their last days in the holy Kashi. The monthly remittances for the widows tapered off after a few months and thereafter they were entirely left at the mercy of the religious establishments at the pilgrim centres. They had to, unless unable to move due to sickness, attend a few hours of singing sessions at the temples and then allowed to receive money or rice, which would enable them to have frugal meals. It was difficult to count the exact number of widows at these pilgrim centres but the largest number of them were from West Bengal.

I discussed this matter with Shri Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, the Minister for Social Welfare and requested him to examine the ways and means of repatriating the Bengal widows to shelters administered by Government around Calcutta, and also to pay them old-age pension, which was being done in some other form by the state. I also convened a meeting of the presidents and secretaries of nearly 70 social welfare organizations which were listed out by the government. Mrs. Renuka Ray, a well-known social worker, agreed to become the President of the newly formed organization called Shanti Vishram, with Dr. Roma Chaudhury as Vice-President and Mr. Rusi B. Gimi as General Secretary. The society was intended to assist the State Government in repatriating the widows and providing them with shelter and sustenance. On the eve of my departure from West Bengal in Feb. 1990, Mrs. Ray wrote to me saying that

my sudden departure had come as a shock, but the initiative taken for the cause of the widows suffering in Banaras and Vrindavan would be followed up. The plight of the widows there, however, continues to be more or less the same.

PROBLEM OF BANGLADESHI MIGRANTS

The problem of migration of Bangladeshi's into India has been of considerable importance from the national security point of view. As DIB, I was aware of the problem which was slowly but steadily becoming more and more serious. During the time of Mr. B.N. Mullick, who was DIB from 1950 to 1964, he had closely studied the issue and suggested a series of important measures to be taken by the Centre and the States. However, due to various reasons, including political compulsions, they were not implemented adequately.

After I assumed office as Governor of West Bengal. I went into the matter in great detail and I found that the problem was far more serious than I had perceived earlier. On this issue, I had written to the President, the Prime Minister and the Home Minister regularly, during my stay in Calcutta. In my very first monthly report for March, 1989 sent to the President of India on April 6, with copies to the Prime Minister and Home Minister, I referred to my discussions with the Chief Secretary, the Home Secretary and the IG, BSF in charge of Bangladesh border on March 14 and 17, and the problem of Bangladesh immigrants. In my second report for the month of April 1989, I had drawn attention to this problem, which was politicised by Vishwa Hindu Parishad in its Press Conference at Calcutta on April 20. In my third report for the month of May 1989, I had referred to this matter in fuller detail since I had, meanwhile, visited the North Bengal districts of Cooch Behar, Jalpaiguri, Darjeeling and West Dinajpur. I also had discussions with the Minister of External Affairs Mr. P.V. Narasimha Rao on May 4, 1989 at Delhi.

After my tour in the North Bengal districts, when I visited the border checkpoints and discussed the problem with local officials and the BSF officers concerned, I wrote a detailed letter to Chief Minister Jyoti Basu on June 5, 1989. The relevant paragraph of this letter is given below:

"The question of influx of infiltrants/migrants/refugees from Bangladesh is becoming a serious factor which has to be taken note of. I am aware of the correspondence on the subject between the State Government and the Centre and the States request for strengthening MTF as well as tightening of Passport and Visa formalities, and I fully endorse these suggestions. The BSF which mans BOPs along the border is being almost doubled and a strategic road is being constructed as a long-term measure along the border. However, there seems to be no awareness on the part of the people in the North Bengal districts, of the serious implications of such influx/infiltration. In none of the four districts, did any MLA or Sabhadipati refer to this issue on his own, and even when I invited them to give their views on this question, they did not seem to consider it as a serious matter. As you are aware, the Muslim percentage of the population in the districts of Murshidabad, Malda and present West Dinajpur was 58.66, 45.79 and 30.97 respectively, as per 1981 census. The decadal growth rate of Muslim population in 1981 in West Bengal was 29.6% while the overall growth of the State was 23.2%. The serious demographic and geo-political implications of this phenomenon are indeed serious."

After the Janata Dal Government assumed office at the Centre, I wrote in January 1990 to Mr. I.K. Gujral with copy to the Prime Minister and the Home Minister, suggesting that a detailed study may be carried out by a committee consisting of senior officers from the ministries of External Affairs and Home, as well as from the State Governments of West Bengal and Bihar, followed by a thorough census, along with the national census of 1991, to ascertain the dimensions of the problem of Bangladeshi immigrants into India. I left Calcutta on Feb.6, 1990.

From 1991 to 2004 I was in Delhi, writing articles periodically to various newspapers and magazines. In May, 2004, I was appointed as Governor, Uttar Pradesh. I served as Governor, UP till May, 2009. Thereafter, I returned to Delhi resuming my usual activities.



Dormers Building, Shimla

The Dormers building, housing the office of Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau, Shimla, is one of the first offices of the Intelligence Bureau. It is a heritage building, constructed in the late nineteenth century. A specimen of British colonial architecture, it evokes nostalgia of Swiss chalets and English country buildings. The two-storeyed main building, having dimensions of 95' x 30', 70' x 40' and 10' x 10', was constructed in "dhajji style", from stone and mud, while the studio room (41½' x 12'9"), record room (58' x 18'9"), peons' quarters (95' x 11½') and incinerator were constructed with brick and lime. The 'dhajji' structure consists of wooden frames, primarily of termite proof cedar wood, over a stone base. Clumps of wet earth with stone pieces/ballast were compiled and closely packed into the wooden frames, and thereafter surfaces were plastered with a coat of mud and lime. The external finish of the building is of grit plaster using pebbles. Doors and windows are of cedar wood and have not been changed since its construction. The use of local stone and sloping wooden roof gives it an organic quality, which harmonises with the local landscape.

Indian Intelligence — Imperatives for Change

Shri Ajit Doval, IPS (Retd.)

In a constant race against time and ever searching for new ideas to defeat the ingenuity of their adversaries, for intelligence agencies to change is not an option, but a compulsive necessity. Regrettably, those who change only when they have to, pay an un-affordably high price. Worse, it is often preceded by a nation bruised, if not bled. Imaginative changes, innovation in tools of intelligence generation and analysis, and constant up-gradation of capacities can only keep them a step ahead of their adversaries. This paper analyses the dynamics of change in the Indian context, and some of the new realities that Indian intelligence needs to factor in for designing its strategy for change.

Intelligence agencies, consciously or otherwise, pursue three discernable patterns of change. First is the evolutionary pattern. Accounting for most of the changes, these are slow, routine and continuous in nature. They are mostly triggered by contemporaneous developments, leading to resetting of priorities, leadership changes in organizational hierarchies and evolving pressures within the organizations to address professional, structural or administrative problems. Though un-noticed, these changes are vital as they keep intelligence agencies progressive, time consistent and forward looking, through constant course correction and problem solving. Most of these changes are effected within the organization and do not impact on the working arrangements with other organs of the Government, or involve changes in law or Government's Rules of Business. Though known to few, the score board of Indian Intelligence, particularly the Intelligence Bureau, on this count, has been outstanding. Even in the absence of additional resources, new empowerments and living with security insensitive, if not illiterate, culture of governance, it has been able to bring about changes in

real time to face new problems of insurgency, terrorism, espionage, border intrusions, socio-political conflicts, etc., even in the remotest parts of the country. Decisional autonomy enjoyed by the Director, Intelligence Bureau, his proximity to political leadership, a strong culture of loyalty and *esprit de corps* within the organization, besides quality leadership at various levels, have made this possible. However, the great contribution of evolutionary changes notwithstanding, it needs to be underlined that the phenomenon operates within a limited band-width and cannot address fundamental infirmities. It is unfit to bring about changes that have a long gestation period, involve high expenditure, require major technological or structural changes or have legal implications. It also cannot alter basic approaches towards security management, of which intelligence is only one component, particularly in a ruckus democracy like India. One down side of such in-house innovations and improvisations is that it makes the Governments complacent, mistaking the success of fire fighting efforts as a solution to the cause of fire. Quite often, the forewarnings and ignored pleas for action to offset the impending threats in India, go unaccounted and unpunished, making systemic failures revisit with vengeance.

The second set of changes may be called 'reformist'. They are triggered by some major reverses or failures forcing the Governments, either on their own volition or under pressure of public opinion, to bring about fundamental changes. Changes following the attack on Pearl Harbour and post war emergence of Communist threat to the US, India's 1962 Chinese debacle, post 9/11 threat of jihadi terrorism etc. fall in this category. Often Governments appoint enquiry commissions or experts committees to study the failures, analyze the causes and recommend

reforms. Warren Commission, on the assassination of President Kennedy, Senate Committee on the Watergate Scandal, Shah Commission on the role of intelligence during emergency in India etc. are illustrative. They examine not only the internal workings of the organization but also functional relativity with organizations and systems outside the intelligence community. Public committees serve a very useful purpose as they are able to examine and evaluate the functioning of intelligence agencies in the broader context of political environment, systems of governance and legal-constitutional framework. However, at times, meant only to serve political purpose or silence mounting public criticism, these committees are less than objective and swayed by extra-professional considerations. They also often get over influenced by populist perceptions of the causes and remedies, which are not always correct. Consequently, their findings and recommendations do not always lead to improvements in the efficiency and effectiveness of intelligence agencies. The Shah Commission's findings and recommendations are a case in point. On the contrary, committees on reforms that are led by the professionals, are able to come out with more specific, incisive and 'doable' recommendations. The Shankar Nair Committee report, despite its limited mandate on intelligence reforms, came out with some highly commendable recommendations.

The third category comprises changes that are brought about by intelligence agencies on their own, or in conjunction with the larger security set up of the country, envisioning futuristic threats and challenges. Transformational in character, they involve constructing future scenarios, assessing the environment in which intelligence agencies will have to operate and calculating gaps between existing capacities and those required to meet emerging threats. This exercise necessitates intensive study of futuristic trends, their implications for national security, analyzing policy options and formulating strategy for change. Forecasting intelligence needs of the country, it should attempt to architect new doctrines, suggest structural changes, aim at optimization of resources and examine administrative and legislative changes required for empowerment of intelligence agencies. While intelligence agencies in developed countries frequently attempt this

exercise, the Indian intelligence has rarely made a conscious effort in this direction. One such exercise was carried out in the late eighties in the Intelligence Bureau on the initiative of Shri M. K. Narayanan, just before he was tipped to take over as the chief.

At the national level, the Report of the Group of Ministers on National Security in 2001, was the first macro level attempt in this direction. Though it came as an aftermath of the Subramaniam Committee report on Kargil, it was an integrated futuristic attempt to restructure national security under four categories namely, defence, intelligence, internal security and border management. It came with some outstanding recommendations, but unfortunately with the change in regime the momentum of change could not be sustained. One of the major recommendations, that was lost sight of, pertained to the review of the national security by a high powered Groups of Ministers, every five years. If implemented, there would have been perspective action plans for intelligence and other reforms in 2006 and 2011. For this category of changes to be really effective, a political will is necessary, that requires serious and enthusiastic involvement of senior political leadership of the country. In India, national security is a low agenda item, except when the nation finds itself in the midst of a serious security crisis. Unfortunately, that is the most ineffective setting for change. In an ideal situation, the Government should develop a long term bi-partisan consensus for these transformational changes.

It needs to be emphasized that both the evolutionary and reformist approaches to change, though important by themselves, are inadequate to meet threats of the future. These approaches to change are premised on the assumption that if shortcomings of the past were redressed, the future would be safe. They allow us to analyse the causes of failure, examine existing systems and processes, and suggest readjustment to prevent their recurrence. The broader legal, administrative and security frameworks are taken for granted; presuming that intelligence would be able to deliver the moon only through changes within — every time, everywhere. Unfortunately, this is an erroneous premise. At best, they equip

the country to win the war that is already over.

Reforms exclusively based on experience of the past suffer from another infirmity. They fail to factor in the innovations and transformations that the adversaries keep on bringing about in their capacities, resources, strategies, collaborative networks, technology, equipments, targets, modus operandi etc. As former US Secretary of Defence, Donald Rumsfeld, reflecting on the 21st century threats, observed that changes will have to be fast and constant to "defend against the unknown, the uncertain, the unseen and the unexpected". These sets of changes, though more valid in operational areas of intelligence generation like trade craft, surveillance, penetration, technology improvisation etc. also have relevance in tools of analysis.

Indian intelligence in the next ten years should press into action an integrated strategy for change, incorporating a judicious mix of all the three sets of changes namely, evolutionary, reformist and transformational. In working out this strategy for change, in addition to its long conventional experience, it may be necessary to factor in some new emerging realities. Following are few such factors that may impact intelligence work in the years ahead.

Indian Intelligence, in times ahead, will have to operate under greater public gaze, media scrutiny and accountability regimen. It will have to develop capability to operate in a translucent, if not transparent environment. One of the conventional strengths of the intelligence organizations have been their ability to operate in a relatively opaque and insulated environment. It was an accepted norm that in the larger security interests of the state and safety of its people, intelligence agencies be allowed to operate outside the public gaze. Even outside the government, there was a tacit acceptance of this reality and the media, courts, scholars and analysts etc. implicitly respected this privilege and were careful not to draw them into public controversies or expose their activities that might undermine national or public interest. Criticism was mostly confined to intelligence production when it was felt that intelligence agencies had failed to alert or forewarn the governments. Except the interested political groups who occasionally

levelled charges on the use of intelligence for political purposes, the intelligence processes, by and large, remained under a veil of secrecy. This provided the requisite deniability to the intelligence professionals, even when they had no legal cover to carry out their secretive functions.

The voluntary restraint exercised, was not so much to protect the intelligence agencies or the governments, but more to deny undue advantage to the enemies of the state, who stood to gain by such exposures. Today, one of the main sources of intelligence for the terrorists, spies and saboteurs are media reports. They learn about the thinking and policies of the Government, movements and plans of the security agencies, details about arrests of their gang members and disclosures made by them, the people and places on the radar of intelligence agencies etc. through open sources. In addition, media provides wide and prominent coverage to violent groups and their depredations, which enables them to get wide publicity and achieve the objective of terrorizing the people. It also enables them to discredit and demoralize the governments in power - the political objective of perpetrating terrorist actions. The live coverage of Mumbai 26/11 terrorist attack, that was being monitored by mentors of the terrorist group in Karachi, and who in turn were directing tactical movements of the terrorists, is a case in point.

In times ahead, this problem is going to get further deepened and accentuated. Soft states with open democracies, like India, will find themselves particularly vulnerable. For political reasons, legal restraints or advisories to the media will neither be enforceable nor advisable. Frequency and intensity of front organizations, supporting the cause of anti-national forces, and masquerading as human right groups, to put pressure on the intelligence and security agencies will show a marked increase. Even, demands for inclusion of intelligence agencies, or at least part of their activities, covered under the Right to Information Act, may find political support.

Unlike in the past when it was not a tabooed subject, intelligence has entered the arena of public discourse. We have to accept the reality as it is and not as we wish it to be. Not only the intelligence production – which can be a legitimate matter of public concern – but even the processes, structures

and systems will increasingly come under public scrutiny. Demands for parliamentary oversight, intervention in internal administrative matters, resistance to legal empowerment, like in the case of National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC), etc. are indicative of the changing environment. It will be desirable for the Indian intelligence agencies to start revisiting their systems and making preparations for change, compatible with the future realities, without undermining vital national interest.

The Intelligence agencies should start deliberating on a public interface mechanism which, in the long run, may even include a media and public relations exercise. The way Indian democracy is evolving, it will be in the national interest to educate the media and have working relation with it, rather than allow it to go haywire for want of knowledge and authentic information. A well thought out action plan, on this count, may take two to three years before it is made operational.

Secondly, it will be desirable to have a group of experienced officers examine the entire working of the IB and R&AW and re-visit its security needs, through VED-analysis. Through a calibrated strategy, it can secure vital secrets that may impinge on national security, while allowing controlled oversight by parliamentary or other bodies, where it will not hurt the vitals. Besides changes in tradecraft doctrines and practices, the changes will involve, a whole new regimen of security re-classification, changes in documentation and filing systems, communications, maintenance of records, weeding out of files etc. Intelligence agencies should be able to bring about this change in the next three to four years.

Technology will have to be another focus area for transformational change. This has two distinct dimensions in intelligence. First is neutralizing efforts of the adversaries to acquire and operationalise technologies to undermine our national security. The second, pertains to up-gradation and integration of state of art technologies by us to enhance our own defensive and offensive capacities.

The rate at which terrorists, spies, saboteurs and hostile intelligence agencies are acquiring new technologies, poses a serious threat. These

include a whole ambit of weapon systems, explosives, communication equipments, defeat systems against conventional intelligence tradecraft etc. Recently, the use of social media for creating lawlessness and inciting people to violence has underlined the scope of technology driven threats. Incessant efforts being made by the jihadi terrorists to acquire radioactive explosive devices (dirty bombs), is a matter of serious concern. With the conditions of instability in Af-Pak region getting accentuated after 2014 drawdown, ideologically motivated Islamists taking charge of senior positions in Pakistan Army and intelligence setups, deepening collaborative linkages of ISI with home grown radical groups like Indian Mujahedeen, in India, the intelligence challenges will get compounded manifold. Terrorist groups are also fast acquiring capabilities of safe communication which will render the task of interception quite difficult. In the area of defence, fast technological up-gradation through heavy investments being made by hostile intelligence agencies like ISI of Pakistan, MSS of China etc. in electronic warfare, offensive cyber capabilities, space surveillance, maritime encirclement of India etc. will have to be factored in for developing counter capabilities.

Another aspect of technology in intelligence work relates to acquisition, improvisation and integration of new technologies. Though its necessity is disputed by none, the intricacies are understood by few. India's strategic partnership with the US and greater security cooperation with the West notwithstanding, no developed country will share real state of the art intelligence technologies with India, particularly as a total system. Even where the second rung technologies are made available, they are fraught with danger, as the suppliers will insist on not transferring the codes or allowing us to change them without their involvement. Secrecy of our systems in this dispensation is seriously undermined. India will do well to take advantage of the offset clause in acquisition of defence equipment and use part of it for indigenous production of intelligence equipment. With India purchasing over \$100 billion worth of defence equipments in the next seven to eight years, 30% of it under the offset clause, provides us a huge investment opportunity for this. Development of internal Research and Development capabilities are

extremely expensive and time consuming. Unfortunately, even in areas where such initiatives were viable, we were not able to exploit them due to paucity of funds and lack of futuristic vision in organizational leadership. The coming up of the National Technical Research Organisation (NTRRO) is a welcome move but its functioning so far does not inspire confidence. Its focus should be more on developing intelligence technological capabilities rather than getting involved in intelligence production, for which it is least qualified.

Revolution in informatics and emerging cyber threats will constitute another area of challenge for the security agencies. The task of handling massive open data emanating from diverse sources, both secret and classified, will make the task of analysis quite difficult. Deliberate efforts to use the information highways for disinformation, propaganda and subversion, will compound the problem. Of late, many youth in different parts of the world are being sucked into the vortex of radicalism, without any physical contact. Concurrently, terrorist and other anti-national forces are acquiring capabilities to wage cyber wars, targeting critical infrastructure, intrusion in classified domains, damaging vital national data etc. The challenge is compounded by the fact that the perpetrators are able to operate from unknown destinations, using inaccessible platforms, thousands of miles away from Indian soil.

Another futuristic challenge against which Indian intelligence will have to brace itself will be its capacity and resilience to cope with challenges of Covert Action (CA) and the Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW). The traditional use of military power to further a nation's strategic, political or economic interests has been undergoing a change since the late eighties. This trend is going to further consolidate in times ahead.

With wars increasingly becoming cost-ineffective ventures of unpredictable consequences, Covert Action will increasingly be used as a new variant of 'war through other means', to achieve strategic and political objectives. Covert Action, is a deliberate state policy, directed against the target state manifesting itself in various forms like engineering political instability, causing

social disruption, retarding economic progress, accentuating disaffection and unrest in civil society and manipulating media. In violent forms, it includes promoting terrorism and insurgencies, political assassinations, social disruption, sabotage, subversion etc. It is a low cost sustainable offensive with high deniability, aimed to bleed the enemy to submission. Moral pretensions and international laws notwithstanding, this option has been equally used by developed countries like USA, in Afghanistan against the Soviets and poor countries like Pakistan against India in Kashmir, Punjab etc. Unfortunately, the doctrine of 'protecting supreme national interests through all means' has bypassed India.

Conventionally, the causes, instrumentalities, resources and consequences of internal threats are domestic, as against the external threats, in which they are of external origin. However, in the new dispensation, internal security has become highly vulnerable to external manipulations. Hostile powers target it to achieve their politico-strategic objectives by internally bleeding the adversary, exploiting its internal faultlines. In Covert Action (CA) the planning, motivation, finances and often manpower is of the sponsoring country and so is the strategic objective it is aimed to achieve. Today, in India, while conventional internal threats involving violence are steadily on the decline, threats from externally sponsored covert action has gone up several notches. Though beleaguered for nearly two decades, India has failed to develop capabilities and a viable national response to the CA threats, both at the strategic and tactical levels. Response has been episodal with short memories, often with time consistency not lasting beyond the next election. CA is a threat against which Indian intelligence will have to develop capabilities, both in defensive and offensive-defense modes. Their role will assume added importance since in this war intelligence agencies would be primary, if not the sole, players. Besides collection of intelligence, the new role will necessitate proactive and interventionist operational actions requiring adequate legal empowerment. Seen in this perspective, opposition to the National Counter Terrorism Centre (NCTC) in India was ill-advised.

Thus, both the internal and external adversaries will try to achieve their political objectives by coercing the Government through internal

violence and destabilisation. This will increasingly take the world to what is known as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), conflicts in which the civil society will play a primary role. The subversive and violent groups disguise themselves as crusaders of disaffected or alienated sections of the society and indulge in violence and other unlawful activities. This will be a war against the invisible enemy hiding within the civil society, stunning to silence the majority through violence, fear and terror and making the governance impossible for its inability to protect them. Inability of the Governments to protect their civil societies and redress their genuine grievances, make them highly vulnerable to the mechanizations of hostile intelligence agencies.

The future pattern of conflicts would increasingly be more civil society centric. This fight against an invisible enemy, conceptualised as Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW), will aim at collapsing the enemy internally rather than physically destroying him through military might. As observed by William Lind, "Distinction between war and peace will be blurred to the vanishing point." In this nonlinear war against the invisible enemy, there will no defined battle fields and the difference between civil and military targets would get obliterated. The disaffected and alienated sections of the society will be targeted by the enemies, both within and outside, to provide cause and the cover for subversive and violent actions. State security apparatus with high fire power, mobility, technology and logistic base will find themselves at a loss to fight this battle, where there is no defined territory to be dominated and visible enemy to be destroyed. Propaganda, skilful use of media and information intervention may be extensively used by the adversaries to discredit and delegitimise lawfully established governments. Actions taken by the government to protect law abiding citizens or to enforce rule of law will be portrayed as persecution and oppression, further eroding government's

legitimacy. American war in Vietnam and Soviet Union's fight in Afghanistan are illustrative. Intelligence will be the primary instrumentality through which these wars would be fought. To fight these futuristic conflicts, the intelligence agencies will have to build an extensive network of agents of information and influence among potentially vulnerable sections of the society. Psy-war capabilities, integrating modern state-of-art technologies, will have to be adopted. A US study paper on 'The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation' has rightly asserted that "Fourth generation adversaries will be adept at manipulating the media to alter domestic and world opinion to the point where skillful use of psychological operations will sometimes preclude the commitment of combat forces. Television news may become a more powerful operational weapon than armored divisions." India with its social fault lines, economic inequalities and fragmented polity is highly vulnerable to civil society conflicts that can lead to instability. The external factor in the form of activities of hostile intelligence agencies, foreign NGOs with a political agenda, trans-border ideological influence of some radical or extremist groups etc., can exploit alienated groups to their advantage. Though these threats have existed for quite some time but with revolution in informatics, accessibility to new technologies and collaborative networking among anti-national forces these may become more extensive and acute in future. Indian intelligence will have to develop new capabilities to meet these threats.

The challenges that Indian intelligence is going to face in the years ahead will be much more serious and complex. India's emergence as a major power centre, provides it an opportunity, as also adds to its vulnerability. There is a need to work out a long term strategy for transformational changes, on one hand and internal reforms, on the other. Under a time bound programme, a plan of action should be prepared and pressed into action with full earnestness.

A Journey that turned my Destiny

Shri Shyamal Datta, IPS (Retd.)

My voyage to the world of Intelligence began rather late for a variety of reasons. Instead of the year 1969, I set sail to report to the Intelligence Bureau (IB), New Delhi only in January, 1979, after having served in three districts as Superintendent of Police and Divisional Commissioner of Police in Calcutta. The creature comforts of life in Police, made the initial years of 'battle inoculation' in this great Institution, somewhat difficult to bear. It was not easy to adjust to the unwritten convention of "doing everything yourself" in the IB.

In the midst of trying to come to terms with the 'new culture', the training in the Basic Intelligence Course breathed a fresh air of novelty, of learning something new and in such depth. The fact that Intelligence, like the Law Enforcement, is an intricate science was not known. A glimpse into the world of unknown went a long way in kindling an urge to know more and more in the vast field of knowledge which, in turn, helped overcome the pains of leading the life of an "aam admi".

After the basic training, began the most difficult period of months of understudy of the Desk Officer, under the supervision of seniors, known to be brilliant in their areas of specialization and hard task masters. They would not express any annoyance or displeasure at omissions and commissions, but through merciless correction of drafts presented for their vetting, would convey very loud and clear, in "silence", that there were glaring inadequacies in the analysis, and would express the same analysis with brevity and lucidity. They would also inspire and mould the young mind to read, think and to question. However, it would be left to the "green horn" to decipher and take initiative to hone all the skills required for analysis and the IB style of writing.

Side by side with this, emphasis was laid on mastering the art of making oral presentation of

the assessment report, in brief, for the benefit of the DIB every week, in the forum of the Friday Meeting. The quality of presentation would be judged, in general, by the impression it left in the minds of listeners. The institutionalised mechanism of Friday Meeting singularly helped instilling the aptitude of speaking in public with clarity and confidence. I still recall the sweets I had to offer as per the prevalent practice, to my colleagues, including seniors, for the compliments I received on my maiden performance in the Friday Meeting.

Another unique feature was the 'Lunch Club' where all the officers attached to different analytical desks, would assemble during the lunch break and learn how to break bread with one another. This, not only provided some measure of relief, after the arduous morning session of the day's work, but also infused a feeling of togetherness. Notes were also exchanged, in general, on latest happenings in different parts of the country while sharing the lunch. That's how the process of cementing of bonds began to make learning interesting.

With the passage of time, a realisation dawned that an 'unstated and inbuilt' design in the grooming of a new entrant in the IB was first to de-romanticize the mind and bring the officer down to a level where he would be required to slowly assimilate the essential ingredients of a life, which would be faceless, shorn of pomp and splendour, associated with the uniform job and behind the curtain, characterised by anonymity. All these called for tremendous understanding and adjustment through continuous mental training.

Another implicit focus of the great Institution was on "self development". Nothing would be done to impose any thing from above to make

one develop. The all pervasive culture would be such that the quest for learning and excellence would gradually get ingrained and supplement in ample measure, the learning under a 'Guru' in the office. The wisdom would guide that while resources of the Organisation were limited, the potential of the resource called 'self', innate in every one of us, was most enormous and unlimited. The development of this valuable resource would depend on the discipline and calibre of the "self" to harness its huge potential and make a difference.

We were made to realise and appreciate, all the time, that an internal teacher existed in every one of us. It must assert to train the mind and body with the help of three instruments of instinct, reasoning and inspiration. The instrument of instinct helped make the mind alert and sensitive to anticipate danger, judge human behaviour, and take steps to ward off adversities. The reasoning, on the other hand, instilled qualities of interpretation, analysis, assessment, understanding and expression. Lastly, the inspiration trained the mind to be imaginative, innovative, motivated and creative. For an optimum development of these traits, all the instruments needed to work in harmony.

A new facet of life in Intelligence opened for me when I was posted at Patna, as the Station Chief, Bihar. The focus of work shifted to production, with proper assessment of the reliability, of intelligence inputs catered to Headquarters. The state of Bihar was then one of the most politically active in the country. It was among the disturbed States on account of the Left Wing Extremist movement and separatist movements that raged in its tribal belt. Both offered enormous operational opportunities for the SIB to try and influence the course of these movements, and enlarge the domain of peace. The breakthroughs made at the leadership levels of the two streams of movement, helped create capacity to prevail over the State Government to try and improve governance in the affected areas, and assuage the feelings of the aggrieved, down-trodden people. Efforts helped in some measure, moderating the temper and tenor of the mass movements. The influence sustained on the mind of the tribal leadership later, helped pave the way for the resolution of conflict through the creation of new states.

The long stint of over six years, turned out to be indeed a very fulfilling and satisfying experience. Regular briefings of the Chief Minister and the Governor helped knowing governance from inside. The exchange of views helped prepare better to meet the requirements of the Government, and the challenges confronting the state. The state, on its part, involved the SIB in all policy matters relating to security and intelligence. The most satisfying moment that I cherished for long, was the benign observation made by the Chief Minister, Shri Bindeswari Dubey, to the visiting Special Director, IB, from New Delhi that the best informed outfit in the state was the SIB, and that his Government heavily depended on it.

On return to IB Headquarters, (April 1997) after doing a stint of two and a half years as the Director, Special Protection Group (SPG), I noticed a marked spurt in the demand for actionable intelligence to deal with the growing surge and dimensions of the militancy of extremist organisations from the late 80s. The collective wisdom went in for a real stepping up of the operational capabilities, on a larger scale upto the SIBx level, taking the state Police under its wings. This called for substantial accretion in the deployment as well as use of both soft and hardware, required for better technical, trans-border, operational, and human intelligence. In supplementing the initiatives, the state Police also got seriously engaged in the building up of its own operational mechanism, by specially training personnel for its specialised wings, with adequate wherewithal. It helped reinforce the bonds of cooperation and collaboration between the States and the Centre, on operational planes.

Simultaneously, both the IB and the R&AW decided to harness and optimise the utilisation of their resources and regular sharing of real time intelligence, so as to impart greater thrust to intelligence operations. The excellent professional relations that grew between the IB and the R&AW, on the one hand, and the State Police, on the other, not only brought about a marked shift in the mind-set of both Intelligence and Law Enforcement but also a great refinement in the overall response to detect, deter and disrupt terror, its plans and preparations, besides infrastructure and operational bases. The present

day architecture fashioned on the basis of the recommendations of the Kargil Report, has been an improvement in terms of better monitoring of the development of intelligence input, both tactical and strategic, and coordination and concerted action, enlisting participation of other agencies, including the CPOs.

During the Kargil conflict, my unhappy experience was that valuable inputs shared by the IB with the Army and others on the mobilisation and plans of the '*Jehadi*' elements across Kargil sector, did not receive the attention that the gravity of the report deserved. It was not subjected to proper scrutiny by the military minds in the field, to test and retest its veracity, with reference to the situation and developments that prevailed in the bordering areas along Kargil. Had this been done, the Army would have asked from the IB additional inputs, in order to put together the pieces of the puzzle for action. Unfortunately, the valuable contents of the report remained without any proper examination. This only showed the mind set of the Armed Forces to often treat intelligence input, including those catered by its own Military Intelligence, with a sense of disbelief and disdain. In the process, intelligence died a premature death for being ignored. No wonder, the worst enemy of intelligence is often, none other than its own consumers.

In sharp contrast to this, Intelligence received much greater appreciation and understanding from the political establishment. The Union Home Minister L.K. Advani, broke from the past, and tasked the IB, for the first time, to make presentations on serious security issues and challenges that the country faced, before the Parliamentary Committee on Home Affairs. Presentations made by senior IB officers dealing with the concerned subjects like J&K, Terrorism, '*Jehadi*' activities from across the borders etc., were highly appreciated by the Parliamentarians of different hues. They were frank enough to admit that several aspects of the presentations and the steps taken by the Intelligence Agencies to deal with the scourge of terror, were not known to them. They requested the Home Minister to continue with the Interactive Sessions with the MPs, on a regular basis.

The Prime Minister, himself, once asked the IB to brief a select group of MPs, and some Cabinet

Ministers on J&K, before embarking upon his decision to go for a cease-fire. Needless to say, that the purpose behind the brain storming session was kept a closely guarded secret. On another occasion, the Prime Minister desired a presentation before the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), on the situation in J&K in the aftermath of the ceasefire.

Unlike the bureaucracy, the political leadership was also very much appreciative of the awful truth that the best of Intelligence Organisations around the world, could not escape failure, big or small. They are not always able to come up to the high expectations of the people to detect and prevent all dangers and untoward incidents. Further, they can neither trumpet their success nor defend their failure. They, therefore, learn to enjoy and suffer both the inevitables, in silence and stoically. These professional hazards make the Intelligence profession one of the most unenviable. It is not every body's cup of tea.

The fact that the political establishment attached great importance to the Intelligence Agencies was evident when the Central Government sent a select team of senior officers of the IB and its Tech unit, R&AW and the MEA to carry out negotiations with the hijackers in Kandahar in the aftermath of the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight No.814 on December 24, 1999. The captive communication, established by the IB Tech Team, facilitated round the clock communication, on the progress of negotiations, from the Kandahar Airport, Afghanistan, to the DIB for regular briefing of the CCS, Cabinet, the Home Minister and the Prime Minister, in particular. The hard bargaining by the joint team, forced the hijackers to climb down from their over ambitious list of demands. What happened thereafter, on the night of December 31st, 2000, is known to all.

The Special Issue of the Indian Police Journal to commemorate the 125th Anniversary of the IB, made me reminisce about the rich contribution made by the Annual Conferences of the DGs and Intelligence Chiefs of the States and the UTs, under the Chairmanship of the DIB. This institutionalised forum has helped the Police and Intelligence fraternity to work shoulder to shoulder, even at a time when the federal relations

between the states and the centre suffered from serious stress and strain.

I recall with a supreme sense of satisfaction how the Prime Minister Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee recognised and appreciated the dire need for augmenting the grant of funds, on a long term basis, for the modernisation of the Police Forces in the country, after his interactive session with a select group of DGs during the annual conference in 2000. Since then, the Police has not experienced any paucity of funds and its modernisation has continued apace with sincerity and seriousness. The entire credit for this phenomenal change in the funding and modernisation of the Police forces, both at the centre and the states, goes to Shri Atal Behari Vajpayee who set up a Committee, comprising DG, Rajasthan, DG, BPR&D and the DIB, besides the Cabinet Secretary, Principal Secretary and the Home Secretary, and on its recommendations, funds got immediately sanctioned by the MHA. Another feather in the cap of the DGs conference, was its success to prevail over the Finance Commission of the time, to treat certain aspects of Policing as part of the Plan Budget. This has added to the coffers of the Police administration across the country.

Earlier, the "Tenure Rules(1988)", which were not considered attractive enough to inspire the young IPS officers to pursue Intelligence as a career, were taken up by me for modification, immediately after assuming charge of the office of the DIB in 1998. The leadership modified the tenure rules, emphasizing categorically that the career prospects in the IB should be dealt with on a footing separate from that of the CPOs. It, however, ran into difficulties because of the reservations recorded by the MHA on some of the important recommendations that put the IB on a footing, separate from that of the CPOs. When the file with changes made by the MHA, reached the PMO, the DIB had to seek the kind personal intervention of the Prime Minister who immediately asked the PMO to reexamine the file in consultation with the DIB and put up for clearance. The PMO appreciated the special modifications made by the IB in the Tenure Rules, and put its stamp of approval, perhaps in April 2000, on important recommendations like the 'in situ' promotions for senior officers from

the rank of Deputy Director to Special Director after completion of the required numbers of years of service, repatriation of officers on the ground of unsatisfactory performance, release of the IB officers on promotion to their cadres, in case of promotion not forthcoming in the IB, consideration of Special Directors of IB for the posts of DG, in organisations dealing with Security and Intelligence etc. Later, a strong case made by the IB before the Kargil Sub Committee on Intelligence for more foreign assignments for the IB Officers than the existing few, was also agreed. Thus, the career prospects of the officers joining the IB, stand vastly improved today than before.


Personally, I remain most indebted to the Intelligence Bureau which enabled me to have a life time experience of working with the Prime Minister on a day to-day basis, who adhered to norms of professional ethics and administrative propriety.

Another great pillar of strength and support was the Union Home Minister who would ring up personally to keep abreast of the latest developments. This required the DIB to try and remain on toes all the time. It was entirely his vision to open a dialogue between the Parliamentarians and the Intelligence Agencies in a proper forum for better appreciation of complex issues affecting the security and integrity of the country. It generated stupendous confidence and courage of conviction among the IB officers. It also helped in adding to the image of the IB. The Home Minister encouraged free and frank exchange of views, even if it meant stating something unpalatable for the ruling party.

I feel most honoured to have led the Organisation for three years and more. I remain deeply and profoundly grateful to late Shri S.M. Mathur, DIB, who took personal interest to prevail over late Jyoti Basu, the then Chief Minister of West Bengal, for my early release from the state, on deputation to the IB. I was most fortunate to have got trained and worked for years under esteemed senior Shri M.K. Narayanan and other DIBs like S/Shri T.V. Rajeshwar, R.K. Kapoor, H.A. Barari and V.G. Vaidya. I also remain grateful to a battery of professionals, both in Headquarters and outstations, known for their

outstanding competence, courage, sincerity, dedication, sacrifice and determination. But for their unstinted support and cooperation, it would not have been possible for me to meet the challenges of critical times. The laurels won, if any, were entirely because of their hard work and cooperation of a very high order. They were indeed matchless and made the organisation proud. Above all, they helped in transforming my destiny.

It is this rich legacy, combined with competence and commitment of the present and coming generations, that would help the IB attain newer heights of glory and excellence. What they need to pursue, are the cherished values of professional rectitude to create hopes for a brighter future of the country and its people. We, members of the IB family, wish the great Institution the best of times and many many more happy returns of the Day, on the occasion of its 125th Anniversary.



Intelligence Agencies in Indian Democracy

Dr Ajai Sahni,

Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

The frontiers of criminality in India have been expanding exponentially since Independence, with terrorism and the changing internal security scenario adding a dramatic new dimension to the character and scale of the challenges faced by the intelligence and enforcement apparatus of the state. Apart from insurgent and terrorist violence, there has also been a noticeable upsurge in organized and transnational crime in recent decades, including disturbing tendencies to collusive operations, covering complex economic offences, as well as linkages with powerful politicians and the bureaucracy, on the one hand, and with international criminal and terrorist groupings, on the other.

A combination of demographic, technological and geopolitical factors suggests that these problems have the potential for significant augmentation in the foreseeable future. Already, many movements of extreme violence are led by men who are obsessed by apocalyptic visions of genocide and omnicide, and who, increasingly, are approaching the possibilities of securing the means to achieve these ends. Indeed, intelligence and security agencies across the world now concede not only the possibility, but, in fact, the imminence of a future catastrophic attack, potentially involving WMD technologies; among these, the most devastating and accessible could well be biological terrorist attacks that could leave millions dead.

Terrorism is undergoing radical, generational shifts, and when this transition manifests itself in a new wave of catastrophic attacks, the resultant shocks could destroy almost all capacities of response within the target systems. With rare exception, however, India's strategic and policy establishment continues to prepare to counter nothing more than the last terrorist attack, substantially oblivious of the continuous process

of reinvention that terrorists are engaged in. There is, in India today, little comprehension of the magnitude and the evolving nature of the future threat of terrorism, consigning much of the discourse on the subject to the realm of make-believe.

Terrorism, however, does not exhaust the threat the country faces. India's democracy is, today, under sustained attack from within and without. In 65 years of independence, the institutions of governance have never appeared as fragmented and fragile as they seem today. Even as the capacities for governance appear to be insufficient to fulfil the most rudimentary mandate of modern administration, the institutions of governance are confronted with a tsunami of rising aspirations, and by a divisive, criminalized and polarized politics that exacerbates centrifugal tendencies across the country.

It is within the complex dynamic of these rising disorders that India's intelligence apparatus has to respond, and is to be evaluated. Despite its considerable achievements, there is evidently a crisis in the intelligence establishment in the country today, and it is obvious that the system is unprepared to deal with the projected threats of the future. Indeed, it has seen significant failures, even in its efforts to confront the problems of the present.

There has been much talk of intelligence failure and intelligence reform over the past years, particularly since the Kargil debacle of 1999. Nevertheless, the contours of the crisis of intelligence in the country may not be those that exhaust much of the public discourse. The current debate on intelligence has overwhelmingly focused on 'coordination failures', centralization or integration of command and control, including the controversial proposals for the National

Counter-Terrorism Centre, 'accountability', and, in a critique arising from a different direction, the interface with human rights and fundamental democratic freedoms.

While many of these concerns are legitimate, they can only be considered secondary, within a framework of priorities, to far more urgent issues that plague India's intelligence establishment in an environment of rising security threat. Indeed, unless the more pressing imperatives of focus and efficiency, legitimacy, capacity and capability – including manpower profiles and technological resources – are addressed, the broader 'architectural' discourse will remain unproductive, even meaningless.

More crucially, all these concerns, both the 'higher order' discourse on meta-institutional reforms and the more pragmatic considerations of capacity, collapse into the more fundamental enquiry: what are the legitimate concerns and limits to an intelligence apparatus within the framework of democracy – and more specifically, India's democracy? And its corollary: how are these to be realized? If a clear, coherent and detailed answer could be found to these questions, most of the remaining conundrums would easily melt away.

Within the theory of democracy, there is a powerful stream of justification that argues that democracy is, itself, to be maximised as an 'ultimate value', as opposed to the contrasting options of 'authoritarianism' or 'tyranny'. Such a framing of the question is obviously emotionally loaded – for how could authoritarianism or tyranny be preferred to democracy, freedom and the rights of man? Advocates of this thesis tend to emphasise the value of certain processes, such as elections, deliberation, and the separation of powers, and various relational and ethical criteria, such as freedom, equality, justice, rights and participation, which are regarded as good and desirable in themselves, without reference to the objective circumstances of their operation or the results they produce.

Such an orientation has resulted, in India's imperfect democracy, in an excessive emphasis on form, and an enduring neglect of substance, with a new institution or new legislation being proposed to 'resolve' every new – or newly

perceived – problem. The abundance and impotence of existing institutions and laws to secure their purported objectives has done nothing to discourage this orientation, which appears to have deep roots in the highest institutions of the state, as well as in what passes for the intellectual elite in this country. Within such a framework, clearly, the inherent secrecy of operations of intelligence agencies would find little legitimate space, unless it was superimposed with layers of oversight which, in present circumstances, would effectively paralyse the agencies from performing any but the most innocuous and ineffective of functions.

Such a perspective, however, militates against far more vibrant and realistic traditions of democracy, which have never shied away from the fundamental truth that democracy is, in essence, a system of government. Few, in India, understand and appreciate the tremendously hard-headed realism that underpinned democratic theory in its early contours, and these origins have been buried deep under the increasingly deceptive and diversionary populism of contemporary electoral democracies, not only here, but, increasingly, across the world. The truth is, the idea of democracy as an end in itself, rooted in the intangibles of 'popular sovereignty' and the 'will of the people', cannot provide any satisfactory justification without reference to outcomes. Democracy must find its justification in the world of hard facts. Politics, in our world, is ultimately concerned with the relationship between the governing and the governed, and it takes little wisdom to conclude that it is about power, and about the outcomes of the distribution and exercise of power. No system of government can be an ultimate ideal without reference to what it can do, or does, for the governed. As Giovanni Sartori notes, "a democracy cannot pass the test, in the long run, unless it succeeds as a system of government. For if a democracy does not succeed in being a system of government, it does not succeed – and that is that."

If democracy is to succeed in practical – and not merely notional – terms, it must, first and above all, be secured. It must recognize the various threats to which it is exposed, and acquire the capacities and capabilities to confront and neutralize these.

Democracies are, today, everywhere under unprecedented attack. Fundamentalist creeds and ideologies of hatred and enveloping violence have created movements that seek millennial transformations that would destroy, not just democracy, but civilization itself and all the freedoms that have come to comprise it. Such movements have, of course, secured only very limited success against the broader democratic edifice and endeavour, but even where this is the case, the damage they have done is colossal. The extraordinary costs they have inflicted, not only in the visible terms of lives and resources lost, but of the long term opportunities of development, the loss of freedom for large populations, and the instability, disorders and suffering they generate even through occasional acts of disruption, can hardly be quantified.

These threats are infinitely compounded by a regime of collusion and criminalization of the state apparatus that has weakened governance everywhere. The Vohra Committee had written about the urgency of breaking down the politician-bureaucrat-criminal nexus after the 1993 Mumbai bombings. Nearly two decades later, if anything, this nexus appears immensely stronger. It needs to be constantly reiterated that the activities of the corrosive cabal of the corrupt, that is eating away at the democratic and constitutional edifice from within, is not only a law and order, but an urgent internal security concern for the country. An elite whose urge for domination is easily translated into a cynical *macht politik* based on force, fraud, and the ruthless use of power, is as much a danger and possibly even more detrimental to the national interest, than any terrorist movement.

It is necessary to recognize, moreover, that major crimes occur within an enabling environment that comprises a multitude of lesser transgressions; that the distressing theatre of a catastrophic terrorist attack is the culmination of a protracted series of concealed – and preventable – offences that relies on a network that services both petty and major crime. The same *hawala* networks, for instance, service corrupt politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen, as well as terrorists. Smuggling channels that bring grey market goods into the country also bring in arms, ammunition and explosives. And the same compromised enforcement agencies and personnel ‘look the other way’, when such crimes occur.

It is significant that those who have spoken the loudest – particularly in the wake of major terrorist attacks – about reforming and restructuring India’s intelligence ‘architecture’, have tended to maintain a deafening silence on an overwhelming proportion of these concerns, preferring to exploit the hysteria provoked by occasional acts of terrorism to augment the powers of select institutions, or to surreptitiously alter the constitutional distribution of powers between the Centre and the States.

Nevertheless, within the broader context of the multiplicity of threats to national security and their impact on the rights and welfare of the average civilian, it is evident that the presumption of an inherent contradiction between intelligence and human rights or democratic freedoms is fundamentally false. Indeed, intelligence operations are often crucial in the protection of human rights, particularly where these are threatened by organised criminal or terrorist violence, by deviant elements within the state apparatus, and by the distortions that corruption and abuse of power introduce into the framework of constitutional governance. In the absence of effective intelligence, no possible preventive or corrective to these ills can be found. All these issues necessarily fall within the legitimate and pressing concerns of a principled intelligence agency within a democratic framework. There is, here, no necessary conflict between democratic values and individual freedoms, on the one hand, and intelligence operations, on the other. Principled intelligence operations are, in fact, necessary to the fuller exercise of freedom by the average citizen. It cannot be the case, within any just system of democracy, that the rights of criminals and those who violently transgress the law should have precedence over the rights of their victims – both potential and actual; this, however, is what the system for the protection of rights has come to mean in India. A just society cannot owe its criminals a protection greater than it affords those who abide by its laws.

It is useful to notice, here, that much of the assault on democracy is ideological, subversive and covert, and is executed through agencies that tread the margins of the law. Virtually all insurgent, terrorist and organised criminal groups, today, set up front organisations, or penetrate and

exploit groups of 'useful idiots', to manipulate the interstices and peculiar vulnerabilities of democracy, for propaganda, for campaigns of disruptive protests and demonstrations, to create legal obstacles for the functioning of security agencies, to propagate their virulent creeds, and to clandestinely recruit to their 'armies'. These are constituencies that adopt the language and idiom of democracy, even as they set about to destroy democracy. An overwhelming proportion of these activities cannot be countered within the framework of a normal 'enforcement' apparatus – which is ordinarily galvanized only after the commission of a specific offence. More significantly, democracies, in general and Indian democracy, in particular, have failed to mount an effective counter-campaign at the ideological level. At least part of such a counter-campaign would necessarily include the sharing by intelligence agencies, of authoritative assessments and information that does not have operational implications. Where these reach the sphere of public discourse, they would generate both greater awareness and cooperation, on the one hand, and better feedback for the agencies themselves, on the other. The wholesale marking of all intelligence information as 'secret', is both counter-factual and counter-productive. There is a vast quantity of intelligence flows that can and should be widely published, and such publication would generate greater strength and credibility for the agencies and help promote India's security objectives. An essential function of the agencies is to create the operational, political and diplomatic environment, where India's security interests are better projected and protected. Public advocacy and creating international perceptions on a range of issues are essential to this function, and must be facilitated by moderated information flows from the agencies. It is useful to recall that a 'media cell' was established within the Intelligence Bureau in 2004, and operated for a couple of years, but was abruptly and inexplicably dismantled thereafter, with information flows reduced to the fitful, opportunistic and unreliable system of 'leaks' once again. A permanent interface with the media and public would serve both public and agency interests, and is an integral element of the modern intelligence apparatus in the more advanced countries of the West.

These, then, are some of the legitimate and necessary functions of intelligence agencies

within a democratic framework. However, just as democracy cannot be justified without reference to outcomes, intelligence agencies will have to root their own justification in the results they produce. To the extent that such results promote the ends of democracy, the greater security of the people, and the substance – as against the rituals associated with the protection – of rights, their structures and operations will be legitimized. To the extent that their operations incline to exceptionalism, partisan interventions and manipulation, and the further accentuation of the distortions of the system, they become progressively delegitimized – and eventually will find their power openly challenged and destroyed.

The crucial question, consequently, is: What matters does intelligence serve? If it is harnessed to partisan interests, to distort democracy and suppress legitimate freedoms, it is the enemy of the people and of constitutional governance. This, unfortunately, is manifestly the case, for instance, in Pakistan, where an entire nation has been devastated by the machinations of a corrupt elite operating through a lawless intelligence apparatus.

The legitimacy and the effectiveness of intelligence agencies are best served where agencies make a clear distinction between the state and regime – though the state is, of course, represented by the transient regime. Legitimate intelligence operations serve the interests of the constitutional state, and are required to resist subordination to the partisan interests of particular regimes from time to time. National security and constitutional values are the touchstone against which legitimacy is to be defined. Intelligence agencies discredit themselves by misdirection; by providing false, misleading and 'convenient' intelligence – intelligence that conforms, not to the realities of the ground, but to the expectations of the political executive and other 'consumers'; or by their willingness to lend themselves to partisan political abuse of powers, or to political and electoral manipulation.

Within a democratic framework, consequently, the integrity, effectiveness and legitimacy of intelligence agencies and their operations will

depend substantially on the restraints within which they function. 'Accountability' has become the new byword of intelligence reform, and many have quickly lifted current western models of parliamentary oversight as the new panacea for the ills that follow from the misuse and abuse of the intelligence apparatus. Like many of our hasty and borrowed 'solutions', however, this reflects a misunderstanding both of the original 'models' and of the ground situation within India. Efforts to impose Parliamentary and Congressional oversight in the West have proved, at best, cosmetic in impact, and Western agencies have remained susceptible to misuse under an aggressive political executive – the case of the distortion, indeed, fabrication, of intelligence on Iraq's WMD capabilities, by both US and British intelligence, is an obvious, though not isolated, example. The business of intelligence will remain, by its very character and mandate, secret. It is unlikely that the relatively immature institutions of Indian democracy would be any more successful than their Western counterparts, in creating an effective system of parliamentary oversight though, given the profile of elected representatives in India and the polarized nature of the country's politics, any such system can be expected to be far more disruptive of the agencies' operational effectiveness.

The most effective system of restraints would be one that is based on professionalism, efficiency and integrity of the agencies and their operations. Once again, invasive intelligence gathering and operations are legitimized by their outcomes. Where intelligence operations result in arrests, if there are clear convictions, within acceptable time frames, through transparent judicial processes, such actions would find broad public validation. Where intelligence-based operations result in protracted detentions with negative or inconclusive judicial outcomes, public opposition to such actions increases, even as purported 'victim communities' become more resentful and potentially radicalized. Again, where particular intelligence initiatives are seen to serve transparent national interests, they will be publicly validated; where they are seen to serve partisan and perverse political interests, they will bring the broader powers of the agencies under increasing and intense scrutiny.

This raises the question of one of the most glaring lacunae in India's present system of intelligence gathering: the very limited quantum of evidentiary intelligence – intelligence that can stand up to the scrutiny of the Courts. Such evidentiary intelligence, and the meticulous documentation of processes that lies at its foundation, has now become an urgent imperative for all intelligence operations, both to secure the visible outcomes that are a necessary component of legitimacy, and to exclude the misdirection and abuse of intelligence resources. The future legitimacy of agencies will depend on the integrity of process and the broader integrity and credibility of the agencies and their operations.

It is abundantly clear that, given the very wide mandate of intelligence agencies within the framework of Indian democracy, and the rising imperatives of a greater efficiency and integrity of processes, current capacities across the board – human, technological and material – are all drastically insufficient. Given their present profiles, it is simply impossible for existing agencies to fulfil their necessary functions, and to develop processes and records that would meet the demands of integrity and professionalism. This deficit of capacities lies at the very heart of the failure to meet the requirements of democracy – both in terms of the tasks that are to be concluded and of the nature of processes that must be maintained. This problem also lies at the heart of many of the abuses that are criticized, particularly by the human rights lobby. The short cuts become a necessity when the capacity, capability and endurance to run the full course are lacking.


The established judicial and human rights narrative in India has attributed the denial of freedom and suppression of rights to an excess and consequent abuse of power vested in state institutions, and has thus sought to progressively constrain and emasculate these. A counter-narrative demands greater and greater impunity for state agencies to counter rising threats to security. Both these positions are a complete misreading of both reality and the imperatives of constitutional governance. The cumulative brutalisation of the Indian state is a consequence, not of any excess of power, but of a progressive erosion of capacities and capabilities. It is not

power but infirmity that brutalizes the Indian State and its agencies. Endemic deficits of capacity in every State institution have made it impossible to secure the necessary and legitimate ends of governance through due process, and the result is a progressive resort to short cuts and quick fixes. As the state weakens, power becomes progressively randomized, uncertain, malignant.

Intelligence agencies and their activities have been demonized within the democratic framework, largely as a result of their abuse or misdirection by an unscrupulous executive – and such abuse and misdirection is a reality, not only in India, but in varying measure, all over the world. The occasional perversion of the essential functions of intelligence agencies cannot, however, take away from the inherent necessity of intelligence work within any complex and large system of management, including democratic governance. It remains, nevertheless, crucial to recognize that democracy is built on an extraordinary tension, a very fine balance, between freedom and restraint; the

slightest unevenness, and freedom hurtles into licence, or restraint into tyranny. The greatest endeavour of civilization is to find ways of being strong without being oppressive.

This is a time for pragmatic and effective, not idealized or Utopian, solutions. At a time of extreme uncertainty and risk in India's internal and external security environment, the demands for greater flows of enormously detailed and reliable intelligence can only grow. At this time, moreover, the enemies of India's democracy will use the very instrumentalities and freedoms of the country's legal and constitutional processes to attack the structure and operation of the Agencies. In these circumstances, the most certain measure to preserve the legitimacy and effectiveness of these Agencies will be to establish and maintain the highest standards of probity and professionalism, of demonstrable efficiency and effectiveness, and of comprehensive capacities and capabilities to serve and protect the state and her citizens. In failing to do this, the Agencies would not only fail themselves; they would fail India's democracy.



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Of Pistols and Pigs and the Old Tiddim Road

Shri K.C. Verma, IPS (Retd.)

“Tension prevails”, a cryptic communication from the civint (civilian intelligence) post at Behang, was among the wireless messages that I read on my very first day of joining as Assistant Director, in charge of the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau, Imphal. I enquired and learnt that tension had arisen because a 'Hmar' had murdered a 'Gangte' in Behang village. The local Police was aware of the situation and taking necessary steps.

The message, “Tension prevails”, was repeated the next day. And again the next.

The day after that, there was a longer message. “Murder case of last week was compounded through the good offices of civint in-charge. The Hmars gave three pigs and ten chicken to the Gangte family as compensation. One pig was slaughtered for a feast for the whole village. No tension prevails.”

In 1978, at the age of twenty nine, I was no spring chicken. I had seen a bit of life and seven years of service. But the training at the National Police Academy at Mt. Abu and, later, the basic intelligence course at Mt. Anand Parbat, had barely equipped me to understand the elements of policing and trade craft. How a murder could be compounded, and that too by a junior officer of the Intelligence Bureau, baffled me completely.

I turned for guidance to my taciturn deputy, Nogen Singh. I asked, “Tamoh, how can the crime of murder be compounded?”

Nogen Singh had joined the Assam Police as a constable in the same year that I was born and he had remained posted in SIB Imphal from around the time I had started going to kindergarten. Quite naturally, I had started addressing Nogen Singh as ‘Tamoh’ – respected elder brother.

Reflecting the wisdom of the ages he said, “You will get used to it, Sir.”

Not a word more did he say to explain the matter. I waited a bit more.

Clearly that was all that Nogen Singh had to say about the compounding of offences.

Gradually, over the next three years, I developed a slight understanding of life in this part of the country. But at that moment, I did not have the patience to listen to that which had not been said.

Barely two months after the compounding incident, I received a grimy envelope which had been posted in Churachandpur, without adequate postage stamps. The letter, written in crude English and signed ‘Soithang’, made the bizarre allegation that “Mr. N. Kuki, Esq., the civint in-charge at Behang, has gone mad and is regularly shooting villagers and pigs with his Sarkari pistol.”

Even if bizarre, I had to do something about the complaint. But I did not know what action to take. I was much too keen to manage my problems by myself, rather than seek guidance from my boss, the Deputy Director at Kohima. In any case, an unreliable telephone connection, routed through the manual exchange at Imphal, was hardly conducive to airing departmental dirty linen or to seek instructions for laundering. And yet, I had to do something about this mad officer who was not just compounding murder cases but also going about committing a few on his own account!

I spoke with Nogen Singh and expressed that I would like to go to Behang to enquire into the allegations.

“But Sir,” said Nogen Singh, “It is very far away.”

I dragged Nogen Singh to the map on the wall, and showed him where Behang was; about fifty

kilometers South of Churachandpur, which itself was barely a two hour drive from Imphal. The Old Tiddim Road, made famous in the Second World War, snaked down as a bold ribbon from Churachandpur to Tiddim and Falam in Burma. Behang was prominently marked by a flag on this road, just on the border of India and Burma.



Old Tiddim Road

Ever so politely, Nogen Singh said, "Yes Sir. It is less than fifty kilometers as the crow flies, but two bridges on that road are broken. It will take you two days to walk there."

He did not add, "Unless you can fly like a crow." So much for my map reading skills, I thought.

"So what should I do, Tamoh? This is such a serious matter!" I said.

"Well, Sir, call Kuki here and ask him," was the simple solution suggested by Nogen Singh.

"If we call him here, he will deny the allegation. How will we check with the villagers?" I countered.

"Sir, call him and ask him," said Nogen Singh. "Abstruse concepts of loyalty to the nation mean little or nothing in remote areas. But the people know that right is right and wrong is wrong. Sir, the people are fiercely loyal to the village and tribe, and no one would lie."

"Kuki is a respected elder," explained Nogen Singh, "He has his position to think of. Social hierarchy is often determined by tradition and kinship, rather than economic status or Government orders. The village elders, the *Gaon Burhas*, command unquestioning respect. And if Kuki has done something wrong, he will admit it. He is a man of honour."



Behang Village

Highly skeptical, I agreed to call Kuki to Imphal. In order to avoid alerting him, I directed all civint post in-charges to come to Imphal for the pay escort at the end of the month and to bring their pistols for a maintenance check. This instruction was necessary because many of the posts were in remote locations. Some were connected through infrequent bus services, and others required long trudges to the nearest road, from where one could hope to hitch a ride on a passing truck. Normally, the posts sent information through messages in cipher over wireless on a daily basis. Written reports, however, could be sent just once a month, when one of the personnel of each post would come to the SIB headquarters to deliver dak and collect the pay of all his colleagues in the post. The post in-charge did not always make the monthly trip.

When all the post in-charges came at the end of that month, I had them and Nogen Singh gather for a meeting in my room. After discussing other issues, I asked each officer to hand his weapon to me for inspection. In anticipation of the inspection, most officers had oiled their pistols, but some weapons were clearly in need of derusting.

With an air of studied indifference, I turned to Kuki and asked him to show me his pistol. Kuki seemed as much a relic of the Second World War as the Old Tiddim Road. His weathered face and slit like eyes showed the years and years of being out in the glare of the Sun. But his gaze was clear as he reached behind and drew his pistol, which was tucked in his belt in the small of his back. He ejected the loaded magazine and in copybook fashion, handed the pistol to me, butt-first. There was no vestige of bluing left on the pistol, but it had that peculiar patina that steel acquires when

it is lovingly caressed hundreds of times every day. The pistol was spotlessly clean, with just the right hint of oil which a weapon in constant use should have.

I smelt the barrel. It had the faint smell of cordite, a dead giveaway that it had been used recently.

"Kuki," said I sternly, "You have used your pistol recently!"

"Yes, Sir! I carry it with me all the time. I fired it twice last week and maybe four times the week before that."

"Are you aware that you have to send a report to headquarters each time you fire your pistol? I have not seen any report from you! Instead, I have a complaint here that you have been using your pistol for shooting pigs and hunting in the forest. What do you have to say?"

Kuki was quiet. I looked at Nogen Singh meaningfully, as if to say "Tamoh, now watch him tell a lie."

Kuki remained quiet for some more time and then, looking quite perplexed, he asked, "Sir, why do I have to send a report? You have issued me the pistol for use, have you not?"

"Look Kuki, I don't have the time to go into all this; but the complaint here says that you shoot pigs and villagers with it. What the hell have you been doing?" I almost yelled.

"Yes, Sir, I do shoot pigs with my pistol," said Kuki. "Sir, whenever I have to kill a pig, I don't slaughter him with a 'dao' the way common villagers do. With a 'dao', the pig makes such a mess. No, Sir. I shoot him! I call all the villagers, including the *Gaon Burhas*, to my house. I make them stand in a circle around the fenced area in front of my house".

"And then what do you do?"

"Sir, then I hoist our national flag and make everyone salute it."

"Good. Then what do you do?" I asked.

"When they have all saluted the flag, Sir, I let the pig loose. The fenced area is quite small, Sir; just about twenty feet by twenty feet. When the pig

starts running, Sir, I shoot him. Sir One pig. One shot, Sir!" said Kuki proudly.

"And then what do you do?"

"Oh! The whole village then has a feast!"

I was speechless.

"Sir, you said someone had complained. Who is this blankety blank who has complained?"

I winced. Not so much at the use of the expletive by a junior official before his senior, but at the vehemence of his outrage.

"Look Kuki, this complaint is from some Soithang, a pseudonymous complaint no doubt. But the allegations, by your own admission are correct."

"Oh ho! That bloody Soithang! He is a no good, Sir," declared Kuki. "Last month, I missed one shot and the ricocheted bullet grazed his temple. Just because of that he complains to the AD Sahib!" Kuki was almost apoplectic.

"Grazed his temple, you said?" I tentatively sought confirmation but hoped that I had not heard correctly.

"Yes Sir. It was just a slight graze and it stopped bleeding after only two days. I told Soithang's wife to put the special mud from the river bed on the wound and he became ok in less than a week. I really don't understand why Soithang should have complained," said Kuki, looking genuinely perplexed and hurt.

"Don't you understand? Half an inch this side and this fellow would have been dead!" I shouted.

"I agree, Sir, but half an inch that side and the bullet would have missed him completely. Don't you agree?"

I agreed but quickly realized that somewhere in this exchange; I had already lost the argument. So I changed tack.

"But why do you need to call the whole village?" I asked.

With all the righteous indignation at his command, Kuki said, "Those *Gaon Burhas* think they are so important! Why, some of them are much younger than I am. No one becomes wise

or gains authority by merely draping a red blanket on his shoulders!" Kuki was really incensed.

"But Sir, I don't need a blanket. I am your representative! I am the representative of the Government of India in Behang. Sir, as a mark of authority of the Government of India, I wear this pistol in my belt and I have to show to the villagers that I use it. You have given me the authority to do so, have you not? I will not ask the Gaon Burhas permission! Do I have to ask them?" he asked rhetorically.

The passionate outburst took me aback. Initially, I had expected Kuki to deny the misuse of the pistol, but after he admitted so naturally to using it, I expected an apology. The last thing I expected was to be browbeaten by him.

"Sir, I am the Government in Behang and to discharge this duty, I have to continue using my pistol for killing pigs." It was an absolute statement.

I accepted Kuki's impeccable logic and said grandiosely, "Very good, Kuki! You have my permission to continue acting as the Government of India in Behang." Somewhat condescendingly, I added, "And if you should run short of ammunition, I shall see to it that more rounds are issued to you."

"Oh, that would not be necessary, Sir. You see, when the Mizo gang led by Biakvela ran away from Bualkot in 1976, they left behind a lot of ammunition which they were bringing from China. I kept some of it, Sir, and about two thousand rounds are still left."

My jaw must have dropped, and Kuki misunderstood the shocked look on my face.

"Oh, don't you worry about the safety of the ammunition, Sir," Kuki hastened to reassure me, "I keep it quite safe in a dug out cavity beneath my bed at home!"

I just about managed to have the last word. "Carry on Kuki Sahib!" I said.



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Through the Eyes of an IB Officer

Shri DC Pathak , IPS (Retd.)

It is a measure of professionalism of India's premier Intelligence agency, the Intelligence Bureau, that it acknowledges the continuity of its existence since its inception a century and a quarter back as an instrument for safeguarding internal security. The evaluation of the threat scenario may have changed from time to time, as it always happens in the security domain, but the concepts and value systems that guide this national intelligence organization have remained unaltered. This is simply because for IB, the goal of serving the sovereign remains constant.

For me, it is a recall of over fifty years- a mix of serious challenges, a ring-side view of how a democratic State is governed and some funny moments as well. I served as DIB at a time when the IT revolution had just announced itself, transforming, among other things, the systems of communication so important for an intelligence organization. I took over as DIB in mid-1994 and the cell phones arrived in India only in 1995. I saw the transition of IB into the Age of Information, before which the best that could be done was to transmit information through encryption on teleprinters.

It was in May 1960 that I reached the National Academy of Administration at Mussoorie for the first Foundation Course, in which all Civil Services were brought together for a 5-month joint orientation programme. It felt like the whole of India was there, boys from the South who did not know that Mussoorie was a cold place, others who could not draw a line between red wine and coke, and a few from the Cambridge Tripos who had problems communicating with the lesser mortals. The experience was delightful and a great enhancer for everybody. The Foundation Course is one great policy decision of the Government of India, as it has helped to produce a lasting sense of kinship amongst the Civil Services to the benefit of the nation. Years later, as DIB I would run into 'batch mates' serving as Secretary to GOI or as the Chief Secretary of the State and the 'Mussoorie days' would make all the difference during those interactions.

From Mussoorie to the National Police Academy at Mt. Abu was like shifting to the harsh realities of life. Every IPS officer mentally accepts that the year-long course only as a 'one time event'. The training programme at Mt. Abu was efficiently run, promoting a deep brotherhood of 'friends in distress'. For me, a kind of bookworm, it was like I had reinvented myself. I got the highest marks in horse-riding and musketry, which was a great achievement, considering that I had never touched a firearm and had never gone near a horse ever.

It was not long after Mt. Abu that I landed as ASP City, Jaipur, my first posting in Rajasthan. I lived on a floor above the Kotwali PS. I also recall that senior officers like Sr.SP and Range DIG would occasionally do the checking of night patrols themselves. The police had a firm grip on the law and order situation in the capital. I remember the 'Police Week' we once organized with the objective of bringing the police and the public closer to each other. At a widely attended public function, some slogans were displayed. One of them, scripted by the Sr.SP, Shri Bhawanimal, read, 'Friendly but not familiar'. I firmly maintain that this is the maxim that the Police organizations anywhere in India must follow to keep themselves on course. In a democratic dispensation Police is the only coercive arm of the State, and it ought to be friendly to all law-abiding citizens but beyond 'approach' for an offender. We need to work for re-establishing the institutional importance of Police for creating equality amongst citizens.

My next major shift in job, that proved to be a career switch, came in 1964. It was in early May that year, I was ASP, Ganganagar City when I received a phone call from the Inspector General of Police, Rajasthan, Late Pt. Govardhan, informing me of my selection for Intelligence Bureau. The Police chief spoke to me on a note of pride that one of his officers had made it to a career in the country's premier Intelligence organization. Those days only the first few in the yearly batch of IPS officers were considered for a long-range

deputation to the Bureau. I too was excited about the prospect of working at the national plane. The last time I wore the uniform of an SP was in the initial months in IB, when once a week on Friday, newly inducted officers were supposed to participate in the marching drill at the Police Lines at Kingsway Camp in the old city. The then DIB, Late B N Mullick had introduced this practice to underline the importance of Police for IB. My wife still keeps, in our sitting room, a picture of mine in that uniform.

I joined the IB on May 16, 1964, at a juncture when the political atmosphere was one of transition after the death of Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru. There was soon a change of guard at IB. Shri SP Verma the then Police Chief of Bihar succeeded Shri Mullick. IB those days worked out of South Block and those corridors looked formidable to a young entrant. External intelligence then was a part of IB, and officers inducted for permanent deputation, were put on a year-long foreign language course, in preparation for a possible posting abroad. My Spanish has rusted, but I can still read a novel in that language. In those times, four Joint Directors represented the top leadership of the organization, and they all had a larger than life image. There were months of understudy before a young Assistant Director was given charge of a Desk, and the Desk Officer had to be the best-informed person on his subject.

It may not be easy for outsiders to appreciate how rigorous the training regime in IB is, for all newcomers, high or low. I recall having made a presentation just a few years after joining the IB. Interestingly the group whom I addressed had amongst them to senior officers, one of whom became my immediate superior after a few months and the other rose to become the DIB.

I spent nearly six years (1969-74) as Central Intelligence Officer in charge of the undivided Bihar. It was a challenging but enjoyable assignment that gave me all the grooming I needed in field-work. It is instructive to recall that even in those early days of left-wing extremism, we traced and apprehended a group of Naxalites in the deep jungles of Jadugoda, led by a highly educated young man from West Bengal. The group also included a British girl, who was obviously an ideological convert. By the time I

left Bihar, the JP movement was on the rise and on way to triggering a major political upheaval. In 1975, I was sent out to London for a training course and appropriately on return from that exposure, posted as AD Training. Power-point presentations were not in vogue then, but as expected, an enormous amount of work was being produced by the IB Training School from the desolate hilltop of Anand Parbat. Faculty members included many officers who were in the midst of conducting live operations, and the knowledge and insight they provided to the trainees, would never be found in any text-book. I got them to submit a summary of every single talk they delivered and, thus, enriched the record of the School.

In IB, the rank of Deputy Director is one of exceptional importance, for the simple reason that at that level the officer for the first time has the authority to inform and educate the Government on developments on the subjects or areas under his or her watch. I remember the first communication, called a UO, which addressed to the Government as a DD, on the state of communal situation in the country, made me acutely conscious of the significance of that occasion, enough to make me go through the fair version twice before signing it. IB has always been a good example, in a classical professional sense, of how centralism of authority combines with decentralized decision making.

In an Intelligence organization you deal with the realities of human existence. Intelligence is all about human activity, it can never be about acts of nature. The organization followed management practices that were far ahead of what the experts would discover and prescribe much later. My initial years in IB were guided by a senior, Late Shri KN Prasad, whose constant advice was that I should learn to 'distinguish essentials from non-essentials'. I do not know if he was aware of the principle enunciated by the nineteenth century Italian economist and sociologist Vilfredo Pareto that 'there are a significant few amongst the insignificant many'. What is abundantly clear, however, is that he was giving an advice based on the institutional wisdom that he had gained during his long years of experience in the organization. He had a rare insight into what can be called, in today's parlance, the 'software' of

an Intelligence agency. He used to emphasize for instance, that in Intelligence 'there is no substitute to reading'. The logic here is that you cannot discard information or data before examining it. The ability to sieve through the material, as you are going over it, is important. I recall that one of the Chiefs of IB, would scan a report so fast that we thought he had taken a course in rapid reading.

An Intelligence organization remains anonymous by choice. This flows from the principle that what it knows about the adversary, proves to be an advantage, only so long as it is handled confidentially. Anonymity and its upshot, the lack of recognition in public, are two basic features of management, not built into any other organization of the Government. One little advantage an Intelligence officer might enjoy at the social level is that people might regard him as being privy to some exciting information or to some sensational subterranean action. A reticent smile to the occasional leading question, is regarded as the display of professional perfection and leaving a party early, an evidence of some extremely important call of duty. I recall how a family friend of ours in the late seventies had a hazy idea that I was an officer of the rank of Director in the Ministry's hierarchy and that I was concerned with the problem of communal riots. I was amused when at a dinner party at his house he introduced me to some guests, and added that I was the Director of communal riots in the Government.

My three years as Joint Director heading the Zonal SIB at Chandigarh, between 1986 and 1989, gave me a hands-on experience of Punjab, during a highly disturbed situation there. The highly successful operation, "Black Thunder", was designed in a way that would totally eliminate the chances of any collateral damage. In recognition of the success of the counter-terrorism efforts in Punjab, the Governor first recommended the award of Padma Shri to the Police officers of the State and in the following year made the same recommendation for the heads of central organizations stationed at Chandigarh who had contributed to this success. The officers of the BSF and CRPF got the award, and in a subsequent year the then DIB also got a Padma Shri.

An Intelligence organization attaches equal importance to operational skills and the abilities to communicate information to the action-takers. Security fails, if there is a failure of either communication or action. An interesting aspect of communication of intelligence is that the Intelligence organization willingly assumes the extended responsibility of ensuring not only that the report reaches the recipient, but also that it attracts the attention of the action takers. I recall how an important piece of actionable intelligence in relation to the goings-on in the state of J&K, failed to evoke a prompt action compelling me, as DIB, to request the highest executive to have the matter looked into. The failure of action was detected in the unavoidable long turn around period that the nearest armed force unit required, on the ground. Necessary corrective deployment was then made for the future, in line with the principle that security must always learn from experience.

Reference to J&K also reminds me of a plenary meeting, chaired by the then Prime Minister Late P V Narsimha Rao, in connection with the developments in the State. The meeting was attended among others by the Governor and the Army Chief. There was a strong line of suggestion in favour of a particular course of action. The PM went along with my view, as DIB, that we should wait a while longer. When pressed for taking an immediate decision, the PM famously reminded the gathering that 'not taking a decision is also a decision'.

Intelligence being an instrument of national security does not cross the path of politics. The only reason, why in a democratic system a study of the political spectrum from the point of view of security might be in order, is that arrangements must exist to detect subversion by alien forces for causing political instability to the detriment of internal security. India is a strong nation and a tested democracy where there are no such fears.

In the last week of June, 1996, while I was out of the country attending the first SAARC Security Conference at Colombo, as DIB, the then PM assigned me the Chairmanship of JIC, a technically higher post, being in the rank of Secretary to Government of India. JIC was an enriching experience.

I retired in 1997 and took to reading subjects that I had not had the time to brush up on, and scribbled some thoughts that would shape eventually into three books on Intelligence, meant as much for the general readers, as they would be for the professionals. In 2004, Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh nominated me as a member of the National Security Advisory Board for two years. I am happy to mention that the two studies that I led at the NSAB, one on Naxalism and the other on Governance, impacted the policy in a way that helped the Government to move forward. Considering Naxalism not merely as a Police problem, but as a problem of Security-Development interface, and enhancing the accountability for both decision-making and execution, were the crucial suggestions that found acceptance with the Government.

I am glad IB has kept up the tradition of being in live interaction with its former Chiefs. Security is always regarded as work in progress, since it has to continually respond to the changing threat scenario, both past and present, to help gain an insight into what lies ahead. End of the Cold War, success of the IT revolution that heralded the advent of the Age of Information, and the rise of a new form of global terror, all happening around the same time, have posed an unprecedented challenge for India's Intelligence, as they have all very directly impacted on our national interests. We have to blend new technology with the Intelligence tradecraft, ensure that information of intelligence value, produced by various agencies converges at a point at the national apex from where coordinated response could be set off. What is equally important, is to eliminate the gap between information and action. It is a matter of satisfaction that all these matters are receiving constant attention.

In the Indian setting, all threats other than an open attack on our borders, translate on our own land and, therefore, rightly become a part of the

Internal Security problem and the prime concern of the Intelligence Bureau, as the country's premier counter-intelligence agency. This holds good for the rising threat to the security of our Embassies and Missions abroad too, as the latter are an extension of the territory of India. It is important that the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) has a stronger framework of functional coordination with the State Governments and other stakeholders in areas of Internal Security. The latter include the new contributors of economic security, this being in line with the new doctrine, that national security is inseparable from economic security. India is only too well aware of how the adversary can use the instrument of terrorism to attack economic targets.

The Police is a state subject, whereas, the nation's internal security is to be acknowledged as a concurrent matter, in which the Centre would be the lead player. A useful tradition has been built over the years, by which, the Director Intelligence Bureau convenes and chairs the Annual Conference of the Directors General of Police and the Directors General of Intelligence of the States. The objective of this conference is to update the state agencies on the security environ of the country and strengthen the operational cooperation between the Centre and the States, in the sphere of internal security. In the domain of Security there is nothing that is functionally 'high' or 'low', as the strength of the chain here truly lies in the strength of its weakest link. Security works well without an excessive bureaucratic formality. A critical matter that has to be attended to, is the functional, not organizational, integration of State Special Branches, and through them, of the District Intelligence Units, for the best interests of the Nation's internal security. Central agencies concerned with security should have the facility to utilize the State Intelligence resources. All this is happening already and needs to be built upon. The turf of Security is non-political.

My J&K Experience

Shri R.K. Kapoor, IPS (Retd.)

After working for ten years in various districts in UP, I joined the Intelligence Bureau as an Assistant Director, in March 1960. At that time, Shri B.N. Mullick was the Director and there were only two Joint Directors. Shri Mullick was a man of strong personality, and he was known to carry a lot of weight with the Government and enjoyed full trust of Prime Minister Nehru. In the IB, he commanded great respect, but he was also feared a lot. His word was law, and very few could muster courage to express a counter view on any subject.

After working in IB Headquarters for two years, I was posted to J&K in February 1962 and was ordered to report at Srinagar. My colleagues and some seniors said that it was a difficult and sensitive posting, but they added that I would enjoy it fully. They proved to be absolutely right. I reached Srinagar in my fiat car, along with my family, late in the evening. It was my first experience of driving 180 miles on a very difficult road in hilly region.

The staff and resources of the IB in J&K were very meagre at that time, although we had to handle all aspects of intelligence work viz., internal, foreign and counter. We were just two ADs and our offices-cum-residences were located next to each other and had history attached to them. It was said that Smt. Indira Gandhi had spent a part of her honeymoon in one of our residences. I could, however, not verify this. The area was full of snakes, who visited our house frequently. Fortunately, they were non-poisonous.

Sheikh Abdullah was in jail, and Bakshi Ghulam Mohammad was the 'Prime Minister' of J&K. His party, National Conference had an overwhelming majority in the State Assembly. He ruled the State with an iron hand and pro-Pak elements were ruthlessly suppressed. He and his family members

were, however, notorious for corruption. He amply rewarded those who were loyal to him. He was reported to have made his barber a Sub-Inspector of Police and he succeeded in prevailing upon the Government of India to make one of his DIGs, Sheikh Ghulam Qadir, an IPS officer, though he was a non-graduate.

The situation in J&K was generally peaceful, and we could move about freely in all parts of the State, without any security threat. Of course, the local Muslims often made it clear that we were outsiders who had 'come from India'.

The presence of the Indian army in the State and its deployment on the border was thin. The army depended mostly on the IB for border and Pak intelligence. It also gave maximum cooperation in our border operations. The importance of IB was also accepted by the State Government, and some State ministers would sometimes drop in my office or that of my colleague Hamir Singh, without prior intimation.

Only two jeeps had been provided to the IB at Srinagar. Both were in a bad condition and they had to be used in winters as well, when the temperature was often below freezing point. We were told that a proposal for sanction of a staff car had been pending with the MHA for many years. Soon after settling down, I made an intensive tour of the Valley and the Jammu region in my rickety jeep. I am strongly of the view that in order to fully understand the various problems of J&K, an intensive tour of all the regions of the State, by road, is absolutely essential. During the summer of 1962, while touring on the border of Jammu region, I passed through a village called Mendher. Half of that village was in POK while the other half in J&K. I was told that in 1949, when 'Cease Fire Line' was marked by a 'chuna line', it divided the village into two parts. This division

could, however, not prevent the residents of the two parts from free mixing and interaction. Even marriages used to take place.

The 'Darbar' (i.e. the State Government and its offices) used to shift, every year, from Srinagar to Jammu during the winter months and of the two ADs, one used to move, with the entire office and staff to Jammu to coincide with the movement of 'Darbar'. In view of the sensitive nature of the situation in the Valley, one AD, with only his PA, used to stay back at Srinagar.

In November, 1962, I moved down to Jammu, while my colleague Hamir Singh stayed behind at Srinagar. Apart from handling all aspects of intelligence and establishment work, I was also responsible for arranging supplies for the entire IB staff posted in Ladakh.

In December 1962, an incident of burning of a temple by a muslim mob occurred at a very remote place called Kishtwar in Jammu region. At about 100 miles on the Jammu-Srinagar highway, there is a place called Batote. There is a road diversion from there towards Kishtwar, which is located at a distance of 50 miles from Batote. The road was extremely bad and we had no IB personnel posted there. The news of the temple burning was announced by the AIR. Despite an extremely bad weather, I directed DCIO, Jammu to go to Kishtwar immediately, to obtain full information. Shri Mullick telephoned me at Jammu and wanted to know full details of the incident. Getting a direct phone call from Shri Mullick was rare and it certainly gave us shivers. I told him that our DCIO had left for Kishtwar but had got stranded in his jeep, at Batote, and could not proceed further as the Batote-Kishtwar road was badly breached due to heavy landslides at a number of places. Shri Mullick ordered — 'TELL THE DCIO TO WALK' and put his telephone down with a bang. I need not describe the plight of the poor DCIO.

In Ladakh, AD, Leh had been given the task of establishing a number of IB posts along the border of the area, which China had illegally occupied. The personnel at these posts were living in tents which used to get damaged frequently due to rain and snowfall. They required repeated repairs and AD Leh had employed some local people, on a permanent basis, for this work. During winter

months, all supplies to AD Leh were sent from Jammu by IAF planes, which would very often come back after flying over Leh airport without landing there, due to bad weather. In January 1963, I received a frantic WT message from AD Leh to send to him 200 needles, as the repair work of tents was suffering. AD, Leh never failed to mark copies of his messages to Shri A.K. Dave, DD at IB Headquarters, who immediately started telephoning me to express his annoyance at my alleged failure in not immediately arranging the supply of needles for AD, Leh. After three days, when I had got the seventh such call from Mr. Dave, I told him "Sir, 200 needles were air-dropped by an IAF plane today on Leh airport and all of them have been successfully collected by AD, Leh". As Shri Dave didn't believe me, I asked him to check up with AD, Leh. To air-drop the needles, we had put them in a small cardboard box which was put in a big heap of straw and made into a ball of about five feet diameter, packed in a gunny bag.

In our days, there used to be only one flight everyday between Srinagar and Delhi. It was a hopping flight with stopovers at Jammu and Amritsar. The plane used was a Dakota, which was non-pressurised and had the capacity of only 28 passengers. Very often, in rainy weather and during winter months, the Dakota could not land at Srinagar airport.

There was always very heavy traffic on the Srinagar-Jammu highway, especially before the commencement of winter. The road was not adequately wide and was poorly maintained. At any point of time, there would be hundreds of trucks, buses and cars moving on the road from both sides. At the time of shifting the 'Darbar' in November 1963, I travelled from Srinagar to Jammu in a jeep, with a trailer attached behind. My wife and two sons and the driver were all cramped in the jeep. The weather was quite bad. After we had travelled about sixty miles, it started snowing heavily. We somehow managed to reach Batote, which is almost midway between Srinagar and Jammu and is a temporary halting place on the highway. By that time, about 20 miles of the road, on each side of Batote, had got covered with snow, and hundreds of buses full of passengers and trucks were stranded. We somehow managed to get a room in the small two-room Batote dak-bungalow and lodged ourselves

there. We remained stranded there for four days, cut off from the entire world. Fortunately, some dry firewood was available at the dak-bungalow. This helped us in melting snow to meet our requirement of water for drinking and use in the toilet. We bought tea from one of the local 'dhabas'. The price of a glass of tea was doubled with every passing day. For each of the three meals of the day, the chowkidar-cum-cook of the dak-bungalow gave us just 'namkin paranthas'. Fortunately, we were able to buy some candles from the local market for use at night. After four days, we were able to drive out our jeep towards Jammu, with great effort.

On 27th December 1963, one of the major incidents in the history of J&K took place – the theft of the 'Holy Relic' from Hazratbal Shrine at Srinagar. The entire muslim population of the valley rose in revolt. Life and administration were paralyzed. The local administration proved entirely incapable of handling the situation. Shri B.N. Mullick, our Director, was specially sent by the Prime Minister to direct and guide the investigation for the recovery of the 'Holy Relic'. Despite an extremely bad weather and against the advice of IAF officers, Shri Mullick insisted that his special plane be flown to Srinagar, even at grave risk. The IAF pilot managed to land in Srinagar with great difficulty. We all heaved a sigh of relief.

The Holy Relic was recovered late in the evening of January 4, 1964 and it had to be immediately established that it was genuine. The lock of my house was broken and the recovered Holy Relic was kept in the drawing room. Muslim religious leaders and clerics were called from all parts of the Valley and when each of them was, one by one, taken to that room, he immediately prostrated before the recovered Relic and thanked Almighty that he had '*Didar*' of '*Mua Muqaddas*'. After this each one of them then testified through an affidavit, before a magistrate, sitting in the adjoining room, that the recovered Holy Relic was genuine. This process went on till early morning on the next day, and then it was made public that the Holy Relic had been recovered and installed in Hazaratbal Shrine. There was great jubilation throughout the valley. Prime Minister Mr. Nehru was reported to have highly praised the IB for this great achievement.

During the pre-recovery crisis, Shri Vishwanathan, the Home Secretary, had also reached Srinagar,

and he and Shri Mullick were staying in adjoining rooms in the State Guest House. The weather was extremely bad, either raining or snowing. One morning at about 8.30 a.m., Shri Mullick telephoned Hamir Singh, AD, that he should reach the guest house without any delay. His jeep being out of order, Hamir Singh reached the guest house on a cycle, fully drenched, in below zero temperature. Shri Mullick and Shri Vishwanathan were standing in the verandah of the guest house, waiting for Hamir Singh. Shri Mullick asked him about his staff car. Hamir Singh replied that his jeep was out of order, and a proposal for sanction of a staff car for AD, Srinagar had been pending with the MHA for many years. Shri Vishwanathan immediately went into his room and wrote with a pencil, a two line order on a sheet of paper that a staff car be sanctioned for AD, IB Srinagar and it be sent to him immediately. Shri Vishwanathan signed his pencil written note with a pen borrowed from Hamir Singh. A new car reached Srinagar within two days. However, the auditors refused to accept the pencil written order of the Home Secretary and it took me many years to convince them that it was a genuine order. It was said that the pencil written order of the Home Secretary was unique in the history of Government of India.

Another major event in J&K, which took place during my posting there, was large scale infiltration in the Valley of armed civilians and Pak-army men, in plain clothes, in August 1965. We had been providing good intelligence to the army about training of civilians in POK in handling of firearms, and their collection in large numbers along the CFL. However, the presence and deployment of our army on the borders in the Valley was very thin at that time, and infiltration from POK side was easy. A few groups of these 'raiders' were able to reach Srinagar. Some of them managed to hide in the forests near our official residences. There was immediately a big induction of Indian army and armed Police battalions in the State to deal with the 'raiders'. Although, the infiltrators were able to entrench themselves in some pockets, Pakistan's hopes of making Kashmiri muslims rise in revolt did not succeed. At serious personal risk, our officers moved deep into various parts of the Valley and were able to provide precise information about pockets of concentration of the infiltrators. That helped our troops considerably in neutralizing and capturing the infiltrators. By that

time, a regular war between India and Pakistan had started. The officers of almost all the Central Government offices, located in Srinagar, sent back their families to their homes. I and my colleague Hamir Singh, however, took no such action. We decided to keep our families with us, as we felt this was essential to keep up the morale of our men working in different parts of the Valley. This was highly appreciated by the 'bosses' at Delhi. We, had, however, made detailed plans for destroying our records, in case we were forced to leave Srinagar.

Sheikh Abdullah was arrested in August 1953 and was detained under the PSA. In May 1958, the Kashmir Conspiracy Case (KCC) was started against him and some others. The main accused were the Sheikh and Mirza Afzal Beg. A special jail was established in Jammu where they were lodged. In the same campus, a court room was built. There were also two residential houses. One of them was occupied by Shri Tikoo, the Special Judge trying the case, and the other was given to Shri M.L. Nanda, a DD of the IB. Shri Nanda was originally from the public prosecutor stream of Punjab Police. He was appointed as the public prosecutor of the KCC. A team of senior lawyers headed by Shri G.S. Pathak was also engaged on behalf of the prosecution. Most of the evidence in the KCC was collected by the IB and it was submitted to the court through J&K Police. In the initial stages, the case was vigorously pursued by both the sides. The functioning of the IB in the State was also challenged on behalf of the accused. They contended that since J&K State had acceded to India, only with regard to three subjects, viz., defence, foreign affairs and communications, the IB could not constitutionally function in the State. In the beginning, our position appeared weak, but ultimately it was argued that the IB was a part of the defence set-up in the State and it was meant to assist the Indian army in its security responsibilities. Our stand was finally accepted by the court. Gradually, due to political reasons, the KCC assumed a very slow pace. The case was finally withdrawn, unconditionally, in April 1964, and Sheikh Abdullah and Afzal Beg were released from prison. The Sheikh had remained incarcerated for almost eleven years. After he had been in prison for nine years, the Sheikh informally said to Shri M.L. Nanda: "Nanda

Sahib, you have kept me in jail for nine years. If you produce nine Kashmiri muslims whom you have won over for India, I would confess before the court whatever you say".

A very important prosecution witness of the KCC was one Sattar Khande, who lived in a very remote village of Tangdhar area of the Valley. It was essential to keep in touch with him. One of our officers had been doing this job exceedingly well. Normally, an officer is not posted for more than three years in J&K. We, however, had to retain this officer for almost nine years for this task. We gave him accelerated promotion, too. Unfortunately, his continued stay in J&K started creating domestic problems for him. His wife even threatened to divorce him. She had started suspecting that he had married a Kashmiri woman and wanted to settle down in J&K. We, then, had no alternative but to get him posted to his home town.

I was posted back to Delhi in July 1966. My four and a half years posting in J&K was professionally highly rewarding. It was also our good fortune that we got an opportunity to live in one of the most beautiful parts of the country. I and my family left Srinagar with a heavy heart.

Militancy, terrorism and Pakistan's proxy war started in J&K in all severity from the years 1988-89. I am, however, of the view that preparations for these sinister designs of Pakistan had started as far back as in 1972, when J&K Jammate-Islami, a staunchly pro-Pak body, decided to participate in State Assembly elections on directions from J&K Pakistan. This gave an indirect license to the State party to start spreading a large network of 'madarsas', to subvert the mind of the Kashmiri youth by indoctrination for 'jehad'.

After the Sheikh-Indira Accord of 1975, Sheikh Abdullah came to power in the State once again. The Sheikh was a towering personality and was very courteous and hospitable, but he was also highly egoistic. I met him a few times and when I broached the subject of the increasing spread of 'madarsas', he said that we 'dilliwalas' knew nothing about Kashmir. He stressed that Kashmir had had a tradition of 'Sufism' for centuries. He claimed that the 'madarsas' would not last long and would 'fade away' soon. Such was the complacency of the State Government. They refused to foresee the developing signs of the Pak supported 'jehadi war' in the State.

Scaling Himalayan Heights with the Intelligence Bureau

Capt. (Retd.) M.S. Kohli

In June, 1962, Sonam Gyatso (Intelligence Bureau's strongest climber), Hari Dang and myself, after surviving three nights at about 28,000 feet, missing the summit of Everest by a mere 100 metres, and after the world media had given us up as lost, safely returned to Delhi to the relief of all. We received a warm reception, from the I.B. and the Indian Navy. Many options about my posting were being considered by the Indian Navy. However, the sudden Chinese invasion of India on 20 October, 1962, placed me under the magic spell of the I.B., where I was destined to lead India's Greatest Climb and the world's greatest Intelligence Operation.

I was born and brought up in the hilly Himalayan town of Haripur, situated on the banks of river Indus and close to the borders of Kashmir, Afghanistan, Tajikistan and China. In 1824, a chilling chapter in the history of courage and valour was written here, when General Hari Singh Nalwa, the bravest known General of Maharaja Ranjit Singh, in whose memory the town of Haripur was founded, had conquered North-West Frontier and part of Afghanistan. Haripur and its neighbouring town of Abbotabad have recently hit the headlines, as Osama Bin Laden had chosen these towns, close to no man's land, for hiding during the last seven years of his life. Interestingly, in 2005, when I happened to visit Haripur for the sixth and the last time after Partition, as a guest of Gohar Ayub Khan, son of the former President of Pakistan, Osama was also there in hiding!

Haripur had shaped my future life and also my career spanning the Indian Navy, the Intelligence Bureau and Air India. Though scaling dizzy Himalayan heights and other pioneering adventures remained a part of my life throughout, the decade of sixties with the Intelligence Bureau, full of dare-devil climbs and death-defying

expeditions, some of which remained under wraps for years, will always remain the most thrilling period of my life.

During my years with the I.B., while facing some of the greatest challenges, I thoroughly relished the pleasure, privilege and the thrill of working closely with some of the best known legends of the I.B., such as, Shri B.N. Mullick, Sardar Balbir Singh, Shri MML Hooja, Shri R.N. Kao, Shri B. Chatterjee and Shri A.K. Dave – all illustrious Imperial Police Officers. Of my colleagues, I fondly remember Shri M.K. Narayanan, who rose to become the National Security Advisor of India, and now is the Governor of West Bengal.

First Contact

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My very first contact with the I.B. was through Sonam Gyatso. I had first met him in 1959 in Darjeeling, where we had assembled for the pre-Everest expedition to Ratong. Sonam had come with fresh laurels. Two years earlier, he had taken on Nanda Devi, missing the summit by 500 feet. A year earlier, he had set foot on Cho Oyu, the sixth highest peak in the world. With his tall and sturdy figure, face like a rock and strength of a mountain, he exuded confidence. On the very first sight, we became close friends and our friendship continued till the end of his life.

The following year, we were on Everest together. Unfortunately, due to a storm on 25 May and early break of Monsoon, we got trapped on the mountain. Sonam, during the gallant attempt, missed the summit by 200 metres. The following year, in 1961, I happened to read the book by the legendary British climber, H.W. Tilman who, after circling the Annapurna range, had remarked, 'Annapurna III cannot be reached at all.' Immediately on reading this, I decided to accept the challenge of Annapurna III. Sonam

Gyatso was on top of my list. Another interesting member was Lt. V.S. Shekhawat, who rose to become the Chief of the Naval Staff. In the annals of mountaineering, Annapurna III expedition was the most dramatic. We were looted by the local Bhotias, two members – Sonam Gyatso and Captain Jungalwala – were taken hostage. Prime Minister Nehru asked for our immediate return. His Majesty, the King of Nepal sent troops from nearby Jomsom to rescue us. Despite the setbacks, we got the equipment back and got our two colleagues released. Sonam and I, along with Sherpa Sona Girmi, in stormy weather, succeeded in reaching the summit. This ascent brought India international prestige.

Short of Summit

In 1962, I was the Deputy Leader of the Second Indian Expedition to Mount Everest. In this, Sonam Gyatso and I, along with Hari Dang, had to abandon the peak, due to a strong blizzard, when we were only 100 meters short of the summit. On our return, at nearly 28,300 feet, Sonam suddenly slipped and was heading for a 10,000 feet fall. Hari Dang was swept unaware. God gave me strength to drive my ice-axe hard into the ice and that stopped their fall. In pitch dark, we said our last prayers. After a few minutes, we started crawling on all fours; standing up was dangerous. At 10 p.m., we miraculously hit our last camp and spent the third night at a height of nearly 28,000 feet. It remains till date, the highest survival in the world. On return from Everest, Sonam and I were given a warm reception at I.B. Headquarters by Sardar Balbir Singh and Shri R.N. Kao.

The Naval Headquarters had now received requests for my posting from various quarters. Pending finalisation, I was given the post of SOS (Staff Officer Spare) at Naval Headquarters. On 20th October, 1962, China invaded India. Within a few days, I received an interesting offer from the Ministry of Defence to become their Advisor on Snow-Clothing and Equipment. I always welcome a change. I immediately accepted the offer and received orders to move to Kanpur to join the Defence Ministry's snow-clothing department.

For almost three days, the idea of moving to Kanpur gripped me. I felt I should instead do

something exciting which would give me thrill and adventure. An idea suddenly struck me. Why not seek some exciting opening in the I.B.? With some difficulty, I found the telephone number of Sardar Balbir Singh and rang him up. "Sir, do you remember me? I had led the Annapurna III team in 1961 and was the deputy leader of the second Indian Expedition to Everest in 1962. You had called me for the I.B. reception. I have something urgent to discuss with you. Can I see you immediately?" Sardar Balbir Singh was very warm and positive. He invited me to meet him straightaway in his office. Excited, I almost ran to his office. I told him about the forthcoming posting to Kanpur and my keenness to do something exciting in the I.B.

I Was Elated

Sardar Balbir Singh seemed equally excited. He was already planning to secure the services of an eminent mountaineer for a new mountaineering force sanctioned by the Government. He got up from his chair and asked, "Kohli, can you handle a rifle?" I promptly replied, "I think I can. I have done a weapons training course during my naval training." Sardar Balbir Singh said, "We are starting a new force on the Chinese border, which will be named 'Frontier Rifles'. A number of battalions are being raised and if you agree, I could offer you an assignment in the Frontier Rifles immediately." I was elated and immediately gave my acceptance. Sardar Balbir Singh shook hands with me and said, "You are in". He immediately referred the matter to the Naval authorities and my posting to Kanpur was cancelled. Orders were issued deputing me to this new force, whose name was subsequently changed to the Indo-Tibetan Border Police.

New doors of adventure now suddenly opened to me. Besides ITB Police, Government had also sanctioned three other special organisations – ARC, SSB and SFF. Since Shri Mullick was in overall command, he started giving me exciting tasks concerning these organisations. S. Senapati, then Assistant Inspector General of the ITB Police, would call me once or twice every month and give me some interesting mission on the border. I enjoyed doing all such challenging assignments. Once I was asked to fly to Leh and

proceed to Dungi to supervise the induction of SFF Personnel. On another occasion, I was sent to Chakrata to give a motivational talk to the staff of Establishment 22.

Trisuli And Nanda Devi East

In 1964, I was asked to lead an Indian Expedition to Trisuli and Nanda Devi East. At Trisuli, when we were poised to reach the virgin summit, a major ice-tower under the pressure of heavy snowfall crashed down, triggering a 14 foot high ice-avalanche, destroying our summit camp. Fortunately, I had ordered the withdrawal of the entire team a few hours earlier and a near tragedy was averted. Harish Rawat of the I.B. was a member of my team. He belonged to the illustrious family of 'Pandit Brothers', who made history in mountaineering in the 19th century. Rawat's grand-father, Rai Bahadur Kishan Singh, known as A.K. Pandit, and his granfather's cousin, Mr. Nain Singh, were both in the Survey of India and could be considered as pioneers of mountaineering in India.

Immediately after abandoning Trisuli, we proceeded to Nanda Devi East. On Nanda

Devi, three climbers and three sherpas fell more than 3000 feet, but survived. Harish Rawat was one of them. 1964, thus, proved to be a bad year.

Leader of Everest Expedition

The following year, I was chosen leader of the third Indian Expedition to Mount Everest. I needed six months to complete the preparations, four months on the actual expedition and two months to wind up and write a book on the expedition. Immediately after the announcement, I went to meet Sardar Balbir Singh. After expressing happiness at my selection, he said, "Kohli, your are only on deputation to us from the Navy. How can we give you one full year off? Go and see Chatterjee." Those days, Sardar Balbir Singh was Joint Director-I cum Inspector General, ITB Police and Shri Chatterjee was Special Inspector General. Somewhat confused, I proceeded to the office of Shri B Chatterjee who said, "Congratulations, Sardar Balbir Singh has agreed to grant you one year off, a special car with a driver and an office for organising the forthcoming Everest Expedition." Sardar Balbir Singh had an interesting sense of humour.





The third Indian Everest Expedition was spectacular in many ways. The scaling of Everest four times in succession in 10 days was a feat that drew the world attention it richly deserved. The second team consisted of Sonam Gyatso and Sonam Wangyal, both IB officers. They were the oldest and the youngest climbers to have stepped on the summit together. Sonam Gyatso, during the climb, was frostbitten on his back. He was in severe pain. But with determination and will power, he reached the top.

On 23 June, 1965, we returned to Delhi. To demonstrate the nation's gratitude, Acting Prime Minister Gulzarilal Nanda headed the reception at the airport.



Historic Reception at Palam Airport

World's Highest Intelligence Operation

As soon as the formalities of meeting the dignitaries at the Palam Airport were over, Sardar Balbir Singh whispered into my ear, "Kohli, go and see Ramji Kao behind the aircraft. He has a very important message for you." I quietly slipped away from the crowd. Shri Kao, was at that time, Director ARC. He was very brief, "You are required to immediately proceed to the USA for a highly important operation. See me as soon as your hectic schedule of receptions is over." A week later he told me the objective of the mission. I was asked to take a team of strong Indian climbers with me and lead a joint Indian-American expedition for trials on Mount McKinley, the highest peak of USA.

As far as the Indian climbers were concerned, there was no problem. I straightaway selected Sonam Gyatso, Harish Rawat, Sonam Wangyal and Gurcharan Bhangu, all I.B. officers from our 1965 Everest team. Devi Singh Sisodia and Dr. 'Pedro' Tripathi, working in para-military organisations, were also added to the team. On the morning of 19th July, we were at the international terminal at Palam. We were discreetly taken to the tarmac, after the rest of the passengers had boarded the Air-India flight. In New York, we were received by a CIA official. The following day, after a lightning

tour of the White House and Lincoln Memorial, we flew to the Elmendorf Air Force Base in Alaska. Our American counterparts included Barry Bishop. Bill McKniff, a senior CIA officer, was in charge of the American side. He was of small built, extremely polite, affable and a cheerful person. We instantly became friends.

After trials on Mount McKinley, we returned to New Delhi towards the middle of August. For me, the project was a major mountaineering challenge. The Americans had chosen Kanchenjunga, the third highest peak in the world, for installing a nuclear powered sensor. I vehemently opposed this and recommended Nanda Kot (22,510 ft). Finally, Nanda Devi (25,645 ft.) was agreed as a compromise. Without wasting any time, we made frantic preparations.

Before the middle of September, we were at the base camp of Nanda Devi. The initial progress of our mission was fairly fast. Despite spells of bad weather, higher camps were established and stocked. On 7th October, America's top nuclear scientist, Jim, broke the safety seals of the special box and peeled off the top. Inside, seven radioactive plutonium rods were nestled in individual glass cradles. With great dexterity, he delicately pulled each one out and inserted it into the generator. As soon as the loading was over, heat started emanating from the generator. We were now ready for the final act. Sherpas enjoyed carrying the hot generator and named it 'Guru Rimpoche'!

Bad Luck

On reaching Camp IV (23,700 ft), we ran into bad luck. A severe blizzard stopped further progress. America's best climber, Tom Frost, was not able to acclimatise himself well and stayed below. The other two Americans, Lute Jerstad (American Everest) and Sandy, were able to reach between Camps III and IV, from where they slipped some 300 feet in an avalanche, but fortunately stopped short of a crevice and survived. A party consisting of Rawat, both the Sonams and Sherpa Sirdar Pasang and Dawa Lama rushed essential supplies from Camp II to Camp III and returned at 10.00 p.m. under difficult and dangerous conditions. We, however, kept up the efforts, defying hostile weather conditions.

On 13th October, when Bhangu reached Camp IV along with his Sherpas, Sandy and Lute Jerstad were at Camp III. The generator was carried by

Bhangu to Camp IV. For the safety of the climbers carrying the generator, white-coloured radioactivity measuring plates were pinned on their chests. In case of radioactivity exceeding minimum safety levels, these plates would change colour. The transceivers (B1 and B2) were also carried, but the power-pack, which was to be attached to the generator and which we believed was to convert the nuclear energy into electrical energy, was kept between Camp III and Camp IV. Bhangu had done an excellent job. On the 1965 Everest Expedition, he was looking after communications. He now proved to be a strong climber.

On 16 October, 1965, under worsening weather conditions and the end of the climbing season, I called off the attempt. Bhangu and party carefully secured the nuclear generator and other sensor equipments to the rocks, so that the following year we could pick them up and complete the mission. The Americans accompanying us were quite satisfied with our decision to leave the device at Camp IV. After an exchange of messages with New Delhi, the approval to leave the device at that height in the mountains was conveyed to us.

Operation Recovery

The year 1966 was fully spent on 'Operation Recovery'. After futile endeavours, the Americans decided to bring in two legendary Huskies, rotary-wing aircrafts from NATO. They were the antithesis of aerodynamic beauty. On 16 August, the maiden flight of Huskie, with Bill Brewer of the CIA on board, attained a height of 22,500 feet. Reaching near Camp IV and keeping the plane steady, some canisters were tossed. Next day, search for the canisters began. Of the 12 canisters, 10 were never found. At the site where two were found, search was carried out without any success. During the search operation, two ascents of Nanda Devi were made. Gurcharan Bhangu accompanied by Sherpa Tashi reached the summit in a heroic endeavour on 8th June. Later, on 20 August, Rob Schaller made a daring solo ascent of the peak. During the year, Shri Mullick once with Shri MML Hooja, made two visits to the Nanda Devi Sanctuary for discussions.

Since the search for the nuclear device on Nanda Devi did not yield any result, the Americans accepted my original proposal to set up the monitoring device on the Dome of Nanda Kot at a height of nearly 22,000 feet, i.e. 500 feet below the summit. I had climbed this peak in 1959 and knew the route well. I was sure there would be no

serious difficulty in reaching the Dome. Besides, we could leisurely carry out the installation operation. Absolute secrecy was maintained for the Nanda Kot expedition also. Besides me, other Indian members of the expedition to Nanda Kot were Sonam Wangyal, H.C.S. Rawat and G.S. Bhangu. The American team consisted of two new climbers, Barry Prather and James Barry Corbet, both of the 1963 American Everest team. Tom Frost, Rob Shaller and Sam Curry of the Nanda Devi attempt returned to join the team.

This expedition was extremely successful. Despite several obstacles, we were able to reach the Dome according to our plans and installed the entire equipment on the summit. We got signals from Delhi that the tracking equipment was functioning well. There were jubilations in Washington and Delhi. Shri B.N. Mullick and Shri A.K. Dave, who had taken over from Shri R.N. Kao as Director, ARC, flew to Base Camp to personally congratulate us. The CIA now realised that had they accepted my original advice of selecting Nanda Kot, the catastrophe on Nanda Devi would not have taken place.

After a few months, the equipment at Nanda Kot Dome stopped functioning. I flew over Nanda Kot to explore the mystery. When my plane was exactly over the summit, an air pocket suddenly brought my plane down about a thousand feet. I thought it was crashing. Thank God, there was no collision. On return, the photos showed no equipment on the dome. I immediately mounted another expedition to Nanda Kot. On reaching the Dome, we saw a white out. After removing a few layers of snow, we sighted the sensor equipment which then started functioning.

CIA Request

During the summer of 1968, on the request of CIA, a small team under Rawat was sent to Nanda Kot to retrieve the sensor equipment which had stopped functioning once again. When the team reached the Dome, as earlier, there was no sign of the equipment. They dug a few feet, and what they saw was a real fantasy. There was a perfect semi-spherical cave formed by the hot generator at the centre. The continuous heat emanating from the generator had melted the snow up to eight feet in all directions. 'Guru Rim boche' had stood in the Centre as a 'deity!'

A few days later, the nuclear-powered generator was placed in a special plane at Charbatia. Before

the plane took off, Shri Mullick touched the hot generator and felt relieved. This top-secret mission was strictly kept under wraps. However, on 12th April, 1978, the mission suddenly exploded in America, rocking the world media and the Indian Parliament. Prime Minister Morarji Desai addressed the Parliament on 17th April, 1978. I was summoned from Sydney where I was posted as Air India's Manager. On reaching Delhi, I dictated the full account from my memory for two days to Shri V. Shankar, Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister. This was carefully recorded. With full world exposure, I was advised by the PM's office to certainly include this mission in my autobiography, as otherwise distorted versions as of 12th April, 1978 will continue. Finally in 2002, in consultation with Shri R.N. Kao and Shri A.K. Dave, I gave this story a full-book treatment. Ken Conboy, who was already going ahead with the book and whom I had ignored for two years, was my co-author.

With the completion of our mission, I was now deputed to Chakrata for an important Survival Course by a British expert. On the morning of 22nd April, 1968, when I was in the midst of the Course, a Mi-4 circled over Chakrata and landed on the parade ground. I figured that it must be carrying a dignitary from New Delhi and did not give it a second thought. To my surprise, however, the camp administrator called me out of the class and said that the chopper had come to rush me to the capital. Fearing a family emergency, I demanded to know the reason. The chopper crew said that they had come on the orders of Shri Mullick. Sonam Gyatso was critically ill at the military hospital and had expressed a desire to see me.


Landing in New Delhi, I headed straight for the hospital. Ironically, Shri Mullick was occupying a room in another hospital in New Delhi with some ailment. Entering Sonam's ward, I looked at my friend and began to sob. Barely alive, Sonam's robust frame looked frail and shrunken. His face, normally burned a rich chocolate from the strong ultraviolet rays at high altitude, was waxy and lifeless, the color drained from his lips. His eyes were pinched tight, and his chest showed little signs of breath.

Next to the bed was Sonam's wife. The beautiful daughter of a prosperous nobleman from western Sikkim, she had managed to retain every ounce of dignity despite her inner pain. Sonam had been waiting for you, she told me, but he had slipped

into unconsciousness two hours earlier. The doctors thought it unlikely that he would open his eyes again. I moved towards Sonam and touched him. As if by a miracle, Sonam opened his eyes, leveled a distant stare in my direction, and feebly tried to lift his right arm. Pointing a finger at his wife, his eyes grew slightly more focused. "Look after her," Sonam whispered. He tried to say more, but nothing came out. His eyes and finger remained frozen, soon his chest stopped moving.

Book On Gyatso

A few months after Sonam's death, Shri B.N. Mullick called me and said, "I want to write a book on Sonam Gyatso. You have led most of the expeditions in which he had participated". We worked together and in 1970 "The Sky Was His Limit" was released. Later, "Sonam Gyatso Mountaineering Institute" came up at Gangtok—a monument to India's fabulous climber.



In 1970, Shri B.N. Mullick realised that I had an overdose of Himalayas and badly needed a change. He asked Shri Ramji Kao to post me to Kathmandu in RAW as India's Consul General. I was thrilled. But destiny had something else in store for me. Three days after offering the assignment at Kathmandu, Shri Kao called me, "Kohli, you are too well known to be sent to Kathmandu."

There were three other offers at that time – D.G. of National Institute of Sports, Patiala, Headmaster

Laurence School, Sanavar and Manager, Air India. I chose the last. On first February, 1971, I joined Air India. It gave me a world-wide platform. Within a few days, I became the first man in the world to conceive and personally promote "Trekking in the Himalayas". During the next 19 years, I visited over 50 countries, some multiple times. During these overseas tours I came across several news of intelligence value which I was pleased to pass on to Shri Kao, Shri Shankar Nair and others.

On 31 December, 1989, when I retired from Air India at the age of 58, I received several highly lucrative offers. Disregarding all these, I accepted two honorary offers, one as an Advisor to the ITBP and second, Presidentship of the Indian Mountaineering Foundation. These gave me an opportunity to make further contribution to the cause of ITB Police and Indian mountaineering.



Capt. M.S. Kohli and Shri B.N. Mullick

Glorious Years

Today, at 81, on the occasion of India celebrating 125 glorious years of the I.B., my thoughts go back to one individual. He, like Prime Minister Nehru, was one of the greatest patriots of India, utterly self-less, dedicated, noble and loyal. He had set the highest standards of service to the I.B. and the nation. He was none other than Shri Bhola Nath Mullick, the first Indian Director of the I.B. I have every hope that his spirit and his pioneering work in the I.B. will continue to inspire generations of I.B. officers.

(The author, a former President, Indian Mountaineering Foundation, is regarded as the Father of Indian Mountaineering and Adventure. He was responsible for shaping the Indo-Tibetan Border Police into a formidable mountain capable force.)

My Experience of life and work in IB

Shri O.N. Shrivastava

I believe that a lot in life is about being at the right place, at the right time — and that to me, is Destiny. It is difficult to say at this point of time as to when I got on to the road, which, notwithstanding its total absence of sign posts, its ups and downs, twists and turns, its episodes of sunshine and defeating darkness, ended up in the Raj Bhavan. Of two facts, however, I am certain; both interlinked, which have made the difference. The first one was in Oct 1962, when already in Bhind for over two and a half years, I was offered a 'choice' and I decided to take the road least frequented to the North-East. And the second; a corollary to the first one, was to come on deputation to the Intelligence Bureau, a deputation from which I never returned.

It was during my deputation to Nagaland that I came across eminent Intelligence Officers like Mr Atma Jayram, Mr. R. D. Pande and Mr. R. P. Joshi and got an opportunity to see them work from very close quarters. It always amazed me to visit SIB offices in Kohima or Shillong, where even as late as 9.30 in the night, their typewriters and their wireless sets would be relentlessly at work. As luck would have it, Mr Jayram visited Nagaland around the time my deputation of five years to Nagaland was coming to an end. He was accompanied by Shri R. D. Pande. This visit provided me a rare opportunity of interacting with Mr. Jayram, and also gave Mr. Jayram an opportunity of evaluating my work in Nagaland. He obviously would have been impressed, for when he was leaving the Police Mess in Chumukedima (Nagaland), he called me aside and asked me if I would like to join the Intelligence Bureau. I left the choice to him and to Mr. Pande, telling both of them that "Yes, provided they found me to be right material for induction into the IB and provided they succeeded in making IGP, MP agree to a third stint of deputation for me." I had earlier done two stints in Nagaland,

a total of eight years. Having received no firm indication from either of them and having finished my deputation in Nagaland, I returned to Madhya Pradesh. A year went by, when one fine morning I received a call from Mr. Pande telling me that having finished the 'cooling off' period of one year in the State, the Government of Madhya Pradesh had agreed for my deputation to IB, and that I should keep myself in readiness for moving to Delhi at short notice.

I joined the Intelligence Bureau in 1974 and was posted as Assistant Director dealing with the North-East as a subject. I had worked in Nagaland and Mizoram and had developed dependable contacts during my stints there. In 1975, Intelligence Bureau received information that Laldenga (President, Mizo National Front), who was then living under ISI's care in Karachi, was fed up with the Governments of China, USA and Pakistan, for their unwillingness to intervene physically against India on behalf of the Mizos. According to him, these Governments were only interested in causing pinpricks, which were hardly of any help. The sufferings of his people due to Army/Police operations in Mizoram were also causing him concern. He was, therefore, willing to negotiate peace with the Government of India. Smt. Indira Gandhi too supported peace talks with Mr. Laldenga, but for that, Mr. Laldenga, along with his five family members and five other senior MNF officials, was required to be smuggled out of Pakistan — into India — considered to be an impossible task, since the entire group was living under ISI's arrangements. Smt. Indira Gandhi's scepticism about the success of the mission notwithstanding, she did not hold back her approval. The then Home Minister Mr Narsimha Rao too nurtured serious doubts about the success of this mission. But he too was good enough to extend his good wishes to the project-

which was completed successfully within six months by the IB and RAW, acting in unison.

The responsibility of looking after this operation, Laldenga's stay and security in India, as also the negotiations, became the responsibility of a group in the IB of which I became a nodal member, due to my long stay in the North-East and due to Intelligence Bureau, under my guidance, having developed excellent contacts amongst student community from the North-East in Delhi. It was through success in this operation, that Shri Narsimha Rao came to know first hand, in all its intricacies, how the Intelligence Bureau went about its job, arduously, meticulously and away from the glare of publicity. It was also through this operation, that I came to know not only the Home Minister, but also the Prime Minister.

And all this happened at a time when the Intelligence Bureau was really poorly off in terms of resources. The administration had just two cars, communication was only through wireless sets which involved enciphering and deciphering at both ends, the only means of pushing intelligence from the field to the IB Headquarters was through registered post, and the only way of getting through to any of the SIBs in the North-East was through lightning phone calls, which had their limitations. This also involved frequent travel to the North-East, which too was not easy, as it was always difficult to get seats in flights with North-East as destination. Financially too, the IB was very poorly off. To be able to run an operation involving smuggling people out of Pakistan safely into India, was therefore considered a big achievement.

It was because of the Intelligence Bureau and the value attached to 'area specialization', that officers like me got a chance to remain in touch with at least three Prime Ministers. With Mrs. Gandhi, decision making in operational matters always came with a 24 hrs delay. She personally knew several personalities in the North-East and she would generally take 24 hrs to contact them to ascertain their reactions prior to taking decisions. With Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, all decisions were on-the-spot, particularly in operational matters and he was always ready to listen to IB officials. With Mr. Narsimha Rao, it was totally a different ball game. He wanted to remain in the picture at

all times and so he allowed IB officials to meet him anytime during the day and even late in the evenings. But he left decision making to the best judgement of IB officials and 'area specialists'. Success in operations on several occasions was, therefore, the direct outcome of the interest taken by the respective Prime Ministers in listening to and understanding the constraints under which the Intelligence Bureau functioned.

It is perhaps not right to go into many details, but some illustrative cases might help to understand the interest which the then Prime Ministers took in National security matters. In the mid seventies, it became necessary to send an officer incognito to Pakistan to talk to and understand Laldenga, and if he agreed, to get the terms written by him. The meeting was supposed to have been facilitated by Laldenga's ADC. It was a project which was fraught with risks and grave consequences. The then Directors of Intelligence Bureau and RAW decided to take the Prime Minister on board. At the end of the presentation, Mrs. Gandhi found the odds loaded heavily against us and 'denial' being the only way out if the cover got blown off. The then Director, Intelligence Bureau agreed that the operation was fraught with grave risks, but in the same breath added that risks are what intelligence officials are supposed to take, day in and day out. It was no surprise that Mrs. Gandhi, and the then Home Minister were elated and were profuse in their compliments when the task was accomplished.

It also struck me as to how brutally frank were the Directors, in expressing their views at any level. It was in 1983, when an important meeting was held with the Prime Minister in the chair, for discussing the Assam agitation. The State was then under President's Rule and in addition to so many others, the then DIB, Mr. T.V. Rajeswar, the then Governor of Assam and his Advisor on Law and Order — a seasoned bureaucrat, were present. The Advisor was a man of action and normalcy and inaction bored him no end. Both the Advisor and the Governor favoured holding of elections without any delay. They made it clear that holding elections might lead to some localised violence, and the CRPF might have to be used for delivering lathi-charges wherever necessary, and that 20-25 persons may die in the process. The agitators, who had by then not

seen a strong lathi-charge, would run away and the agitation would fizzle out. DIB's interjection during this otherwise ambitious monologue is worth recalling, "What are you talking? Our senior officers have just the other day assessed the situation in detail... violence will be so widespread that Assam administration would run out of Policemen to reach everywhere.., the number of casualties would run into thousands...?" It did not take a month for the DIB to be proven right.

Similarly, in 1989, Tripura went through a sudden spurt in violence, spearheaded by the Tripura National Volunteers (TNV) and directed against the Bengali speaking people of the State. As a way out, and in consultation with the then Prime Minister, Shri Rajiv Gandhi, it was decided to explore the possibility of secret parleys with the then TNV, chief, B. K. Hrangkhawl. The TNV supremo was then based in Bangladesh and was located next to a Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) camp in Khagrachari (Bangladesh). The then DIB in his wisdom decided to entrust the responsibility of contacting the TNV supremo, to me. I launched myself on this mission with a wireless set which stopped working just 20 Kms inside Bangladesh and had to be left behind hidden in the forest, and a spring loaded camera with a declared capability of 6 shots, but an onground capability of only 3 shots for secret photography. However, these shortcomings notwithstanding, the project was launched. I remained missing for 3 days, reappeared in Agartala after 5 days and everyone heaved a sigh of relief. The operation turned out to be a major success. The Intelligence Bureau did manage to get Hrangkhawl into India and persuade him into joining the mainstream along with his followers. This was another operation, solely negotiated by the Intelligence Bureau, which has stood the test of time, like the Mizoram Accord.

While on this subject, it would be worthwhile mentioning the kidnapping of 15 officials in Assam, out of which 12 belonged to the Centre/Central agencies, by the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). Such was the faith of the then Prime Minister Shri Narsimha Rao in the capabilities of the Intelligence Bureau, that he reverted forthwith to Shri M K Narayanan, the then DIB, seeking assistance in the release of the kidnapped officials. The DIB recalled me from a training course abroad and asked

me if I could try getting the kidnapped officials released without any serious quid pro quo. This feat was accomplished in a record time of 15 days and negotiations with ULFA leaders about their coming over ground and joining the main stream, were the end product of these parleys. The success in this operation further endeared the Intelligence Bureau to the Prime Minister.

In all humility, I believe that all this would not have been possible without the opportunities and support provided by the Intelligence Bureau. I only converted these opportunities into successes. I am grateful to each and everyone in the Intelligence Bureau, to all my bosses, my colleagues and all my team members.

The Intelligence Bureau, as I have mentioned somewhere earlier, was an organization without a solid technical base till as late as the late 70's. Credit must go to Shri T. V. Rajeswar for taking the Intelligence Bureau out of the wireless age and into the teleprinter age. This resulted in a communication upsurge, which helped particularly, the far-flung posts in the North-East. Then came Shri Rajiv Gandhi and the inimitable Mr M. K. Narayanan. Mr Rajiv Gandhi was quite impressed with the Intelligence Bureau's achievements in the North-East, particularly the Mizoram Accord, the Assam Accord and the TNV Accord. He had immense faith in the Intelligence Bureau in handling sensitive negotiations. He was further impressed when the Intelligence Bureau brought to Delhi, the entire leadership of many under ground organizations, away from the prying eyes of the media.

He did notice the Intelligence Bureau officials going round their jobs sans publicity. I can not forget my last meeting with him, in which he advised that the IB should not ignore the youngest or even the simplest of groups of malcontents, operating particularly in the volatile environment of the North-East. The upshot was the establishment of contact with Bodo underground leaders. He didn't live to see the fructification of these parleys, but they climaxed in Shri Narsimha Rao's time with the signing of the Bodo Accord between the Government of India represented by Shri Rajesh Pilot, the Assam Government represented by Chief Minister Shri Hiteswar Saikia and five Bodo underground

leaders. This happened around the time when I was about to retire.

Life is a continuous process of learning; one continues to learn literally till his last breath. Mr. Rajeswar was a man of great contacts, Mr. Narayanan an officer of nuts and bolts, a down to earth man, and Mr. Vaidya was a visionary, a man of great imagination. I learnt extensively from all three of them. However, about imagining the impossible and making it possible, I learnt only from Mr. Vaidya. Hats-off to all three of them.

Till the late 70's, women were not represented in the Indian Intelligence. It was then that Renuka moved in as my Assistant Director. And when I became Additional Director and Establishment was added to my charge for a brief period, I recruited three girls who had just then finished their Masters from Bombay University. They were desperate to join the Intelligence Bureau as they wanted to do something for the nation, then passing through a difficult phase on the law and order front. The Board, during interview, made them aware of the difficult living conditions within the Intelligence Bureau, and still more difficult postings. They were, however, fired with patriotic zeal and were ready to savour any hardship for the sake of the nation. They left the Board with no option but to take them in as ACIOs-II, and what amazing results they produced while working in the Intelligence Bureau. One ACIO-II, I used to call her 'KK', was utilized by me in the ULFA operations and there was no stopping her from producing results to an extent that she received more than 30 rewards, both cash and commendations, from a DIB as tough and as legendary as Mr. Narayanan. I am sure that even today, women officers can do wonders in the field of intelligence, provided the middle level leadership in the IB shows no hesitation in exposing them to risks which is the bread and butter of any good intelligence officer.

While having a lot of contacts in the field assures one of the ability of on the spot verification and of being forewarned, a lot can be achieved in the field of intelligence mainly through good team work. I am convinced no intelligence organization can flourish in officer-subordinate syndrome. In intelligence organizations, you should not be giving orders but you should be

joining shoulders with subordinates, in meeting an objective. Excellent results can be achieved only when the lowest in the team has confidence that all laurels would necessarily visit him, and that the senior most in the team would accept responsibility for all failures. I am sure, I succeeded in generating that level of confidence in my teams. Consequently, they ended up doing all the leg work and all the unpleasant work and I just shared their achievements.

The Intelligence Bureau is an excellent organization to live and work in. It is also a wonderful organization in retirement, since it continues to treat you as a family member till your last breath. It contains excellent officers, for some of whom the word impossible does not exist. I personally knew two such ADs, including the one who is presently the DIB and Doval, the former DIB. To both of them, no obstacle was insurmountable. Both Doval and Nehchal raised excellent teams of intelligence officers and I used them to the organisation's advantage at the oddest of places. Twice we missed out on contact with the underground leaders inside a foreign country and twice the ACIOs-II in our teams took a cover which took them deep inside, and contact was re-established. It was a feat all the same, hidden securely from publicity and media glare-like most of the Intelligence Bureau operations are.

I am now retired for 20 years, of which 11 years I have spent in Bhopal. I can't envisage Intelligence Bureau not being around me. They have looked after me in my happiness and in my grief. I remember and deeply mourn the death of Mr. Trikha who did spend some years in the Intelligence Bureau, though he finally retired from the State Police. What I remember most about his illness were the last few days and nights that he spent in a nursing home in Bhopal. During those days and nights, it was only the IB officials who helped Mrs Trikha by spending the nights and days with him in the hospital. Even his funeral was an exclusive IB affair.

It has been 25 years since the Intelligence Bureau celebrated its centenary. For organizing the centenary celebrations a committee was constituted at the IB headquarters, nicknamed C.O.C.K (Committee for Organisation of Centenary Karyakram) and I was entrusted the

onerous responsibility of being its Chief, jovially called the 'Chief C.O.C.K'. We had no guard file to refer to and the organization had no one with experience to fall back upon, excepting of course our imagination. But everyone extended a helping hand. Shri Narayanan was then the DIB and Shri Rajiv Gandhi, the Prime Minister. The Intelligence Bureau, when it celebrates its 125th anniversary, has something to fall back upon, some record which they can refer to. There are also several officers with centenary celebration's experience, including the present Director Shri Nehchal Sandhu. I wish him and

through him, everyone serving the Organization, many anniversaries and many years of glory. We should remember that everyone cannot become an intelligence officer. It should be a matter of great pride to have been given an opportunity to work for an intelligence organization. It should also be a matter of great satisfaction to have worked quietly, in total anonymity, contributing to national security, braving odds and risks and to have retired with grace, to live yet another life of dignity and anonymity. My best wishes once again to everyone serving the Intelligence Bureau.

Just like that!

AJIT
NINAN



The 'belly-scope' not only helps them in reading weighing scales, it also checks their shoe shine.

My Unforgettable Years in the North-East

Shri Prakash Singh, IPS (Retd.)

My association - and fascination - for the north-east started at a very young age when I was still an Assistant Superintendent of Police. I was picked up by the Intelligence Bureau under the 'earmarking scheme'. It was the brain-child of B.N. Mullick, the then Director, Intelligence Bureau, under which top position holders from every batch were picked up for the IB. Mullick was a colossus among the police officers of those days. He was held in great awe and esteem. Once he had earmarked an officer, there was no getting away from it. I was released for deputation to the Intelligence Bureau, Ministry of Home Affairs in December 1963.

It would be interesting to place on record an interface I had as a probationer with B.N. Mullick in the Police Training College, Morabadad on December 1, 1960. It so happened that the seven IPS probationers, undergoing training, had been taken to a scene of dacoity in the countryside. Here we were told by the instructor that the dacoits always came with their faces covered, but this fact was never mentioned in the FIR. On the contrary, it was always recorded by police that the villagers saw the criminals and identified them in the moonlight or in the light caused by burning of haystack. This fudging, we were told, was necessary to meet the requirement of law. What is laid down in theory and what is done in practice greatly agitated our young minds. We knew it was wrong but we also knew that stating the truth would mean letting the criminal get away from the clutches of law. "Law is an ass", we remembered.

A few days later, Mullick arrived at Moradabad and was staying in the Police Training College Mess. We had dinner with him. At Mt. Abu, we had got into the habit of having frank and informal talks in the Mess with our senior officers. We told the DIB of our experience at the

scene of dacoity and underscored the difference between the theoretical and practical aspects of police working. Mullick was an idealist and unfortunately did not appreciate our views. He insisted that police officers should be truthful, irrespective of the consequences of their action on crime or criminals. Not that we were bereft of idealism, but we found his views impractical. At this stage, I committed the indiscretion of saying that we would then be, in Matthew Arnold's words, "beautiful but ineffectual angels beating our luminous wings in the void in vain". Having been a student of English literature, I was fond of quoting the great authors. Mullick, however, was not amused at the poetical reference. The conversation ended abruptly and he left the Mess in a huff. The next morning, he called Qamrul Hasan, Principal of the Police Training College, and said that he was greatly disturbed at the way the probationers had talked to him and was worried about the future of the Indian Police Service. He even said that he had not been able to sleep soundly the previous night. Mullick's stature being what it was, the Principal was upset. He called us to his room and wanted to know what had actually transpired. We told him faithfully the entire sequence of conversation. Fortunately for us, he understood our point of view better. Nevertheless, he advised us to be circumspect while talking to senior officers in future.

I served in the Intelligence Bureau for nearly a decade and had the good fortune of serving under stalwart Directors like BN Mullick, MML Hooja, and Atma Jayaram. Two other officers who greatly impressed me by their intellectual brilliance were AK Dave, an expert on International Communism, and KN Prasad, an expert on North-East. It was really unfortunate that neither of them could rise to the rank of DIB, though they eminently deserved to occupy the high office.

The most memorable part of my stint in the IB was the four year period (1965-68) I spent in Nagaland. It was a very exciting period. Every day there was a new challenge, a new development, a new threat or an otherwise disturbing piece of information. I had all the time, a feeling of contributing to the country's fight against insurgency in a very sensitive area. This was a strong motivation and brought the best out of me. There were far too many challenging incidents. I would reminisce just two of them— one when I walked *incognito* into a Naga Army Camp and spent the night there, and the other when Naga rebels, on learning that I was the brain behind the raid on their Jotsoma camp, issued an *ahza* (order) for my annihilation.

Visit to Lephori

The Naga underground had a well organised parallel government – it was called 'Naga Federal Government' with a President, Prime Minister (*Ato-Kilonser*) and Ministers (*Kilonser*). The armed wing, known as 'Naga Army', had a Commander-in-Chief and it was divided into battalions. The tenth battalion had its headquarters at Lephori in the Pochury area, quite close to the Myanmar border. During one of my tours, I went to Meluri, which was our outpost in the Pochury area. The Assistant Central Intelligence Officer in charge of the outpost was one Chandrika Singh, a daring officer who was a storehouse of information on the Nagas. He suggested that we undertake a trek to Lephori, with a view to getting an idea about the strength of the Naga Army camp there, the weapons stored and their defences. Chandrika Singh was known in the area as he met the underground leaders quite frequently. My going as Assistant Director of the Subsidiary Intelligence Bureau (SIB) was a different proposition. It was bound to be viewed with suspicion. However, I decided that we should go. For reasons of safety, a story was cooked up to camouflage my identity. I was to be introduced as an Assistant Professor of History from Allahabad (which, in any case, I had been), who had come to collect material on the history of the Nagas.

Meluri to Lephori was a ten mile stretch. It was not much of a distance. But half the distance was a descent and the remaining half was a steady uphill climb. It was a difficult trek. We reached Lephori

late in the afternoon. The Naga Army personnel were playing volleyball at the time. As they saw us approaching, they stopped the game and were surprised that we should have ventured into their camp. We were, of course, unarmed. Self-styled Lt. Col. Henito Sema, who was Commandant of the tenth battalion, accosted us. He in fact gave us a hostile reception. He shouted at Chandrika Singh for having come to the camp without any prior notice or permission. Chandrika Singh used all his tact and persuasive skill to convince Henito that we had no evil designs and that it was purely a friendly visit. Arguments and counter-arguments went on for about ten minutes before Henito could be pacified. I was a silent spectator to their exchanges. Henito finally relented and asked his men to usher us into a *basha* (hut), where we could stay for the night. I must say the Naga Army personnel treated us very well. We were offered *madhu* (rice beer) by a young girl in a *chunga* (mug). I did not like the taste of it, but it had to be consumed. Sleeping in the Naga Army camp was an unforgettable experience.

Next morning, to keep up the facade of research, I collected some village elders of Lephori and pretended to elicit information out of them about the origin of the Nagas. They could tell me only about a folk tale on the subject. At the beginning of creation, according to the story, God gave the knowledge of reading and writing both to the hillman as well as the plainsman. The plainsman was given paper to write upon while the hillman was given skin. As it happened, the hillman devoured the skin when he found it edible. The Nagas have consequently no record of their past. I told them that the Nagas were none else than the *Kiratas*, frequently mentioned in old Sanskrit literature. The *Mahabharata* mentioned the King of Kamrup fighting on the side of Kauravas along with the *Kirata* warriors. The *Ramayana* also mentioned the *Kiratas*. The village elders listened to me with interest, but they appeared confused. Thereafter, we bade good-bye to Henito and the Naga boys of the camp and left for Meluri. We were both thrilled with the experience. We were also relieved that everything had gone according to plan.

A few months later, we came across an intercepted document from self-styled Lt. Col. Henito Sema to another person which contained a reference to our visit to the Naga Army camp at Lephori. Henito

stated that Prakash Singh, Assistant Director, Intelligence had visited their location under cover, that he should not have done that, and that if the Naga Army personnel had discovered his real identity, the consequences would have been disastrous. In retrospect, I should thank God that I could come out of the Naga Army camp with my head still in place (Nagas were earlier a tribe of head-hunters)!

Jotsoma Raid

The other unforgettable incident relates to the Security Forces' raid on the Jotsoma camp of the Naga underground in 1968. The Government's policy hitherto had been to intercept the incoming or outgoing gangs outside the area covered by the suspension of operations agreement, that is in the three mile belt along the international border where the Security Forces' right to patrol was recognised. The underground, on the other hand, moved about with arms and in uniform with impunity, collected taxes, recruited men, and imported arms from abroad brazenly. It was obvious that they were abusing the agreement to regroup their ranks and build up their fighting potential. A more positive approach was called for on the part of the Government. It was ushered in by B.K.Nehru, the new Governor of Nagaland, who openly declared that the Government shall take necessary action to see that "breaches of cease-fire by the underground are nullified". The GOC 8 Mountain Division, Maj. Gen. N.C. Rawlley, was also a man of tremendous drive and initiative. This combination of Nehru and Rawlley brought about a complete transformation in the situation in Nagaland. The undergrounds were forced to give up their aggressive posture and the fangs and claws of the 'Naga Federal Government' were for once broken.

China had around this time started meddling in the north-east; the objective being to weaken India's flanks. The first Naga Army gang to China, about three hundred strong, had crossed the Tuensang border in November 1966 and went over to China for training and weapons. It was led by Thinuselie and Muivah. The gang returned in January 1968 and dispersed in the Angami, Chakhesang and Ao areas. About two hundred and fifty of them set up a camp in a deep jungle near Jotsoma in the Angami area. Here they were joined by some other Naga Army personnel also.

The total strength, in due course, swelled to about four hundred and fifty.

The Government had intelligence about the re-entry of the Naga Army gang from China, but it was in the dark about their exact location. The GOC was particularly anxious and he asked me to develop information about the exact location of the China-returned gang. It took me about a month to get pinpoint information. The gang was located near village Jotsoma in the Angami area of Kohima district. A plan of action was thereupon worked in consultation with the GOC 8 Mountain Division. We gave two sources who would lead the Security Forces' columns to the camp. The Army mobilised about one Brigade strength of troops to surround and attack the camp.

The operation was launched in the early hours of June 7, 1968. The Security Forces marched through an unfrequented route and were successful in laying siege to the camp. This was by itself no mean an achievement, in an area where intelligence about the movements of Security Forces, more often than not, reached the underground in advance. However, while the cordon was being laid, one of the hostiles going from the camp to perhaps another village noticed the movement of troops, and he rushed back to alert the Naga Army personnel. In the next two hours, before the engagement actually began, the underground hurriedly packed their weapons, and the hard core, including Thinuselie managed to sneak out. One company of the Security Forces led by Major Biswas walked into an ambush and they were sprayed with bullets. Several of them, including Major Biswas, fell. A fierce encounter followed on the precipitous heights. Sporadic fighting continued on June 8 and 9 also. The Security Forces captured twenty-five Naga Army personnel, together with a large quantity of Chinese arms and ammunition. The equipment seized included 60 mm mortars, 7.62 mm self-loading rifles with folding bayonets, sten-guns and .303 rifles. Besides, a substantial volume of documents, papers and diaries, giving conclusive evidence of the underground's collusion with China were recovered.

The Jotsoma encounter was militarily not much of a success. The Indian Army suffered casualties, and though the exact number was never given

out, we saw helicopters undertaking several sorties to evacuate the dead and the injured from deep inside the jungle. I also learnt informally that General Kumaramangalam, Chief of the Army Staff, was unhappy with the GOC, as the bulk of the Naga Army gang had been able to break through the cordon and the Army had suffered casualties more than they had bargained for. Politically, however, the operation was a thumping success. The Government, for the first time, got incontrovertible evidence of Chinese involvement in the north-east and their material help to the underground Nagas. On June 19, 1968, the Chinese *Charge d' Affaires* was summoned to the Ministry of External Affairs and given a strongly worded Note *demarche*, charging Peking of complicity in abetting subversive elements in Nagaland in flagrant violation of all canons of international behaviour. The Government of India claimed "concrete and irrefutable proof" that arms and other equipment manufactured in the People's Republic of China had been surreptitiously smuggled into Indian territory, and that the Chinese Government was "master-minding this covert scheme in order to stir lawlessness against the legally constituted authority in India".

The documents seized at Jotsoma threw a flood of light on the nature of training imparted to the underground in China and the political indoctrination given to them. The note-books contained detailed instructions on the handling of different kinds of weapons, use of explosives, the techniques of guerilla warfare, and included quotations from Mao Tse-tung. "We do not want war", one of these said, "but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun, it is necessary to take up the gun". There were some interesting observations on love and women as well. Marriage, it was said, "is a lottery in which men stake their liberty and women their happiness".

The Jotsoma incident was a watershed. It shook the underground who had hitherto taken the Government for granted and believed that they could get away with violations of the suspension of operations agreement. The Naga underground were shocked that a secret hide-out of theirs, where the bulk of the China-returned Naga Army gang was camping, could be raided. They grew suspicious that someone had betrayed them and started making enquiries. A couple

of months later, they learnt that information had been developed by the Intelligence Bureau and that the groundwork for the operation had been prepared by me. The so-called President of the Naga Federal Government, thereupon, issued an *ahza* (order) on September 14, 1968 stating that "the attack was planned by Prakash Singh, Deputy Director 'Intelligent', Kohima", that "the action taken by the Indian Army on 9, 10 and 11 September against the Federal Army was also due to the same Intelligent Officer", and that therefore the Security Command of the Naga Army should take action to annihilate him. The Security Command was a specialised wing of the Naga Army which carried out acts of sabotage like blowing up railway tracks, bridges, vital installations, assassinations, etc. The *ahza* was as good as my death warrant. But, as luck would have it, a copy of the *ahza* fell into our hands some time at the end of September 1968. It so happened that one of our sources brought us a whole bundle of documents which he had ransacked from the 'Federal' headquarters at Chedema. It was late in the evening and the source was keen to replace the documents before next morning. We hurriedly photocopied them at night. Next morning, as I was scanning the documents brought by the source, my eyes ran through the aforesaid *ahza*. I was stunned for a few seconds. I thought over it very coolly, discussed it with M.N.Gadgil, the Joint Deputy Director, who was my senior at Kohima, and we decided that the contents of the document should be flashed to the Intelligence Bureau headquarters at Delhi. A coded message was prepared and immediately transmitted.

There was no time to lose. The *ahza* had been issued about a fortnight back and we imagined that perhaps some action would already have been initiated by the Security Command. Possibly, some Naga Army personnel may already have been detailed to do the job. The SIB got in touch with the State Police to plan for my security. Realising the gravity of the threat, the IG Police, R.D.Pande, promptly despatched an armed guard to our residence. The same evening, I told Savitri, my wife, that we had to go on a long tour the next morning and that we must leave before sunrise. She was taken aback at the pace of events and was surprised that suddenly there was Police protection around the house. She asked some searching questions but I parried them. I did not consider it advisable to

take her into confidence. That would have upset her greatly. Our luggage was loaded on a trailer late in the evening itself and next morning, before sunrise, we left Kohima in our jeep for Mokokchung and onwards to Tuensang. Our two little children (Pankaj and Piyush), then aged seven and five years, accompanied us half asleep. The office staff was not told about my tour programme, which was known only to Gadgil. In fact, I worked out code names for myself for the next one week with separate *nom-de-plumes* for different days, and told Gadgil that I would be keeping him posted with my movements. The idea was that my location and movements for another week or so should be secret until we were able to assess the threat potential. While at Tuensang, I got a message that I should immediately report at Delhi for consultations. Thereupon, I proceeded to Jorhat and took the flight for Delhi.

At Delhi, I appeared before M.M.L.Hooja, the then Director, Intelligence Bureau. K.N.Prasad, the Deputy Director who looked after the North-East, was also present. The contents of the *ahza* were discussed. The DIB was magnanimous to say that I need not go back to Nagaland and that he would give me a posting at Delhi then and there. He also added that he would arrange to have a helicopter sent to Kohima to evacuate my wife and children. Hooja wanted my reaction. I thought for a moment and then said that I would be falling in my own estimation if I just disappeared from Nagaland even though there was threat to my life. I told him of my conviction in the philosophy "*Jako rakhe Saiyan maar sake na koi*" (None can kill a person whom God protects), and said that I would be content if I was transferred from Kohima by the end of the year, as was originally stipulated. Hooja promptly agreed to that. He advised me on the precautions I should take during the remaining period of my stay in Nagaland. He also directed K.N. Prasad to order a bullet-proof vest for me. A signal was sent to SIB Bombay for the same. The vest however never arrived; it was a rare item those days.

For the next three months, I lived under the shadow of Death. All possible care was no doubt taken. A shadow was attached for my personal security. There was an armed guard at the residence. But

these were no more than kindergarten measures in an area where well armed platoons were wiped out by the Naga hostiles in a single ambush. It was a great mental strain for me. Every morning when I left for work, I was not sure if I would come back to see my wife and children.

One reason why the underground could not execute their plan was that serious differences had meanwhile developed within their own ranks. Kaito Sema, a firebrand underground leader who had led the first gang of Naga hostiles to the then East Pakistan and was dissatisfied with the Angami hegemony of the movement, ransacked the Naga Army headquarters at Gaziphema and carried away the bulk of arms, ammunition, wireless equipment and an enormous amount of money kept there. Kughato Sukhai, his brother, who was the *Ato-Kilonser* (Prime Minister) of the 'Naga Federal Government' was accused of having abetted the coup and also criticised for the failure of negotiations with the Government of India. Kughato, therefore, resigned in October, 1967. The Semas, a powerful component of the Naga tribes, thereafter set up a parallel 'Revolutionary Government of Nagaland'. They even abducted Mhiasi and Ramyo, self-styled President and Home Minister respectively of the 'Naga Federal Government', and occupied the Chedema camp, which had hitherto been headquarters of the rebel Nagas. These internecine power struggles upset the apple cart of the underground and prevented them from any destructive moves against the Government of India or any of its representatives.

The Almighty saw us through that terrible period and, in December 1968, I joined the Intelligence Bureau headquarters at New Delhi. While proceeding on transfer, we took the train from Dimapur. The four of us - myself, my wife and the two children - travelled in a first class coupe. As the train steamed out of Nagaland, I told my wife for the first time of the threat I had faced. She heard me with a sense of disbelief but soon realised what I had gone through and was able to link my unexplained movements and the protection given to me, with the events of the past few months. The nightmare was over. *Yamaraj* had stared me in the face but realised that I had a longer lease of life.

ITBF Ladakh: A Saga of Courage and Service

The term Ladakh comes from a Tibetan word "La-Taghs", which literally means a mountainous country with passes, and Leh, which is the headquarters of this region in Ladakhi language means an oasis. Ladakh is strategically located, surrounded by Pakistan in the west, Sinkiang province of China in the north and Tibet (occupied by China) in the east.

The ITBF played an important role during the Chinese aggression in 1962 and sacrificed many of its personnel in the war in Northern Sector. A 'Police Memorial' was built at "Hot Spring" to commemorate the martyrs and every year, a Police party visits "Hot Spring" to pay homage to the martyrs. ITBF personnel have also excelled as mountaineers and Padma Shree Sonam Wangyal, was the youngest to climb Mt.



Leh 40 years back

The Intelligence Bureau started functioning in the Ladakh region from November 7, 1950, with a skeletal staff of one Deputy Central Intelligence Officer, one stenographer and two gunmen, who formed members of the Indo-Tibetan Border Force (ITBF), a name given by Shri B.N Mullick, the then Director of Intelligence Bureau. It was the only place where IB personnel were a truly uniformed force, with all the associated paraphernalia.

Since then, the ITBF personnel have been serving the nation at the borders, under extremely difficult weather conditions, terrain and circumstances. Since its inception, ITBF, besides catering to the intelligence requirements has also remained a lifeline for the local people. Infact, till the 1990's the local people were fully dependent on ITBF for communication, transport, medical facilities, ration and fodder items, both in the remote areas as well as in Leh town.



Officer's Mess ITBF

Everest while Phu Dorjee, climbed Mt. Everest without oxygen. Both were from ITBF.

The professional expertise of ITBF employees was also acknowledged during the Kargil crisis in 1999, when ITBF was the first agency to report the intrusion by the Pakistani army. During the conflict it provided pin-pointed information and technical support to the armed forces.

In an air crash at Khardung La, which resulted in the death of almost all passengers on board, ITBF personnel were first to reach the crash site and start rescue operations. The same spirit was exhibited by ITBF personnel during recent flash floods in Ladakh.

The Ladakhis identify themselves with ITBF and vice-versa, as on all occasions, be it joy or sorrow, they have always found the ITBF standing beside them.

Police - Intelligence Interface

Shri Julio Ribeiro, IPS (Retd.)

My last official interface with the Intelligence Bureau was in August 1992, when I was warned of an assassination attempt by Khalistani terrorists. I received a letter in Bucharest, capital of Romania, where I was serving as Ambassador of our country. I immediately intimated the Romanian Foreign Ministry and was provided security. That saved my life because fifteen days later, when my wife and I were strolling down the Herestrau Boulevard in Bucharest, a car screeched to a halt about fifty meters from us. Four men jumped out of the car, while two stood on guard besides their car, the other two chased me firing all the time with their AK47.

The Romanian security which was following me at a short distance spoke to a colleague on their wireless handsets and he rushed to the spot in his car, shot two of the assailants and captured one. Only one got away. I received a bullet on my back and was removed to hospital for surgery which involved reconstruction of the urethra, severely damaged by that single bullet. If it was not for the IB's warning, I may not have been alive today! The IB had received inputs from RAW as mentioned in the book "The Kaoboy's of R&AW" by a former RAW officer B. Raman. But my interaction was with the IB, and I am eternally grateful to that organization for the gift of life. It has been twenty years now since that second assassination attempt.

My very first introduction to the IB began in the Police Academy at Mount Abu. Four of my batch mates, R. Govind Rajan (father of the internationally acclaimed Economist, Raghuram Rajan), Anant Kumar Verma, Hari Ananda Barari and Ram Kishan Khandelwal were earmarked for the Intelligence Bureau because of their sheer brainpower. Personally, I was quite happy to serve in uniform as it suited my temperament and my penchant to interact with people in

need of help. But I certainly admired and looked up to those four colleagues whose intelligence quotient was far superior to mine. They worked quietly, behind the scenes all their working life, unknown and unsung, wrestling incessantly with facts, figures and information, analyzing the same with their sharp minds.

Hari Ananda Barari was the Director, IB when I was Special Secretary in the Ministry of Home Affairs. We were in close touch then. One of the jobs entrusted to us by the Government was to select a capable officer to serve as DGP Punjab, in the background of the terrorism unleashed by Khalistani elements. We pored over the list of IPS officers who could be considered and short listed some names. These were discussed with the Minister of State for Home, Arun Nehru who in turn consulted Mr. Barnala, Chief Minister of Punjab. Ultimately, they hit on one name. I was entrusted to sound this officer who unceremoniously turned down the assignment, angering Arun Nehru considerably. The end result was that I was sent in his place!

On two occasions, Barari arrived at my residence in the wee hours of the morning, woke me up from my deep slumber, literally bundled me into his car and drove to Arun Nehru's residence to confabulate with him on matters that needed urgent attention. Such nocturnal meetings were a part of the Home Ministry's daily existence. I never really got used to them. I wondered how the DIB could keep awake well after the city retired for the night, on almost a daily basis. Later, during my stay in Punjab, when I was Advisor to its Governor, Barari was appointed Governor of Haryana, and since we were batch mates, I was a frequent visitor to Haryana's Raj Bhavan. I presume he was able to catch up on his sleep in the Governor's Residence!

My first interface with the IB was a mundane one involving a junior operative. In 1956, a young probationary Sub Inspector of the IB was assigned for a short period of training to Nasik, where I was the Assistant Superintendent of Police. Since the cadets, as they were then called, had been trained in Mount Abu, I took particular interest in his initiation and he too appreciated my contribution to his grooming. On letting off with a warning, a villager who he had accosted for riding a cycle after dusk without the mandatory light, the villager repaid the kindness by giving him some information that led to the arrest of a gang of cattle lifters. It was a lesson in human gratitude that I needed to learn at the very start of my own service!

In 1958, I was promoted as Superintendent of Police and posted to Parbhani in the Marathwada area of the old Nizam's territory. Fringe elements of the Muslim gentry, who were the privileged ones in the Nizam's times, were not very comfortable with the new regime, particularly after the State of Hyderabad was split and some districts (five) were merged into the new State of Maharashtra. The activities of some of these disgruntled elements were the subject of close watch, not only by my own intelligence branch, headed by a Sub Inspector of Police, but also of the IB's representative stationed in Nagpur. He was a senior man of the rank of Dy. SP, who came in every month or so to brief me about the political activities in my jurisdiction.

Twice a year, S.E. Joshi, who later became Director of RAW, and a very eminent one at that, visited my district. In 1958, he was the Central Intelligence officer of the IB based in Mumbai (then Bombay). Joshi, who was a year senior in service, stayed with me when he visited Parbhani. I had a huge bungalow, which, as a bachelor, I occupied in solitary splendor till I got married in April 1959. But even after my marriage, Joshi who belonged to a very renowned family of Amravati and whose father, or was it grandfather, had been Knighted by the British, was happy to stay with us. We continued our contacts till my next district, Nanded, which also came within his jurisdiction.

Joshi was one of the finest human beings I have come across. A lesson he taught me is etched

in my memory. I was praising the acumen of his deputy from Nagpur. His reaction was that a good intelligence officer should never harbour prejudices. His deputy, he felt, was somewhat biased against Muslims. Anybody with a bias could never report objectively or judge situations, as they needed to be judged, for taking vital decisions at the administrative and, more importantly, political levels. This piece of wisdom coming to me from an intelligence officer, seconded to the IB under the earmarking scheme, has remained in my subconscious ever since. To overcome the normal human failings of bias or prejudice is not easy at the best of times. Every time I struggle, I think of S.E. Joshi whose recent death in Mumbai left me grieved.

Joshi was offered an extension in service but he refused on principle. His thoughts were for those who aspired to succeed him and many more down the chain who aspired for promotions in the vacancies that would automatically be caused by the senior levels moving up. Not many officers of Joshi's caliber and strength of character can be found today. On the other hand, those lobbying for extensions are a dime a dozen!

My next significant interface with the IB was in Mumbai when I was Police Commissioner between 1982 and 1985. Shreekant Bapat, whose marriage I had attended in Pune nearly fifteen or more years earlier, was the Jt. Director in charge of the IB in the Western Region, with his headquarters in Mumbai. During our watch, we received intimation from his headquarters in Delhi, that Bindranwale was travelling to Mumbai from Gujarat in a bus, with followers who were armed to the teeth. Some of these men were perched atop the bus brandishing guns! A clear violation and defiance of the law! I offered to take them on when they crossed into my jurisdiction but was advised to hold my hand since a plan had been put in place to confront the law breakers on their return journey. A crack detachment of paramilitary personnel was assigned to disarm them in an uninhabited area of the highway, so as not to cause damage to person or property of innocent civilians. My mandate was to monitor the movements of Bindranwale during his stay in the city and report back religiously to the Central Government.

Shreekant Bapat and I surveyed the area around the Dadar Gurudwara where Bindranwale and his followers were staying. I assigned Parvinder Singh Pasricha, a Sikh IPS officer, then in charge of traffic, to mingle with the devotees in the Gurudwara and report regularly to me. We were to ensure that he did not disappear without our knowledge. The lookout provided two hourly reports and based on Pasricha's and the lookout's feedback, we reported Bindranwale's movements to Delhi.

After a week of this exercise, we learnt to our consternation, that Bindranwale had reached Amritsar and was back in the Golden Temple, whereas we thought he was in the Dadar Gurudwara in the heart of Mumbai. Bapat and I rushed to the observation post and looking through the binoculars, we were convinced of Bindranwale's presence in the room. It took us time to realize we had been taken for a ride! The person occupying the room was a lookalike of the Khalistani supremo! The matter came up for discussion in Parliament and Smt. Indira Gandhi was forced to admit that Bindranwale had hoodwinked both her local intelligence chief and the Police Commissioner of Mumbai. I do not know how Bapat and I were let off the hook by a Prime Minister who was known not to suffer fools!

I had begun these reminiscences with my very last interface with the IB in Romania. And I will end this piece with my last interface in India at the fag end of my Police service, which was in the Punjab. This interface involved a young officer called Nehchal Sandhu who is today the Director of IB and easily one of the smartest young men I had come across in my

thirty-six years in the Police. Nehchal was a true operations man in the mould of Doval, who also retired as Director a few years ago. The amount of information that the Punjab Police got from the IB, which worked silently behind the lines cannot be enumerated and should not be. IB officers were on the job 24X7. I saw Nehchal himself at work on one memorable occasion, when operation Blue Thunder — II was in progress. He had his contacts in the Golden Temple, which was under siege, with the security forces comprising the NSG, the CRP and the Punjab Police surrounding it from all sides. Nehchal's contact used to speak to him on phone and provide him with the correct situation reports from inside the Temple where the terrorists were holed up. Their discussions, their plans, their numbers, their identities, the state of their morale, all were known to Nehchal and he fed us with this information, helping us to successfully manage a massive and critical operation that gained worldwide attention as well as admiration. Two senior IPS officers, one in charge of the Punjab Police and other of the NSG were awarded the Padma Shri for this operation. Nehchal Sandhu was an IB operative, anonymous and silent — and so was left out!

And let me not forget to mention O. P. Sharma, who was sent to me in Punjab from the IB, on deputation, as my State Intelligence Chief. What would I have done without his skills in the art and the science of intelligence gathering. On retirement, he was rewarded with the Governorship of Nagaland, just as his predecessor, Gurbachan Singh Jagat, was rewarded with a Governor's assignment. These are two Intelligence men I cannot and will not ever forget.

My Journey through the Intelligence Bureau

Shri K.P. Singh, IPS (Retd.)

To begin with, my innate fondness for the I.P.S. (to the exclusion of all other Services) is a story peculiar and personal to me. Excelling in both academics and sports, right from my school days, I went on to acquire a first class Masters' degree in Physics from Agra University, leading to my appointment as a Lecturer in my alma mater, Meerut College, Meerut. Additionally, I emerged as a hockey player of some standing, having played the game at the University and State level, besides participating in various major hockey tournaments across the country. My obsession with hockey made me an ardent fan of Mr. Ashwini Kumar, I.P., the redoubtable Police Officer who was at the helm of the Indian Hockey Federation, in an era when our global supremacy in the game was virtually unchallenged. Yearning to emulate Mr. Kumar, I appeared only for the I.P.S., got selected in the very first attempt and never appeared again for any other Service. Equally fondly, I remember with gratitude Mr. Nikhil Kumar, I.P.S. (presently Governor of Nagaland), whom I chanced to meet at Delhi Railway Station, while on way to the U.P.S.C. for the I.P.S. interview; he gave me some tips which proved extremely useful.

Fortunately, I was allotted the Madhya Pradesh cadre, which boasted of a very strong Police hockey team, which I represented, perhaps the only IPS officer to do so. Alongside, I thoroughly enjoyed my job in uniform, first at Jabalpur and then at Dabra and Gwalior, chasing the dacoit gangs of Mohar Singh and Madho Singh, in a chain of never-ending raids. Life could not have been better, with a job in uniform with attendant authority, responsibility and social recognition, which I thoroughly enjoyed; bungalow to live in; a chauffeur driven vehicle; couple of orderlies; and a young wife! As I awaited my promotion and posting as S.P. of a District, came the unforeseen news that I was one of the young I.P.S. officers

whom IB had considered meritorious and suitable for long term deputation. If, on the one hand, was the uneasy feeling of virtually saying 'good bye' to uniform, on the other, was the elation and pride of having been specially selected by the IB. (of B.N. Mullick's fame) whose Director, as per I.P.S. Rules, was the highest paid and highest ranking Police officer in the entire country. Also, there was the simultaneous fear and charm of being catapulted in one leap from the hinterland of a district to the national capital. Incidentally, I was to recall at this point of time, as to how some months ago, Mr. Devendra Singh, IPS, had come all the way to meet me with the hinted purpose of seeking a matrimonial alliance; I then being an eligible bachelor. This indeed was my first experience of the finesse with which IB conducts a secret enquiry. With the adoption of a suitable cover story, Mr Devendra Singh feasted on the special 'black partridges lunch' served by me, all the while evaluating my suitability for IB, while I was hoping to get a beautiful wife!

On joining I.B. in September 1970, life in Delhi was least comfortable, specially for my wife, living, first, in a rented accommodation, and later, in a small Government flat, without help of any kind. On the brighter side, was the beautiful city of Delhi with its monuments, gardens, avenues and charming landscape. Above all, was the immense joy and pride of having an office in the imposing North Block. Also, the medical and educational facilities in Delhi, as compared to those available in districts, were extremely good. Both our children were born in the V.I.P. ward of Wellington Hospital and later had their schooling in some of the better known public schools of Delhi.

Soon enough, however, the absence of material comforts in IB/Delhi was more than compensated by IB's invigorating professional environment of

excellence, dedication and commitment to duty without any *quid pro quo*, which to say the least, was simply sublime. Those days, our Training School was located in a ramshackle rented building in Anand Parbat, but it nonetheless could boast of some outstanding teachers (all non-IPS) on the faculty. Their articulation, clarity of concepts, and width of knowledge were awesome. Though more than 40 years have since elapsed, I still do remember their names, along with the subjects they taught; and failing to mention them would be unfair to my own conscience.

Mr. Shanti Swarup on Agents and Sources; Mr. Murthy on Progressive and Revolutionary Movements; Mr. Seth on Communalism; Mr. Kapoor on Trade Craft and Mr. Kriplani on Communications and Liaison (may God bless them all).

To add to my excitement of sitting in North Block, I was assigned to the Branch dealing with Left Wing Extremism, this too at a time when Charu Mazumdar himself had stepped up the 'prairie fire' of revolution that swept through large parts of the country, with endless violence, countless slogans and more than a hundred revolutionary journals in English and various vernacular languages. It was a subject difficult to comprehend in its subtle dimensions and complexities, and even more difficult to keep pace with, because of the rapidity of events. Endless hours were spent, virtually every day (24X7 in today's jargon), by us, going through plethora of reports, analysing them to discern emerging trends and keeping the Government constantly informed and alerted, besides issuing advisories to State Police/Intelligence. This indeed was a great beginning to my debut in the IB, under the guidance and care of my senior colleague, the impeccable Mr. Prakash Singh, whose contribution to the cause of Indian Police is too well known. Another inspirational figure occupying an adjacent room was Mr. M.K. Narayanan (now Governor of West Bengal and earlier the National Security Advisor), whose prowess of conceptual analysis and projection was regarded as matchless. We all looked up to him in awe and reverence. Above all, my immediate boss, Mr. R.K. Khandelwal (later retired as Chairman, J.I.C.) was perhaps the best trainer a young officer could aspire for; a man obsessed with professional excellence in both

desk and field work alike. Highly industrious and committed, and a hard taskmaster, he took great pains to groom his wards. In a sense, he taught us virtually how to hold the pen and write. A moment of great personal joy, right to this day, is when Mr. Khandelwal fondly calls me his 'Arjun'.

For a young entrant into the IB, particularly thrilling but initially unnerving was the exposure to the weekly Friday Conference, chaired by the D.I.B. and attended by a galaxy of senior officers, rich in multifaceted experience and expertise. Here, the Assistant Directors make presentations regarding developments in their areas of responsibility and more importantly, respond to queries and comments made by their more experienced seniors. This weekly exercise, which has become a kind of an institution in itself, is immensely helpful in improving the prowess of articulation, analysis and projection of the officers besides giving them the confidence to face any audience. Virtues of precision and brevity are, thus, inculcated into I.B. officers from the very beginning.

In keeping with IB's policy of rotation of officers between the IB Hqrs and SIBs, I was due for a field posting and was offered a choice between SIB, Lucknow (i.e my home state of U.P.) or SIB, Shillong, in the North-East. Believe me, in my quest for newer territories and people, I opted for Shillong, a three year long posting that indeed proved a boon, both professionally and socially. One got the opportunity to go on inspection tours, driving through the entire length and breadth of the North-East, including distant places like Kohima, Manipur and Aizwal, soaking into their rich cultural diversity. In a similar vein, it was soul satisfying to see numerous IB officers and men serving in every nook and corner, and in the mountainous border area, unmindful of the severe health and security hazards faced by them. A sizable number of these middle level functionaries were Keralites/South Indians, and no wonder, at many places, they used to run their 'Malyali Canteens' serving delicious food, not only unto themselves but to the culinary delight of other colleagues as well! As an IB officer, one came face-to-face with top functionaries, be they Ministers, top bureaucrats, Police officers and the like, while the entire family enjoyed the

social gatherings, and the vibrant cultural life of Shillong, amidst occasional visits to spots like Cherapunjee, regarded as the wettest place on earth. This tenure also afforded the much needed opportunity to work in close coordination and cooperation with, not only the State Police/ administration, but also with other Central Organisations, be they the Armed Forces, diverse para military forces or sister intelligence agencies. My exposure to the North-East was to come in very handy later, particularly in the matter of peace dialogues with the Nagas, Bodos and such other groups, since many of their leaders had been educated at Shillong.

My return to IB Headquarters in 1976 witnessed a fragile environment, marked by instabilities of different kind amidst the imposition of Emergency in the country. All these problems kept the I.B. and its officers more than busy and overworked, but nonetheless imparted them with once in a lifetime experience. Believe it or not, for almost two years, it was 24x7 call of duty. Another nightmarish experience for me was the coverage and reporting of the Police agitations of 1979, which erupted in one State after another, and in different organisations, including their reverberations in the I.B. itself. However, I do cherish this turbulent period for an entirely different reason. One of the two young and energetic IPS officers inducted into the IB and assigned to assist me, was Nehchal Sandhu, presently the DIB, while the other was Koshy Koshy, who retired as Director General, BPR&D — for both of them, it was the proverbial 'Baptism by Fire'.

In late 1983, on being interviewed personally by Mr. R.N. Kao (then Security Advisor to the Prime Minister) and found suitable, I moved on as head of SIB, J&K — a tough but scintillating assignment, that was to last a good four years. SIB, J&K, covering the diverse regions of Kashmir, Jammu and Ladakh, is traditionally regarded as the toughest professional theatre, with its myriad concerns and issues, with a blend of domestic, national, trans-border and international dimensions, marked by an extremely sensitive and delicate polity. Here, even seemingly trivial issues were prone to flaring up in no time, and as such, the requirements of advance preventive intelligence were perhaps nowhere greater than

in J&K. On the other hand, was the definite charm of having visited numerous famous places like the Hazratbal Shrine, Dal Lake, Gulmarg, Pahalgam, Amarnath, Vaishno Devi, Drass, Zojilla Pass, Kargil, Leh and surrounding Buddhist monasteries, Ponggong Lake, Chushul and above all, literally, the Khardungla Pass (over 19000 feet in altitude). Equally cherished is my personal association and acquaintance with Governors, B.K. Nehru and Jagmohan, political stalwarts like Farooq Abdullah, Mufti Mohammad Syed, Maulvi Iftikhar Husain Ansari, Chief Secretary Mir Nasrullah, DGP, Peer Ghulam Hasan Shah, the 'thinking General' M.L. Chibber of Northern Command, and of course, Justice A.S. Anand, who rose to become the Chief Justice of India. These names I have mentioned, just to focus on the extreme finesse and knowledge that a senior IB officer requires in order to meaningfully interact with such bigwigs on a sustained basis. In fact, J&K is a polishing stone that grinds, chisels and fine tunes one's professional persona, thereby, converting a generally 'good' officer into an 'outstanding' one. No wonder today, I understand, there is a waiting list of IB officers at junior and middle levels alike, volunteering to serve in J&K. As a by product of my posting in J&K, our daughter acquired proficiency in Urdu language, which she retains till date, while her mother added a B'Ed degree of Kashmir University as a suffix to her M.A. (Economics), from Lucknow University.

My return to Delhi presented me with several opportunities to further widen the sweep of my professional expertise. This included participation, during 1988, in the 11 month long course at the prestigious National Defence College, in the company of selected officers from the Indian Army, Navy, Airforce and Civil Services, besides those from more than a dozen foreign countries including USA, UK, Russia, South Korea and Australia. A unique opportunity to have a closer look at various facets of policing and law-enforcement, and problems connected thereto came my way in 1991, while acting as the Secretary of the Annual Conference of the DGPs of States and CPOs. The next decade was spent on acquiring expertise on a plethora of topics like socio-ethnic conflicts, Labour, *Kisan* and Student Movements, Religious and Regional issues, Human Rights, Security (Departmental, Industrial, Civil Aviation, Communications),

Immigration, Inter-State Disputes, movements for creation of new States, problems of North-Eastern region, Maoist terror, etc. This was reflective of the 'brick by brick' and 'step by step' process of career development in the IB. It is essentially because of their decades long, multi-faceted grooming that quite a few earmarked IB officers were deputed, in recent years, to head other organisations including R&AW, JIC, CISF, BCAS, SPG, Secretary (Security) and even those who reverted back to their State cadres, ended up invariably as DGPs. It is also no coincidence, that more than half a dozen of them were appointed, post retirement, as Governors and successfully adorned that high office.

I.B. also offered me the opportunity to review my association with sports, as I became the Secretary of the All India Police Sports Control Board (AIPSCB), that oversees the holding of roughly a dozen Police tournaments in different disciplines every year, with the participation of a large number of Police sports persons, many of whom have represented India with distinction at the Olympics, Asian Games, SAF Games, etc. For the sake of senior officers, an All India Police Golf Tournament was introduced in the mid-nineties, and the first one was held in Shillong. Another matter of pride is the record haul of medals won by the Indian Police contingent in successive World Police Games, including those at Colorado Springs, USA (1993) and Melbourne, Australia (1995), when I was the Team Manager. Yet another achievement of the Indian Police was the deputation of about a dozen DIG/Commandant level officers from various States/CPOs - all of them proven sports administrators - to the Atlanta Olympics (1996). Another notable achievement of the Police forces, particularly the I.T.B.P., is in the field of mountaineering; a little known fact, however, is that almost a dozen IB mountaineers have successfully made it to the top of Mount Everest, and these include the legendary Sonam Gyatso, Sonam Wangyal and Phu Dorjee. IB's journey into mountaineering continues, thanks to the Sonam Gyatso Mountaineering Institute (SGMI), Gangtok.

As regards the role of the Director, Intelligence Bureau, a position I was privileged to hold for more than three years (2001-2004), it would be appropriate to mention, that apart from his onerous responsibilities unto National Security,

DIB owes a special duty towards the professional advancement and welfare of the entire Police community of the country. It is for this reason that he is designated as the Chairman of the Annual Conference of DGPs of States/CPOs, All India Police Sports Control Board, All India Police Duty Meet and the All India Police Memorial Committee, besides being the only Police member in the committee for empanelment of IPS officers as Additional *DGs/DGs*. Of course, DIB's participation in the meetings of the Cabinet Committee for Security (CCS) and his easy access to dignitaries like the President of India, Prime Minister, Union Home Minister and the National Security Advisor ensures the projection of Police point of view on important issues.

On this count, successive DIBs have played a crucial role, starting from the legendary B.N. Mullick, a great visionary responsible for designing virtually the entire security and policing architecture of the country. Shri T.V. Rajeswar was instrumental in the upgradation of Police Chiefs of States/CPO's to the level of DGs from IGs earlier. To Shri M.K. Narayanan goes the credit for inclusion of the Indian Police in the global community of the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP) and for organising its Asia-Pacific Conference, in Delhi in early 1992, with the active participation of State DGPs and CPO Chiefs - perhaps the first ever International Police Conference in India. Incidentally I was the Organising Secretary of this Conference. From the days of Shri D.C. Pathak, an Indian delegation led by the DIB, regularly participates in the Annual Conference of Police Chiefs of SAARC.


I too did my bit in terms of operationalising the project relating to the National Police Memorial (which should hopefully be completed soon); setting up of an All India Police Band Institute at CRPF Campus, Manesar, near Gurgaon; initiating the proposal for canteen facility to CPOs (since formalised); raising the IPS intake through the UPSC to over 80, which had dipped previously to only 30-35 per year; Reunion Seminars at N.P.A. Hyderabad for IPS officers; and in the matter of the I.P.S. Memorandum to the Vth Pay Commission, which resulted in quicker promotion to IG rank (within 20 years now, as against 25 years earlier). Also, not known to many is the behind-

the-scenes role played by the DIB in respect of the Cabinet approval for pay parity between the State DGP and the Chief Secretary. At this juncture, I strongly recommended the setting up of an 'Indian Police Foundation', a dream project that should be one of the main concerns of the Delhi based Association of Retired Senior I.P.S. Officers, presently presided over by Shri A.K. Verma and ably guided by Police stalwarts like Shri B.S. Das and G.C. Saxena.

In the end, what makes the IB, regarded as the oldest National Security Organisation, retain its charm and attraction, even now, is that this is an organisation; thanks to its strong leadership over decades, that has remained non-controversial, mainly because of its highly professional and unbiased approach and conduct. No wonder, it is one of the few organisations that zealously guards and retains its credibility, believing as it does, in quiet efficiency without any craving, whatsoever,

for publicity or populism. In IB, reputations are built over a period of time, even decades, through hard meritorious work and no one parachutes to the top on extraneous considerations. In a manner of saying, IB and its officers believe in the 'ladder and staircase approach' to the top. Also, the congenial environment within the IB over the years has not allowed any divergence of opinion and approach amongst its leadership to degenerate into ill will or rancour. It is a happy family with a large number of high achievers, past and present, which is constantly blessed by its elders.

My journey through the IB, I reckon, has been a continuation of my journey in the I.P.S. To me the two are integrally intertwined. To the query, if given another chance, may be in next birth, would I like to repeat this journey, my answer is an emphatic 'yes'. Long live the Bureau to pursue its basic charter of 'Protection of the Constitution of India'.



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Observations on India's State and Central Intelligence Apparatus

Shri K.P.S. Gill, IPS (Retd.)

When I look back on my 38-year career in Policing, including positions in some of the most troubled areas of the country, in their most troubled of times, I am astonished at the very limited interface I have had with India's central intelligence apparatus. I am, indeed, quite amused when I hear Police leaders from across the country — particularly after a terrorist attack or other major security debacle — complain, for instance, that the Intelligence Bureau had not provided them with 'actionable intelligence' that could have allowed them to prevent or better deal with specific incidents (these grumbles are quickly picked up and amplified by the political executive and the media). IB inputs and advisories are, of course, the staple of Policing in the country, but were hardly pivotal in State Police responses to security threats or crises, at least in my experience.

I understand, of course, that things have changed somewhat since then. Many terrorist and organised criminal enterprises now have trans-border dimensions, both across a multiplicity of States in India and often across international borders. Central agencies, particularly including the Intelligence Bureau, the Research and Analysis Wing and the National Technical Research Organisation, have a specific mandate and technical and technological capabilities that are not available to the State Police apparatus, and, consequently, the States have developed a certain dependence on inputs from these organisations. This is not, however, a necessary or natural consequence of the evolving nature of crime and terrorism, but is, rather, an index of the failure of State Police organisations to keep pace with emerging challenges and necessary transformations of their mandate, structures and capabilities.

In any event, the more things change, the more are they the same. While more noise is

made about 'cross border terrorism' today, the truth is, terrorism and insurgency had cross border implications from the earliest rebellions in India. Certainly, every insurrection in the country's Northeast — starting with the Naga uprising — has found safe haven and support outside the country, and has had implications for neighbouring States within the country. The Naxalite movement found support in China; the Khalistani and Kashmiri separatists in Pakistan.

Crucially, even where threats have trans-border dimensions, it is far from the case that the State Police and intelligence are impotent to respond. It has been my personal experience, and my understanding from the experience of other exemplary officers, that the best intelligence and operational capabilities are often vested in the State apparatus. This has certainly been the case, to take some prominent examples, in Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh, where State Police capabilities were developed to extraordinary levels of effectiveness, operating far beyond the nominal jurisdictions of the State's territorial boundaries. This should not surprise anyone; the State Police has the largest presence in the affected areas, including border areas, and it is impossible that any central agency would ever have a comparable reach. If borders are 'porous', as we often (quite rightly) protest, they are porous both ways, and an enterprising Police leadership will find ways to exploit this permeability to advantage.

Unfortunately, this tremendous structural advantage has been progressively eroded across much of the country by the continuous decline in the Police intelligence infrastructure and its penetration, crucially, into the 'interior'. Rural information networks, operating through the now defunct village watch scheme and through a range of subordinate Government officials,

including the Panchayati Raj and village revenue administration apparatus, village school teachers, and development workers, have lost their integral and close linkages with the Thana, and information flows upwards have become fitful and unreliable. This is often even more the case where such intelligence flows are most needed, in regions of violence and disorder. An illusion of 'intelligence' may be created by monitoring urban and political gossip centres and such 'intelligence' may even be quite useful in drafting general risk assessments — but the real substance of operational intelligence flows from the grassroots, from rural and mofussil concentrations, or from the most degraded and neglected areas of the urban complex.

The enormity of what can be achieved by the Police is illustrated by an interesting case in the late 1960s, when the Naxalites were trying to establish a foothold in Assam. In Kamrup, we were able to break the emergence of Naxalism, because an alert constable, who was getting his slippers repaired, saw a pair of shoes, wrapped in a Naxalite poster, which had also been given to the same cobbler. A trap was laid and the owner of the shoes was arrested. His interrogation led to the arrest of others, and systematically, the entire chain was broken, with a number of inter-State operations and arrests also resulting from this very humble beginning. Ironically, the constable was almost illiterate, and we had to exempt him from various requirements to promote him to the post of ASI as a reward.

It is the sensitivity and responsiveness of this grassroots apparatus that creates intelligence successes of the highest order. Unfortunately, the problem, in substantial measure, is that the system, today, has come to be dominated by Police and intelligence bureaucrats; what it needs is leaders. The efficiency of an organisation can often be judged by the frequency at which its top leadership visits its most remote outposts, and by this measure, it is unlikely that most State Police and intelligence organisations can presently be judged very positively.

Effective Police leaders in some of the worst insurgency-afflicted areas have, nevertheless, established highly efficient networks of listening and operational posts across their jurisdictions.

Here, significantly, the internal-external dichotomy is also found to be substantially false, and such leaders have been able to create linkages across borders essentially through the populations that inhabit the border areas, often among those who are notionally 'sympathetic' to the insurgent cause. Through the extended period of terrorism in Punjab, it was always possible to keep very close tabs on the terrorist leadership across the border through a number of intermediaries and informers. Among those who will betray their country, you will always find some who will betray their cause as well. I was, moreover, personally able to establish continuous contact with several of the terrorist leaders holed up in Pakistan. I recall, also, that in the early Sixties, as SP Naogaon, I was able to identify and process the deportation of as many as 300 illegal migrants from what was then East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) on the average day, and an overwhelming proportion of intelligence relating to these came to me from other migrants, who had long been settled in the area. Crucially, there was also ample intelligence coming from across the border, regarding the resettlement of these expelled groups along the border, and the violence that was orchestrated by them, at the behest of Pakistani State agencies, against Hindus in those areas. Other Police leaders have been effective in doing as much, for instance, G.M. Srivastava in both Assam and Tripura, in the most crucial phases of the counter insurgencies there, had developed excellent capabilities both within and across borders. Similarly, the Andhra Pradesh Police has been instrumental in generating effective intelligence on the Maoists virtually across the country, leading to arrests of top Maoists in the most widely dispersed locations. The 'home advantage' that a State Police Force has, and the linkages these can create even beyond borders, cannot easily be replicated by a central agency.

These are not aberrations or deviations. There are imperatives of modern policing and intelligence operations, dictated by the very nature of contemporary security threats, and will be ignored at terminal risk to the authority and capacity of the Indian State. With our proclivity to look westward for our 'models', it is useful, in this regard, to notice the response of the New York Police to the new challenges and threat

assessments that arose after the catastrophic 9/11 attacks in that city. Over the intervening decade, the New York Police Department (NYPD) has gone on to create what has been described as the most powerful and technologically advanced counter-terrorism bureau that anyone has ever seen. First providing the rationale of what was done, NYPD Commissioner Ray Kelly stated, as far back as in February 2003, "We couldn't rely on the federal government alone. I believed that we had to create our own counter-terrorism capacity, indeed our own counter-terrorism division."^{1,2} Within the first years after the 9/11 attacks, this Division was set up with a colossal capacity for human and technical intelligence gathering, and exceptional technical capabilities, extending to the detection of extremely low levels of nuclear radiation and threat. Emphasising the core of human intelligence gathering, the Division includes personnel who speak 60 languages and dialects, and, crucially, posts its own officers across the world.

It is not the intention, here, to suggest that every State and city in India must immediately rush off to try to create comparable capacities. Our solutions do not lie in imitating systems that have resource capabilities that we cannot even imagine for ourselves — though we may draw lessons even from these. The point is, our capacities, our capabilities and our responses — including the distribution of tasks within the system — must be dictated by the contours of the challenge and by the potential of the executive agencies, not by some prior distribution of immutable jurisdictions. The approach must be pragmatic, problem solving, not bureaucratic.

None of this is, of course, intended to suggest that the Central Agencies are irrelevant or marginal to the effort of intelligence gathering, or to national security. Indeed, there is no either-or proposition here. Both Centre and States have to develop their capacities and capabilities to their maximum potential. Each has certain natural advantages. I have had, through my career, extraordinary episodes of close and productive coordination, for instance, with the IB. During Operation Black

Thunder, I was in daily contact with the Nehchal Sandhu, now the DIB, among others, and there was an exemplary sharing of purpose and intelligence. Nevertheless, despite continuous inputs from the IB, the State intelligence apparatus remained crucial for a complete picture of events. I must confess, moreover, that the extraordinary cooperation with the IB during the Black Thunder episode is not something that happens often. The relationship between State and Central agencies tends to be mixed. They often operate independently of each other, and at least occasionally, at cross purposes, though examples of successful collaboration are also not difficult to locate.

It is important to recognize, moreover, that both State and Central agencies begin to harp on the question of mandate only when they are unwilling or incompetent to do what is necessary, or when something goes abysmally wrong. Otherwise, there are perfectly healthy signs of coordination and cooperation, with joint operations between State and Central agencies, as well as between the agencies of different States, executed with surprising frequency and success. Indeed, it is when an acute lack of capacity, or of will, exists, that operations hobble and questions of turf begin to rankle.

This is, increasingly, aggravated by a proclivity, everywhere, towards the eager abdication of responsibility, though the craving for power and pelf remains intense. There is a strong trend in the popular discourse regarding the purported role of 'the public' in countering terrorism and crime, greater 'public-private' partnerships, and even the flogging off or off-loading of a range of Police functions to the private sector. This is not a subject that needs detain us here, though it is important to emphasise, in passing, that an overwhelming proportion of such proposals are misconceived, misdirected and counter-productive, and militate against the most fundamental and inalienable duty of the State to provide security and justice to every citizen, irrespective of station or other grounds of identity. While it is right for the Police to expect cooperation from citizens, the idea

1. "Fighting Terrorism in New York City," 60 Minutes, September 25, 2011
http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-2011_1059.html

2. Craig Horowitz, "The NYPD's War On Terror", New York, February 3, 2003, http://nymag.com/lnymetro/news/features/n_8286/.

that Police responsibilities can be 'off-loaded', in any significant measure, to citizens, or to the increasingly fashionable panacea of private corporations, needs to be strongly discouraged among the Police leadership.

If the Police and intelligence apparatus in India is to embrace and execute its fullest mandate, both State and Central agencies will have to enormously augment their capacities and capabilities, and learn to pull together. Such an effort, however, will have to be preceded by a far deeper understanding and appreciation, within the Police leadership, of the nature and significance of intelligence, and of their role in its acquisition and employment. The unfortunate reality is that enormous distance has progressively been created between the grassroots of law and order management and the superintending Police establishment, and this has worked to the abiding detriment of both crime control and intelligence work.

I recall that, when I got my first District, less than 14 years after Independence, I was posted to Naogaon, a communally sensitive District, by Haider Hussain, then IG of Police. At the SP's Office there, I discovered certain old bound records in the almirahs. In these, I found the most detailed records, including, for instance, the annual histories of dacoities in India, disseminated by the Intelligence Bureau. I also found the volumes of weekly intelligence reports sent out by earlier SPs, written in their own hand. I found similar records in my subsequent posting to Tezpur, with detailed, hand written correspondence between, for instance, the SP and the IG, on a range of intelligence and administrative issues. Over the years, however, such practices fell into disuse. SPs stopped writing reports in hand, and these came normally to be prepared by subordinate officers, often the Inspector who was heading intelligence in the District, and were merely corrected and signed by the SP, and sent on to the DIG CID, who oversaw Intelligence and Crime. This was not merely a technological shift — with the advent of the typewriter and later, the computer — but a major psychological and administrative shift, reducing such tasks to a bureaucratic routine, and snapping the vital link between the superintending officer and the continuous flows of intelligence generated within his jurisdiction.

This problem has been further compounded by the fact that hardly anyone wants to go into the intelligence system, except to the IB. This is particularly the difficulty within the lower echelons of the State Police apparatus, there is extreme reluctance among most of the subordinate ranks to be posted into the intelligence department.

I think the central intelligence system has also suffered in some measure as a result of the system of earmarking officers to the IB at inception. I believe all officers must work in the Districts for a substantial tenure. Keeping the IB as a closed house has not helped it in its capabilities to recruit intelligence sources and develop efficient information networks.

Another factor that has undermined the quality of intelligence is the growing corruption and politicization of the Police Force. No policing and intelligence apparatus can perform its functions with requisite competence, if it is compromised by corruption, or where its officers and personnel are mixed up with the very people they are meant to monitor. Nor can an intelligence system fulfil its mandate if it is constantly looking to please political masters by telling them what they want to hear, rather than what is actually the case; or worse, when the agencies are directly involved in orchestrating political mischief — something neither State nor Central agencies are innocent of. On at least some occasions, the consequences of this last deviation have been devastating to the national interest. This was certainly the case in the initial troubles in Assam and in Punjab, for both of which the nation has paid an extraordinary price. In the external sphere, the record of India's meddling with the Tamil insurgency in its early phases in Sri Lanka reads as a cautionary tale against such waywardness. At least in the Sri Lanka case, and on the external dimension, lessons appear to have been learned. On the domestic front, however, the seduction of political manipulation through an abuse of the intelligence agencies, even to the extreme detriment of law, remains great and agencies need to be watchful of the same.

It is clear that the intelligence apparatus in India, today, is hobbled by a range of defects and infirmities, and a tremendous effort is required for its reconstruction, at both the State and Central

levels. The deficiencies of one part of the system should not become the grounds for an inordinate emphasis on developing other parts. The inability of many States to pull their weight cannot be an excuse to attempt to replace their networks with an overwhelming Central apparatus. There must be acute consciousness of the natural confines and limitations of each system, as well as of their comparative strengths and advantages. Turf wars are, at least occasionally, inevitable in any system of shared power and responsibility, but they must not be allowed to subvert the national interest.

There is a tremendous and mounting challenge of governance, of security, and of law and order management in India today, and every national institution appears to be in, or headed for, a crisis. At such a time, the intelligence apparatus has a huge role to play, and each of its failures, errors and excesses will be magnified manifold. It is of

little utility, in the complex scenario that presently prevails, to propose ideal or utopian solutions; the Police and intelligence leadership will have to function within the vagaries of the given state of affairs. This will demand even greater integrity, commitment and sense of purpose on the part of the national security leadership. I am deeply aware of the many and grave failings of this leadership. Nevertheless, I am also witness to the fact that, when the national interest is at stake, the same leadership has demonstrated extraordinary capacities of dedication, courage and sacrifice. Though no single crisis or challenge, today, constitutes a decisive threat to the national interest, the cumulative impact of the many disorders and infirmities that afflict the system is tantamount to an existential threat to India. It is now time, once again, as in so many past instances, for India's security leaders and Forces to prove themselves.



A House Named Blessington

Many who drive past Late Capt. Beale's house at South Point also know that the house on the opposite side of the road is called Blessington. However, not many know how the house got the name, or who its first occupants were, before it became the property of the Government of India. Like many old houses in Port Blair Blessington too has a tale to tell.

James and Amelia Whitby had one daughter, Violet Emelie, born on 8th December 1877 at Port Blair. She was educated in a school situated on Ross Island. Reuben and his wife Jemima had five children, all born in Port Blair. Reuben died in the year 1900. His tombstone can still be seen in the cemetery at Aberdeen.



It is a tale of three families whose fortunes were linked to the Andaman Islands for more than three generations – **the Whitbys, the Boomgardts and the Delaneys.**

The first of the three families to come to the Andamans were the **Whitbys**. James Whitby Sr. was born in Romford, Essex, England in 1822. He enlisted in the British Army and travelled on the S.S. Elizabeth to Madras in 1841. His son, also named James, was born in 1846 in Poonamallee. James Jr. married Amelia Jane Shandley, whose grandmother was born in a little village named **BLESSINGTON** near Dublin, Ireland. A job in the Jail Department brought them to Port Blair. Soon James Whitby's brother Rueben also joined them at Port Blair. They were there at the time of the assassination of Lord Mayo on 8th February 1872.

As the settlement expanded, a young civil engineer Allan Joseph **Boomgardt** from Travancore (now Trivandrum), arrived in the Islands to plan the road system throughout the Andamans. Allan belonged to an old Dutch East India family and his father worked for the Dewan of Travancore. His mother, La Bouchadere, was French. Allan met Violet Whitby and they were married on 11th April 1898 at Vellore. They returned and settled down in Port Blair.

Allan and Violet Boomgardt had two children: Coralie, born in 1900 and John, born in 1907. Allan continued to work till his retirement. A grateful Government allotted him a large coconut plantation at South Point called Mt. Haughton estate measuring 53 acres and land to build a house. This was the pension for his loyal service

of laying a network of useful roads into the thick forest of South Andaman. **Blessington** came up on this land and Allan and Violet led quiet, retired lives raising chickens, keeping a few cows and tending to their plantation of coconuts and cashews. Sitting in the forecourt of Blessington, they could behold the magnificent view of the entrance to Port Blair harbour and Ross Island while, on the other side of the bay was North Point, from where a light house winked at them during the nights.

Meanwhile Coralie and John were growing up. They went to school in Darjeeling but always returned to their beloved Port Blair. Coralie married Leslie Vincent of the Wireless Department and they moved to Rangoon. They had three children and were frequent visitors to Port Blair, until Vincent's work contract forced him to return to England, and the family left India in 1938. This must have been a time of great sadness for the Boomgardts. Soon the Whitby/Boomgardt family would unite with another Port Blair family, the Delaneys.

John **Delaney** was born in Brentwood, Essex, England in 1852, and he married Margaret Gibbons from Ireland. He joined the British Army Ordnance Survey and was posted to India. They had five children, all born in Madras; one of the sons was Patrick, born in 1886. Patrick became an officer in the Jail Department and was put in charge of the rehabilitation of the convicts at Port Blair. His popularity led to a part of the town being named after him as Delaneypur, a name that continues even today. At Patrick's invitation, his elder brother John Delaney joined him in the Jail Department at Port Blair in 1930. Before this, John was in the Royal Horse Artillery and had been sent to England where he met and married Nora Maguire. They had two daughters, Molly and Monica. In 1930, John and Nora Delaney, with their two daughters aged 18 and 14, moved from Southampton, England, to Port Blair.

John Boomgardt fell instantly in love with Molly and they were married on 16th May 1933 at the Roman Catholic Chapel on Ross Island.

James Whitby died in 1882, Amelia in 1937 and Allan Boomgardt in 1938. They are all buried in the cemetery at Port Blair. Violet continued to

live at Blessington surrounded by friends – the Delaneys, Monins, Myers, Youngs and many more old Port Blair families, leading an idyllic existence, except for the absence of her daughter and family.

When World War II broke out, John Boomgardt enlisted and was commissioned as an officer in the Maratha Light Infantry. He was sent to North Africa where he was severely wounded. He was admitted to the military hospital in Poona. Molly and daughter Eileen joined him and they stayed there till the end of the war. John Boomgardt was later awarded the Military Cross.

Meanwhile, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands were occupied by the Japanese. Most Europeans left the Islands. Violet reluctantly left on the last ship and went to Calcutta. The few who stayed were brutally treated by the Japanese. To set an example for all, Maj. A.J. Bird was beheaded in public by the Japanese. Cato, a Swede, was killed because he refused to bow before the Japanese. John Delaney was severely beaten, which left him blind in one eye, and transported to Tavoy P.O.W Camp in Burma (now Myanmar). Chief Commissioner Waterfall and many local residents were tortured. Forty-four local residents, on the suspicion of being British spies, were shot dead by a firing squad at a place called Homfray Gunj. A group of elderly and infirm men, among them the father of Molly's close friend Ivy Myers, were taken out to sea and forced overboard; two survived.

The war ended with the dropping of two atomic bombs on Japan. On August 14th, 1945, Japan announced its surrender. All the Japanese soldiers in the Islands became prisoners of war and Allied troops retook the islands. The Japanese garrison at Port Blair surrendered to Brig. A. Solomon at the Gymkhana Grounds.

As soon as the war ended, Maj. John Boomgardt, now recovered from his injuries, was posted to Car Nicobar as Assistant Commissioner. Violet returned to her beloved Blessington. Molly and children joined John Boomgardt at Car Nicobar. His job was to oversee the reoccupation and heal the wounds of the Japanese atrocities during the occupation. When India won Independence on 15th August 1947, it was Maj. John Boomgardt

who hauled down the Union Jack and hoisted the Tricolour for the first time at Car Nicobar. Although his family had been in India for many generations, John Boomgardt was of European descent and it was the wish of the new Government to appoint an Indian to the post of Assistant Commissioner.

The Boomgardt family moved to Mysore, where John built and managed a bobbin factory for the jute industry in Calcutta. Violet stayed at Blessington, looked after by a dear friend Mrs. Mary, whom she called 'Mary-girl'.

Tragedy struck when Coralie died in England in 1949, sadly, never having been able to return to visit her mother and homeland. Six months later, Maj. John Boomgardt died of a massive stroke, he was aged 42 years.

Molly decided to return to England (after twenty years in India) with daughter, Eileen and Penny, aged 14 and 5 years. She invited Violet to accompany them, but there were too many memories for Violet to want to leave the only place she had called home. Eventually, old age and illness forced her to leave Blessington and go to Calcutta in 1951. The terrible sadness of the old lady can only be imagined. She died a few months later and was buried in Calcutta, but her heart and spirit are somewhere near her beloved Blessington at Port Blair.

With the departure of Violet, Blessington became the property of Government of India. It was neglected for a long time, but the sturdy timber Allan Boomgardt chose to build the house, withstood the ravages of the tropical climate. Thanks to the efforts of a dynamic young officer, **'Blessington' is now with the Intelligence Bureau**, and it has been restored to its former glory. It now radiates the same warmth its former occupants must have felt in bygone times.

The descendants of those who built the house live in far-off England, the area from where the Whitbys and the Delaneys started their epic journey in the early 1800's. This coincidence has only been discovered in recent years. Eileen Arnell and Penny Buck, grand daughters of Allan and Violet Boomgardt visited the Islands in 1998. They hope and plan to visit again. Blessington has cast a spell over them. Eileen is the custodian of the family photographs and maintains the family tree. It is her desire that the story of Blessington be told as a memorial to their ancestors, especially Violet, and for the children and grandchildren who they hope will visit in future. Paul Arnell, the great grandson of Violet and Allan Boomgardt, has already done so and fallen under its spell.

There are more such old houses still standing in Port Blair which have a story to tell.

Technology in Intelligence- Future Scenario

Dr. V K Saraswat

Secretary,
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“If you know the enemy and know yourself, you need not fear the result of a hundred battles. If you know yourself but not the enemy, for every victory gained you will also suffer a defeat. If you know neither the enemy nor yourself, you will succumb in every battle.”¹

– Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, 511 B.C.

Sun Tzu, one of the greatest military theorists of the east has clearly elucidated the fact that for any campaign to be successful, or more eloquently, for any success against an adversary, information about him and one's own strengths and weaknesses is the key. Throughout the history of warfare and in-hitherto the history of mankind, strategists such as Chanakaya², Clausewitz³, Jomini⁴, Machiavelli⁵, Sun Tzu⁶ etc. have always emphasized on the perpetual need for information, and subsequently its effects on national security; thus resulting in the creation of specialized institutions within the national security apparatus i.e. the Intelligence wings.

These institutions over decades have evolved in multifarious ways, catering to information gathering, analysis and dissemination to the decision makers, thus acting as pinnacle institutions of national security apparatus. One of the key challenges which these organizations face is to evolve, keeping abreast with the evolving times, thus channeling innovation, technology and human geniuses for achieving the ultimate objective of national security. Among the three, one of the key aspects is technology, as it, to an extent, enables or in certain aspects, compensates the lack of the other two.

With 21st century being considered as an era of technological revolution, the effect of the same has, to a larger context, changed the way or is in process of changing the way in which these intelligence institutions work; thus metamorphosing them into next generation organizations, with technology being a critical force multiplier. This paper elucidates this force multiplier effect of technology and its futuristic implications on vital phases of intelligence gathering, analysis and dissemination to decision makers, consequently implying the herald of next generation of technologically enabled future for these pinnacle institutions of national security apparatus.

1. ROLE OF TECHNOLOGY IN VARIOUS PHASES OF INTELLIGENCE CYCLE⁷

Technology, in a way, has revolutionized the mere genesis of intelligence, with it being a critical enabler in every phase of the intelligence cycle i.e. Intelligence gathering; intelligence analysis and intelligence dissemination. The impact of technology is not only limited to revolutionizing the traditional means of intelligence such as the

Human Intelligence (HUMINT), but has evolved in the creation of all together new disciplines, dependent almost totally on technology, such as Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Imagery intelligence (IMINT), Open Source intelligence (OSINT) and so on.



Figure 1: Intelligence Cycle

Source: Author, adapted from Henry 1. Stimson Centre Report 70⁸.

1.1 Phase 1: Intelligence Collection and Technology

1.1.2 Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

Human Intelligence (HUMINT) is one of the oldest disciplines of intelligence institutions. HUMINT is usually defined as “a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources”⁹. In contrast to the conventional dictum, this discipline is extensively dependent on technology in various aspects. Covert communication and exchange of information from foreign agents, i.e. the “dead drops”¹⁰, is one most critical component of a clandestine HUMINT operation. Technology is extensively employed in terms of advanced encryption systems for the creation of secure communication channels on IP as well as RF link¹¹.

Some of the techniques commonly used are cipher based communication, involving mil

grade symmetric encryption of 512bit key and above ¹²; Digital steganography¹³ based techniques of embedding information in images and videos(Figure 2); IP based covert channels of communication involving embedding covert information as part of protocol streams or redundant bits, thus obfuscating contemporary Internet interception mechanisms¹⁴; Use of remote VPS and VPN servers for obfuscation of agent’s IP details and communication path for track back, along with mail-eliminator for removing the traces of emails sent from the agents, especially to evade counter intelligence cyber forensics; and hushmail like services involving a single mail creation for a single communication and subsequently purging of the account and auto creation of subsequent accounts for next communication¹⁵; Spread spectrum and frequency hopping based encrypted communication channels for tactical communication devices required extensively in covert reconnaissance and direct action operations; Espionage based equipment such as digital transmitters, GPS locators; Similarly advanced bugging devices for surveillance and so on.

Similarly, one of the key components in HUMINT is the process of interrogation. Here again, technology has revolutionized the way in which interrogation is conducted with advances such as the Psychoactive medication¹⁶, or the truth serums and advanced behavioral analysis based lie detectors, involving vital bodily parametric measurement and correlation.




Figure 2: Digital Steganography process¹⁷.

Source: Onathan Cummins, Patrick Diskin, Samuel Lau and Robert Parlett, *Steganography And Digital Watermarking*, School of Computer Science, The University of Birmingham, 2004.

These are just some of the aspects where technology has evolved the conventional processes in the HUMINT discipline of Intelligence.

1.1.2 Signals Intelligence (SIGINT)

Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) is usually defined as "A category of intelligence comprising either individually or in combination of all communications intelligence (COMINT), electronic intelligence (ELINT), and Foreign instrumentation signals intelligence, however transmitted. Intelligence derived from communications, electronic, and foreign instrumentation signals."¹⁸ This discipline of Intelligence, if not fully, is extensively dependent on technology, as is evident from the mere definition itself. One of the starting points in SIGINT is Signal detection, i.e. to know whether the signal/communication exists and subsequently to find the location of the transmitter and the receiver. This process is extensively aided by set of receivers for particular frequencies of interest, in cases where there is information about frequency of interest, else usually by, the analysis of power transmitted on primary or sideband frequencies using a spectrum analyzer.




Figure 3: Spectrum Analyzer display for RF analysis.¹⁹

Source: Tektronix Data Sheets for RSA3300B Series.

Similarly, another key component of SIGINT includes direction finding. Here again technologies such tunable directional antennas and large omnidirectional arrays, such as the Wullenweber, can be used for multipoint signal arrival time measurement and GPS correlation method for precise time synchronization. Apart from the above, COMINT or Communication Intelligence dealing with interception of voice, text etc. use techniques such as Automatic computation of session key (Kc) in real time for A5/1 and A5/2 algorithms, without disclosing

traces to subscribers; Invisible active intercept of A5/1, A5/2 and A5/0 GSM conversation; Full targeted recording through TMSI, IMSI and IMEI identification; multi-channel tunable CDMA Monitoring system operating at 450MHz, 850MHz and 1900MHz CDMA band for interception of voice conversation, Text Message and service channel information automatically form the CDMA IS-95A, IS-95B and CDMA 2000-1x networks²⁰; and so on.

In terms of Direction finding and location tracing of adversary, RF transmitters technologies based on Single channel Direction finder involving multi-antenna array with a single channel radio receiver with amplitude, phase and hybrid comparison; Pseudo-doppler technique; Watson-Watt / Adcock antenna array; and Correlative interferometer etc. are extensively employed. Other sub disciplines of SIGINT which are extensively dependent on technology include FISINT (Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence) and TELINT (Telemetry Intelligence) based extensively on collection and analysis of sensor information from enemy weapon systems and Air borne platforms.

1.1.3 Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

"It measures and identifies battle space entities via multiple means, that are difficult to spoof and it provides intelligence that confirms the more traditional sources, but is also robust enough to stand with spectrometry to differentiate between paint and foliage, or recognizing radar decoys, because the signal lacks unintentional characteristics of the real radar system. "

William K. Moore²¹

As defined by William Moore, MASINT is a technologically intensive intelligence gathering sub-discipline, which relies extensively on Information gathering from various technological sensors/systems such as Airborne Electro-Optical Sensors;(Figure 4) Infrared; Optical Measurement of Nuclear Explosions; LASER based sensors; Spectroscopic sensors; Hyper spectral Imagery; Space-based Staring Infrared Sensors; Nuclear sensors involving Radiation surveys and dosimeter on airborne and space based platforms; Space-based Nuclear Energy Detection; Geophysical sensors for detecting underground facilities/bunkers such as the Weather and Sea

Intelligence sensors, Acoustic Sensors; Seismic, Magnetic Sensors based on Magnetic Anomaly Detection using scalar and vector magnetometers for detection of buried weapon systems and minefields; Gravimetric Sensors involving Superconducting Quantum Interference Device gradiometer; Radar, such as Line-of-Sight Radar, Synthetic Aperture Radar (SAR)(Figure 5), BoomSAR using an ultra-wideband low-frequency SAR for validating electromagnetic models and develop target detection algorithms and Inverse Synthetic Aperture Radar (ISAR), involving Non-Cooperative Target Recognition, Multi-static and Passive Covert Radar with one of the primary aims of Coherent change detection; and other sensors involving analysis of CBRN Materials, such as non-dispersive infrared analyzer and gas chromatographs coupled to mass spectrometers and surface acoustic wave technology based Chemical Agent Detector for Chemical Explosives and IED detection; Biological warfare sensors involving Analytical methods such ELISA, Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR), Liquid chromatography-mass spectrometry (LC-MS), and high performance liquid chromatography (HPLC).



Figure 4: Electro Optical(Left above) and IR (Right above based MASINT Images.²²

Source : Freye Jeffrey, Naval Postgraduate School US



Figure 5: Synthetic Aperture Radar SAR(left above) based MASI NT Image and Airborne platforms with Sensor range (Right above).²³

Source: Freye Jeffrey t, Naval Postgraduate School US.

PLATFORM	SENSOR	RANGE (meters)
P-3	EO/IR	75000
P-3	SAR	200000
RC-135	SIGINT	300000
RQ-1	EO/IR	50000
RQ-1	SAR	200000
RQ-4	EO/IR	75000
RQ-4	SAR	200000
RQ-4	SIGINT	300000
U-2	EO/IR	100000
U-2	SAR	250000
U-2	SIGINT	400000

1.1.4 Open source intelligence (OSINT)

“95% of the information an enterprise needs can be acquired through open means”.

**Henry Stiller,
Director General of Histen Riller**

As referred by Henry Stiller, one of the contemporary changes with intelligence setup) is with respect to the vast amount of information in open domain. With the use of the Internet, people around the world are extensively sharing information on the net, and in most of the cases, potential adversaries utilize it for orchestrating their nefarious designs. In view of this phenomenon, a new sub-discipline is extensively emerging, which is known as the Open Source Intelligence (OSINT). This sub discipline relies extensively on open media such as the news, blogs, social media such as Twitter, Facebook, YouTube etc., online forums, chat rooms and so on (Figure 6).



Figure 6: Open Source Information on Al Qaeda and affiliate terrorist Organizations on websites (Bottom left: regarding IED making techniques, Bottom Right: Radical comments posting along with planning etc.), YouTube, Facebook (Radical Material and recruitment information) etc.

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This vast amount of information, in most of the cases, holds the key to a potential crime which the only challenge is to extract these in patterns from this plethora of information. Here again, technology is playing the key role in extracting

these patterns almost equivalent to the extraction of a needle in a haystack. The first step is to extract target information from the internet/other open sources, one of the key technologies used in it is, crawler engine (Figure 7).




Figure 7: Social Network analysis of Al Qaeda and affiliate terrorist Organizations. Source: FMS Advanced Systems Group²⁴

This is in principle, an autonomous program which crawls the interconnected web of information, subsequently indexing them using techniques such as Suffix tree with linear time lookup, Inverted index with atomic search criterion, Citation index with Bibliometrics, Ngram indexing, Document-term matrix etc.²⁵ Then techniques such as tokenization, Document parsing, natural language processing, word boundary disambiguation, tagging, text segmentation, content analysis, text analysis, text mining, concordance generation, speech segmentation, lexical analysis are used to convert them into logical elements.²⁶ These elements, which by using statistical techniques such as correlation, factor analysis, and time series analysis along with ontology²⁷ and taxonomy involving creation of Individuals instances, Classes, Attributes, Relations, Function terms, Restrictions, Rule, Axioms and Events, are subsequently used to generate models, with the primary goal of semantic extraction of patterns (Figure 7). These models and patterns when corroborated with other sources of information, in most of the cases, actually point to credible intelligence and if not then, a suitable starting point for the next phase of intelligence gathering.

1.1.5 Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and Imagery intelligence (IMINT)

Geospatial intelligence is an intelligence gathering sub-discipline which involves the analysis of geospatial information and imagery with respect to Geographically referenced adversary activities. GEOINT involves spatial and imaging technologies such as photogrammetry which is based on optics and projective geometry and uses algorithms such as Levenberg-Marquardt algorithm; Cartography; Remote sensing involving passive remote sensors such as film photography, infrared, charge-coupled devices, and radiometers and Active sensors such as RADAR like Interferometric synthetic aperture radars, Laser altimeters, Radiometers, photometers, LiDAR, multi-spectral and hyperspectral sensors; Terrain Analysis; and Stereo-photogrammetry, with feeds from sensors such as the SPOT 6 and 7 Satellites producing Automatic orthoimage with location accuracy of 10 m; simultaneous acquisition of panchromatic and multispectral imagery of 1.5 m panchromatic (0.455 [im] - 0.745 [im]) 6 m multispectral, 4 bands: blue (0.455 [im] - 0.525 [im]), green (0.530

[im] - 0.590 [im]), red (0.625 [im] - 0.695 [im]), near-infrared (0.760 [im] - 0.890 [im]), Pan-sharpened: 1.5-m colour merge combining panchromatic and four multispectral bands²⁸; Digital Elevation Terrain Models; Map Projection systems and datum analysis; GPS and GNSS Mashups; Spatial Databases; and Applied Multivariate Statistical Analysis.

1.2 Phase 2: Intelligence Analysis and Technology

“One of the effects of living with electric information is that we live habitually in a state of information overload. There’s always more than you can cope with.”

-Marshall McLuhan

Intelligence analysis is one of the most critical phases of the intelligence cycle, as it is the process, which extracts tangible results in the form of actionable input, by correlating and analyzing information under certain context, for a necessary objective. Technology plays a key role in enabling intelligence analysts by providing mechanisms to extract patterns. One of the first steps in this phase is in regard to collaboration of information in a common grid i.e. the data fusion, for generating collaborative frameworks. This involves highly customized data warehouses for different types of data such as text, web and semantic data, SIGINT data, geo referencing of maps, images, spatial data involving normalization of coordinate systems, projections, datum etc. and infusion in a spatial MIS based GIS interface as subsequent feeder to analytical reasoning modules.

Once it is achieved, the next process involves Knowledge management, analytical reasoning and pattern extraction tools and technologies, which are used so as to enhance the Intelligence analysis and include modeling tools based on Colored Petri nets algorithms; Influence nets that can be used for modeling and analysis of effects based operations; temporal modeling and analysis critical incidents, events/activities of interest to identify hidden patterns of temporal relations; Stochastic Opponent Modeling Agents; Cultural Adversarial Game Engines; Bayesian Belief Networks and influence diagrams; graphical decision-theoretic model Causal Analysis based on uncertain causal reasoning for forecasting (uncertain prediction of future

events) and inference from evidence (analysis of how observation of modeled events change both our future forecasts, and our understanding of events in the past); Predictive Environment Generation along with statistical techniques such as correlation, factor analysis, and time series analysis.²⁹

Subsequent to the construction of the specified models for pattern extraction, a key requirement,

which emerges, is the visual analysis of the produced data (Figure 8}. The visual analysis of these models makes it easier for the analyst to comprehend the granular details and subsequently exacting valuable intelligence out of the plethora of data, by correlating it with the context and the objective of the whole intelligence cycle. Here again, visual analysis technologies play a critical role.




Figure 8: Multi-source fusion of information and extraction of patterns along with visual analysis as an aid to conventional Intelligence analysis.³⁰

Source: Green Tim, "Mumbai terrorist attack", Visual analysis, 10th February 2009, Updated on 24th March 2012, Version 1.2 GSA 2009, Available at: www.visualanalysis.com

1.3 Phase 3: Intelligence Dissemination and Technology

"Information can tell us everything. It has all the answers. But they are answers to questions we have not asked, and which doubtless don't even arise."

-Jean Baudrillard

The final phase of the intelligence cycle is with regard to dissemination of intelligence to the decision makers, hence completing the complete cycle. Here again, technology plays a critical role, especially by providing secure and survivable networks for dissemination of information based on the premise of confidentiality, availability, non-repudiation and integrity.³¹ In order to

achieve this, multi-redundant networks should be designed with strong Encryption systems preferably mil grade 512 bit key symmetric encryption, accompanied with strong multi-factor authentication, preferably biometric system.

This should be accompanied with Intrusion detection/prevention systems, Proxy integrated Gateway firewalls, Network behavior analyzers, UTM, Application sandboxes, Integrity management systems with event logging, secure operating system specifically hardened for high grade security, disk encryption systems, hardware configuration management/alert systems, data ware houses with disaster management systems along with multi redundant active-active mode high availability clusters etc.³² All these mechanisms will ensure a multi level security system with integrated survivability mechanisms supporting a secure intelligence dissemination system. Although, survivability and security are the key requirements in this phase, the aesthetics are again a critical component especially in the visual representation of information to the decision makers. These visual systems should have back correlation and linkages to all the phases of intelligence cycle, which may be required during the final briefing to the decision maker. Also, the system for dissemination should have a feedback loop, which may induce the strategic directives and necessary comments to intelligence cycle for further refining the information. All of the above are extensively technology driven processes, thus reiterating the fact that technology is a vital component in every arena of Intelligence.

2. CONCLUSION

"Intelligence is an intellectual process. Regardless of the means by which it is collected, the ultimate product is the result of smart people pondering what is known, what is unknown and trying to determine what it all means."

Mark Lowenthal^{B3}

As referred by Dr. Lowenthal, Intelligence is an intellectual process, which ultimately relies on the intelligence of the man behind the machine. Technology can enable this person by acting as a force multiplier, thus enhancing his productivity and capacity to handle information, thus enabling him to identify answers to the question, which in itself is unknown. This paper has beyond doubt proven the fact that technology plays and will play, a critical role in every aspect of intelligence cycle i.e. the Intelligence gathering; intelligence analysis and intelligence dissemination; and in a way has revolutionized the way in which, intelligence as an intellectual process has evolved. The impact of technology in the various disciplines of intelligence such as Human Intelligence (HUMINT), Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial intelligence (GEOINT), Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT), Imagery intelligence (IMINT), Open source intelligence (OSINT) etc. is without any doubt indelible. The author predicts that, as technology is evolving, the discipline of intelligence will also evolve to a level where technology would become an inseparable component that will metamorphose from a tactical force multiplier to a strategic enabler.

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Window into the World of Intelligence

Shri M.K. Rathindran, IPS (Retd.)

As I proceeded to join IB Headquarters on a hot summer day in May, 1967, the magnificent structures of North and South Blocks of the Central Secretariat, silhouetted in the distance seemed particularly awe-inspiring. Having crossed the North Block, I walked in the direction of the South Block. Behind me the words "Liberty will not descend to a people. People must raise themselves to Liberty. It is a blessing that must be earned before it can be enjoyed", stood out from the façade of North Block. Very queer, I thought. Wasn't liberty one's birth right! Even after 20 years of independence, why should such imperialist slogans be allowed to remain, I thought to myself as I journeyed through the labyrinthine corridors of the huge building to report to the AD/Establishment. Herbert Barker's "Seat of Government", described by later day communists as the 'citadel of reaction', was indeed a very imposing one and housed all the important ministries.

Fresh from the spoilt comforts of district life, joining the IB was a harsh revelation. Without the trappings of any authority or any material help, one felt quite lost in the colourless anonymity of Delhi life. The IB Training School was situated in a distant area in Anand Parbat, housed in a rather dilapidated building. The training was professional and we familiarized ourselves in the various nuances of Intelligence Trade Craft, walking through the back alleys of Ajmal Khan Road on various surveillance exercises. After two months of training, we were posted at Headquarters, and I was thrilled to be included in a group headed by Shri R N Kao. The training in his group was a very elaborate affair and included tours to 5 states, including the newly emerged Naxalbari. Finally, I was given the charge of a desk and was privileged to share a room with Shri M K Narayanan.

Analyzing endless reports, culling the essence and finding trends, was no ordinary task. All this required a great deal of time and we, very soon, got into the habit of sitting late in office. Friday meetings were particularly interesting when all officers got together to review developments of the week. Soon after, I was sent for the Advanced Course in Mount Abu. I returned in January 1968. The IB, soon after, was bifurcated and moved to North Block, while the RAW remained in South Block itself. Here as well, I had the privilege of sharing a room with Shri Narayanan.

Shri B N Mullick had retired in 1964, after a term of 14 years as DIB and had been replaced by Shri S.P. Verma, an IG from Bihar. Even in 1967, the shadow of Mr Mullick still lurked in the corridors of the IB, where he had stridden like a colossus. Shri M M L Hooja, who presided over the dissolution of the IB empire in 1968, was ably assisted by his second in command, Shri A K Dave. Things were very difficult and the relations with the new organisation, RAW were strained. Apart from bifurcating some of the border SIBs, reallocating personnel, division of assets etc caused many difficulties. Shri A K Dave was a brilliant and impressive Police officer who had a style of his own. His subordinates disliked him for his treatment of juniors. In fact, when it was rumoured that Shri Dave was returning to the IB from his tenure as Director, ARC, early in 1968, two conflicting groups of officers sought divine intervention regarding Shri Dave's posting. On the one hand, officers in the ARC who wanted to see him go early, were breaking coconuts at the famous Ganesh Temple in Trivandrum, even while officers of the IB were also offering coconuts at the same temple, to ensure that Shri Dave did not come back to the IB. Needless to say, the impassioned pleas of the ARC officers were more than a match to those of the IB, and

Shri Dave was posted back to the IB. He later resigned from service in 1972 and joined the ITC, which he headed with great distinction for a number of years.

The IB, shorn of its international burden, became a very compact unit with only about 5 JDs, a dozen Deputy and Jt. Dy. Directors and about 2 dozen ADs. The Outstation posts were usually manned by CIOs. The general atmosphere for the ADs in the IB was never riddled with tensions and stresses, despite the unending demands made on it. Since at the senior level, practically all the officers belonged to the IPS, there was never any cause for jealousy or bickering. Even senior officers never pulled rank in dealing with subordinates and there was general informality, quite unknown to uniformed service, which prevailed most of the time. Frayed tempers, shouting at subordinates etc. were unheard of. This surprisingly never caused any insubordination or situations of indiscipline. Work was never discussed publicly, while the lunch clubs in each building gave opportunities for officers to congregate during lunch and indulge in banter. This helped build a camaraderie, seldom witnessed in any Police organisation. The average IB officer was also a shade different from his counterpart in the districts, and could be credited with having an intellectual bent of mind.

With Headquarters work becoming a little stifling, and the lure of the borders captivating me, I opted to go to Leh, which was considered as one of the most difficult stations. Leh, where I remained posted for 2½ years, turned out to be the best and most challenging assignment of my life. Apart from looking after the IB work and check posts, I was also the Area Organiser of the SSB, AD/ARC and Incharge of the CRP. The ITBP also came within my operational control. Working closely with the Army and the Air Force, travelling to the furthestmost remote areas, right from the Karakoram pass through the snowy wilderness and seeing the grandeur of the high peaks and lakes, one really came to like this life. Motoring through some of the highest passes in the world, playing Polo and Cricket at sub zero temperatures and wading through half frozen rivulets of Indus, became highlights, which one remembers even to this day with nostalgia.

For the check post personnel, particularly those who were posted in the Northern sector, things were really tough and survival itself was a triumph. The posts were located above 16,000 thousand feet and the temperatures were below -40 degrees centigrade. Even though I had completed my tenure by Sept 1971, I was asked to continue in Leh, since a war with Pakistan was imminent. Ladakh has areas open to both Pakistan and China and while there was little Chinese activity on the Tibet side during the December war, things became difficult in January 1972. The Chinese used to come close to Demchok post and fire mortars in the direction of our post. While there was enough justification for withdrawing from this area, our boys hung on, saving the embarrassment of withdrawal and were duly rewarded later. On the Pakistan side, the infantry division based in Leh had tremendous success across the LoC. When the ceasefire was announced, all the top brass of the Army and the Airforce in Leh were present for a gala victory dinner that night at the IB mess.

One of the most remarkable experiences in Leh was the time I acquired two snow leopard cubs. I bought these pets from a local villager. They were of the size of two small kittens and proved to be good company to my one year old daughter. Unfortunately, one of them died and a problem soon arose, since it was against the law to keep such rare wild animals in the house. Therefore, I dispatched the cub to one of the forward check posts, where it grew up to be a magnificent animal with a long bushy tail. She was very friendly, particularly with one of our *dhobis* who used to look after her. To escape the clutches of the law, I then hit upon a plan. The Prime Minister Mrs. Gandhi was visiting Leh and I chose the opportunity to discuss the presenting of the snow leopard to Mrs. Gandhi. I spoke to Mr Dutt, JD Security, accompanying the PM, who checked with her and told me to bring the cub to Delhi for presentation.

So "Lucy", one of the rarest snow or clouded leopards in captivity was brought to Delhi in a jonga along with my *dhobi*. Lucy spent one night in my brother's apartment in Bengali market and the next morning I took her to one of the IB offices in Akbar Road to pick up my friend Rattan Sehgal, who had agreed to accompany me to

the PM's house. I opened Rattan's office door leading Lucy on a chain. On seeing the Leopard, Rattan was so bewildered that he made a sudden leap and stood on his table. The leopard not knowing what the fuss was all about, also made a mighty leap and landed on the same table and to the relief of everyone, started licking him. At PM's house, Mrs. Gandhi told me that as much as she would love to keep Lucy, it would not be possible and that she would have to give it to the Delhi Zoo. The Zoo Director was summoned and a presentation ceremony was held. In later days, I used to go and visit Lucy in her cage at the Zoo. In summer months, she would be sent off to Shimla. Lucy unfortunately did not survive for long and left behind fond memories.

In the summer of 1972, I was posted to SIB Trivandrum, indeed a model SIB, which I headed for almost 10 years, in two stints. Each district was headed by a DCIO with a complement of lower staff. Since the whole State was compact, every nook and corner was covered by the IB. Intelligence work was of a very high quality and there were very few gaps in coverage. Mr Mullick had ensured that top quality officers were available to the State during the communist rule and so, a galaxy of people like S/Shri A.C.N. Nambiar, Raveendran, M K Narayanan and Gopalakrishna Menon were Incharge right from 1955. The IB's presence in the State was far reaching and we did not function in complete secrecy. The term Central Intelligence was widely known and it carried a certain degree of awe. So much so, that when our DCIO's house in Calicut was burgled by common thieves, the *Deshabhimani*, the Marxist Party's mouthpiece headlined the event on its front page as "Ants eat through burning coals". That is to say that the fortress of an organisation considered impregnable and unassailable was trespassed into by ordinary mortals.

The politics of Kerala had always been hyper subtle and tortuous and even a minor event could rock the fragile coalition, frequently functioning with a wafer-thin majority. In the State, the IB officer also functioned as an Adviser to the Governor. Armed with the power of precise intelligence, the CIO could use his clout to get many things done.

In 1975, as part of an arrangement between the Secretary RAW and DIB, some IB officers of the

rank of ADs were sent to the RAW for a five-year term in order to be posted abroad. I was selected for the honour. Accordingly, I joined the RAW and was sent off on a posting to the middle East. This experiment of taking officers from the IB for foreign postings, however, did not last, largely because the RAW did not want to fill up their foreign posts with IB officers. The experience of living in a foreign country as a diplomat under cover and doing intelligence work was very exciting. On return from the RAW, I was earmarked to be sent to the NDC. But before I could join the NDC, I was asked to proceed to Trivandrum since some important intelligence operations were taking place there. Even though I regretted missing out the NDC, the tenure at Trivandrum was very rewarding professionally. I continued at Trivandrum for another 7 years, before I got my promotion and came to Delhi as Joint Director.

After Shri Hooja, Shri Atma Jairam had taken over as DIB. His close friendship with Mr Kao, brought the two organisations very close. Shri Jairam was followed by Shri S.N. Mathur who was succeeded by Shri Rajeshwar, who brought about a lot of reforms and turned the IB into a crack efficient outfit.

In 1987, Shri MK Narayanan took over as DIB. This was a particularly interesting phase in IB's history. With Rajiv Gandhi, who was very interested in the functioning of Intelligence agencies, IB's relations with the PM came on a different footing altogether. The young PM was impressed with the "fine mind" of the new DIB and promised all help. The IB Centenary was celebrated the following year with all the SIBs holding seminars and ensuring the presence of Governors, CMs and intellectuals at these functions. At IB Hqrs, the PM spent an entire day meeting senior and junior officers, visiting the Control Room, going into the technical possibilities of intelligence work and having tea with a wide cross section of IB employees. He also attended a dinner at the DIB's house later that evening. At an impressive meeting in Vigyan Bhawan earlier in the day, attended by all the top political and bureaucratic elite, Rajiv Gandhi said that no intelligence agency could function on bureaucratic lines. He wanted the IB to break out of its bureaucratic mould and become a true intelligence agency.

He even suggested separate pay scales for the IB, promising every help. Unfortunately most of his promises could not be fulfilled, since he lost power soon after. Thanks to the PM, the IB's resources soon improved radically and the organisation itself became an efficient and elite one. During Shri M.K. Narayanan's term, the IB's stock soared to dizzy heights.

In 1987, I had assumed the charge of JD at Headquarters. Twenty years after my Ladakh posting, the border fever persisting, I volunteered to go to Shillong in 1989. JD, Shillong had the charter of looking after the seven sisters (at that time Sikkim was not included) and the long border with Burma, Bangladesh and Tibet. With a large territory which involved hours of travelling by chopper, there never was a dull moment. The Mizo insurgency had died down but Nagaland, Tripura and Manipur were in ferment.

In 1990, the Ulfa movement peaked and as expected all hell broke loose in Assam. In the wake of a break down of the law and order machinery, President's Rule was imposed. 'Operation Bajrang' by the Army was carried out and though the Ulfa movements were restricted, it was only after the next Operation Rhino that near normalcy was restored. But throughout 1990, one lived in the shadow of unprecedented violence. Murders, kidnapping, etc. were resorted to in front of the Police Stations. The IB was at the top of Ulfa's hit list and travelling became a big problem. Two of our junior officers were also kidnapped and only one of them could be saved.

After I left Shillong and returned to Delhi in 1991, the Army requested for my services during 'Operation Rhino', and once again I had to return to Guwahati for a short while. The reason was that I had good relations with the Army and during 'Operation Bajrang', I had even persuaded IB Headquarters to supplement the Corps Intelligence operations with some badly needed funds. In those hard days, one never thought of separate organisations, but lent a helping hand towards achieving a common cause. The two years spent in the North East were hectic and rewarding. One traversed the far flung idyllic spots all along the borders, studying the vast panorama of India with its vastly different geography and ethnicity.

In 1990, Shri M.K. Narayanan was transferred as Chairman JIC and Shri Joshi took over as DIB. The next year, however, Shri Narayanan returned as DIB and continued till his retirement. But his stewardship of the IB continued for several years even after his retirement. As advisor to the PM and later as National Security Advisor, Shri Narayanan maintained close links with the IB. The IB will always remain beholden to him for his guidance.

Part of the charm in having been in the IB is the varied kind of jobs one got to learn. On return from Shillong, I was allotted the counter intelligence portfolio. Catching spies was a very rewarding work and perhaps there was nothing as satisfying as seeing your target finally being nabbed, after a testing time. In this, you had to pit your brains against some of the very clever and experienced intelligence officers in various Embassies, who were using vastly superior gadgets. Very often, the good work of the counter intelligence departments could not be publicized due to diplomatic niceties and protocol. However, when Indian agents were involved, the press always got a chance to mention it. This is one aspect of IB work, where the credit always is given to the local Police. Some years later, as Additional Director (Operations), we had several successes against Pak terrorist modules, who were nabbed by the Delhi Police at our instance. Though the IB's contribution is always recognized by the Government and a few knowledgeable circles, the credit is always given to the local Police. This is part of the IB work profile and nobody grudges it. As head of the CI unit, we had some memorable successes, particularly against some diplomats of Western countries in Delhi, who had targeted the IB.

I recall an interesting incident about the activities of an extremist organisation. In May 1992, the Ministry of Defence, which was expecting a consignment of missiles and other military hardware from Russia, informed the IB that along with the defence cargo, a consignment of 20,000 AK-47 rifles and 30 million rounds of ammunition, which was never indented for by MoD, was arriving at the port of Cochin. The consignment had been fully paid for and \$4 million had been transferred through some Swiss banks and manifested as defence cargo for the Ministry of Defence. Since the whole thing

was very suspicious, the MoD wanted the IB to investigate. The ship was expected to berth in Cochin the next day. That very night, I led a team of IB officers and reached Cochin. Without taking either the Navy, Coastguard or the Customs into confidence, we decided to wait for the claimant of the consignment. The ship, "Bratislava", berthed on the morning of May 18 and some of our officers, posing as Customs officials went on board and examined the packages. The consignment was unloaded along with the other defence cargo while we waited.

Even after 48 hours of unobtrusive watch, no one came to claim the packages. We then opened up some packages, satisfied ourselves that it contained genuine AK-47 rifles, and then dispatched the entire consignment in two trains to the Ordnance Depot, Jabalpur, making the depot richer by \$4 million.

Our enquiries, subsequently, revealed that this consignment, in all probability was meant for the LTTE. Normally all ships from Russian ports carrying defence cargo would come directly to Cochin. In this case the "Bratislava" had docked in a port near Yemen for 14 days before coming to Cochin. The fact that \$4 million had already been paid by some foreign agency and the MoD stamps and signatures had been forged on the certificates of origin, clearly indicated that there was a foul play. The LTTE was known to have the capacity for piracy on the high seas and had earlier effected transshipments off the port of Cyprus. In this case, apparently, due to circumstances beyond their control, the LTTE was unable to offload the shipment at the Yemen port or in the high seas.


One shudders to think what would have happened if the consignment had fallen into wrong hands and ended up with the extremists or the insurgent groups. Though no one group had the capacity to absorb such a huge quantity of arms, it was known that groups like ULFA were maintaining links with LTTE and could have sought its assistance to provide the weapons. Our presence at the docks could have thrown a spanner into the works and blown up their entire plans.

At the fag end of my service, I was promoted as Special Director and took over the responsibilities of VIP security. Work was very routine, though full of anxious moments and often punctuated with advance liaison visits abroad to destinations like South America and other far flung regions. One really saw the world during these visits and was compensated for an otherwise desultory work.

Though fundamentally a Police Organisation, the IB vastly differs in many ways from other Police services in the states. The pandering to authority is hardly visible and succumbing to political pressure is totally absent. Since colleagues are from various States, one gradually gets to imbibe a culture which is national rather than parochial. The exposure to International developments and issues is vast and training courses in various aspects, of Police and security work are multifarious. As the premier Police organisation, IB officers are always sent for many training courses. Liaison sessions with foreign Police and security departments are frequent and all these help to broaden the outlook of officers. Being posted to the far corners of the country also brings about a national outlook which is very valuable and vital.

Looking back on the years spent in the Bureau, I feel humbled at the opportunities I had received in the IB, the biggest one being the opportunity to travel, study and in some ways to make a difference for the better, in far flung areas of our country. The IB's active presence in these border regions has always brought about a marked change. Many of the Accords in the region, particularly the Mizo and the Tripura ones were the result of, or brokered by the IB. While ones own life benefitted through the valuable "experience" gained, one also had the opportunity to make a small difference in these areas. The IB's yeoman service to preserve the integrity of the nation must rank as one of its foremost contributions to this country. In furtherance of the objectives to preserve this integrity, a number of human lives have been lost and it is to these heroes that I would like to pay homage today.

The Unsung Heroes



The Intelligence Bureau personnel work under a shroud and in a veil of secrecy, their achievements are not acknowledged publicly. They work without any protection in disturbed areas, infested by insurgency, terrorism and left wing extremism. The personnel of Intelligence Bureau are deployed ahead of the Army in some border posts, and unarmed they keep vigil, being the eyes and ears of the Nation.

From the frozen heights of the Himalayas to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea, Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean, and the vast landmass in between, the personnel of the organisation, grapple with the widest array of challenges from inimical quarters, estranged sections of the society and subversive elements, committed to causing disruption. In fact, the personnel of Intelligence Bureau, in order to protect national security have their fundamental rights abridged under Intelligence Organisations (Restrictions of Rights) Act, 1985.

The personnel of the Intelligence Bureau, have with unwavering commitment stood to protect the sovereignty and integrity of the nation. Unknown to many the Intelligence Bureau personnel have offered the Supreme Sacrifice for the Nation and continue to remain unsung and unknown martyrs.

The Martyrs from Intelligence Bureau, who sacrificed their today for our tomorrow are.....

Name	Rank/Designation	Date of Martyrdom
Inato Sumi	S.A.	NA
Ramprakash	Constable	September 19, 1965
Phendo	Constable	September 19, 1965
Ningey	Constable	September 19, 1965
Sapula	Constable	January 1, 1968
C.K. Francis	Constable	August 2, 1969
Loktsu	S.A.	January 30, 1970
Sonam Topden	JIO-I	January 1, 1971
Yogendra Jha	S.A.	April 24, 1971
Megh Nath Banerjee	ACIO-II/G	September 1, 1971
Bhaben Saikya	JIO-I/G	May 17, 1973
Anant Kumar	ACIO-II	January 1, 1974
B.P. Singh	JIO-I/G	January 1, 1974

Name	Rank/Designation	Date of Martyrdom
Mam Chander	ACIO-II/G	June 23, 1982
Satish Kumar Varma	ACIO-II/G	June 2, 1983
Phu Dorjee	ACIO-I/G	May 26, 1986
Gurnam Singh	JIO-I/G	December 1, 1987
Bhupen Das	S.A.	March 29, 1989
Krishan Gopal	ACIO-I/G	January 9, 1990
R.N.P. Singh	ACIO-I/G	January 31, 1990
M.L. Bhan	ACIO-II/G	January 15, 1990
Jasbir Singh	JIO-II/G	February 11, 1990
T.K. Razdan	ACIO-I/WT	February 12, 1990
Nachattar Singh	JAD	June 4, 1990
Bijit Debnath	S.A.	June 28, 1990
Md. Rafiq Rather	S.A.	July 10, 1990
A.K. Saikia	JIO-II/G	December 26, 1990
C.T. Chandi	JIO-II/G	September 10, 1991
R.B. Chetri	JIO-II/G	June 11, 1991
S.S. Pandey	ACIO-II/G	May 1, 1994
Yeheto Sema	JIO-I/G	December 12, 1994
K.T.C. Nunga	S.A./G	May 3, 1995
A.D. Sharma	ACIO-II	July 19, 1995
Krishan Lal Sharma	ACIO-II/G	October 17, 1996
Katoshe Yeptho	S.A./G	November 26, 1996
Chandra Sekar Mandal	JIO-II/MT	February 17, 1997
Birendra Nath Medak	A.D.	September 3, 1997
Soumitra Kumar Das	JIO-I/WT	February 16, 2000
Dawa Sherpa	JIO-I/G	September 24, 2005
Vinod Kumar	JIO-I/WT	April 12, 2006

